

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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May 1972

SOVIETIZING RELUCTANT RELIGIONS

Two recent events, a "Lenten Letter" addressed to the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church by Nobel Prize-winning author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and a petition sent to the United Nations Secretary General by 17,000 Lithuanian Roman Catholics have served to refocus world attention on the continuing persecution of religious groups within the USSR and on the dilemma that "religion" poses for the Soviet regime.

The Lenten Letter

In his open letter to Patriarch Pimen, Solzhenitsyn highlights both the hypocrisy and the duality of Soviet policies regarding religion at home and abroad. He accuses Pimen of being a tool of the atheist Soviet state who passively acquiesces in regime efforts to stamp out the church within the Soviet Union while serving Soviet propaganda abroad in its efforts to portray the USSR as a country in which complete religious freedom exists. Recalling that Pimen's New Year's message had appealed to the Russian faithful abroad to raise their children to love the church, Solzhenitsyn notes that "perhaps for the first time in half a century, you finally spoke about the religious upbringing of children." He then asks, "But what is the purpose of all this; why is your earnest appeal directed only to Russian emigres; why do you call only on those children to be brought up in the Christian faith; why do you admonish only the distant flock to 'discern slander and falsehood' and be strong in truth and justice; and we---what should we discern; should we or should we not foster in our own children a love for the church?"

Given Solzhenitsyn's moral authority and the worldwide publicity his statement has been receiving---with much of this publicity filtering back into the Soviet Union---this denunciation of Pimen (and indirectly of state-controlled spiritual heads of other religious bodies in the USSR) may have widespread repercussions not only within the Russian Orthodox Church but throughout the religious communities in the Soviet Union. The "Lenten Letter" marks the first time since Stalin's death that a public figure of Solzhenitsyn's stature has openly demanded greater religious freedom for Soviet citizens and denounced the compliance of church leaders with the Kremlin's anti-religious measures.

Solzhenitsyn portrays the futility of a religious man under the yoke of the totalitarian atheist Soviet regime as he dissolves the veneer of "religious freedom" in the USSR to indict the Kremlin with specific charges of officially administered religious persecution.

He captures the substance as well as the essence of repression, not only of Orthodox believers, but also of Moslems, Jews, Catholics, Protestants and others in the USSR in the following excerpts from his letter:

"The entire administration of the church, the appointment of priests and bishops (including even sacrilegious churchmen who make it easier to deride and destroy the church), all of this is secretly managed by the Council for Religious Affairs. A church dictatorially ruled by atheists is a sight not seen in two thousand years.

"Priests are powerless within their own parishes; only the conduct of church services is still entrusted to them, and even then, only if they remain within the church building. But if they wish to visit the bedside of the sick or a cemetery they must first ask for approval by the city council.

"For every functioning church, there are twenty that have been razed or irretrievably ruined and another twenty are in a state of neglect or profanation. How many populated places are there in this country where the closest church is one hundred or even two hundred kilometers away? Any attempt on the part of the church activists, donors or bequestors to restore even the smallest church is blocked...

"...after the baptizing of infants, all of the child's associations with the church usually cease. The doors to a religious upbringing are tightly shut against them. They are barred from participating in church services, taking communion and, perhaps, even from attending church. The right to propagate the faith of our fathers has been broken, as well as the right of parents to bring up their children within the precepts of their own world outlook. And you, leaders of the church, have yielded to this and condoned it by accepting as reliable evidence of religious freedom the fact that we must place our defenseless children not into neutral hands but into those of the most primitive and unscrupulous kind of atheistic propagandists.

"We do not even ask about the pealing of church bells. Why is Russia deprived of her ancient adornment, her most beautiful voice?

"There are even no gospel books---these are brought to us from abroad....

"Why was it necessary for me to show my passport when I came to church to baptize my son? With what sort of canonical demands must the Moscow Patriarchate comply in

registering the souls of those who are being baptized? One must wonder at the spiritual strength of the parents and at the fathomless spiritual resistance inherited through the ages with which they go through this denunciatory registration and must later face the persecution at their place of employment or the public ostracism of ignoramuses."

The Catholics

In February of this year more than 17,000 Lithuanian Roman Catholics, in the largest known open protest of its kind ever experienced in the Soviet Union, petitioned the United Nations because "believers in our republic cannot enjoy the rights set out in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." (The declaration, passed by the UN with the Soviet Union abstaining, calls for the recognition of religious freedom by all countries.) Among the specific charges of religious persecution cited by the Lithuanians were:

"Soviet officials limit the number of new priests to be trained and control the assignment of priests to parishes. No more than 10 youths a year can enter the seminary. There are so few priests in Lithuania that one must often serve two or three parishes and that even invalid and aged priests must work.

"Catholics have not been allowed to rebuild churches destroyed during World War II and have difficulty in getting permission to hold services in private homes.

"Two parish priests were sent to labor camps for providing religious instructions to youngsters. Two bishops were exiled without trial.

"The authorities do not enforce a law which would punish those who persecute church-goers."

There are an estimated 3.5 million Roman Catholics in the Soviet Union, most of them ethnic Lithuanians and Poles living in Lithuania and in western parts of Belorussia and the Ukraine. Lithuania, with a current population slightly over 2.5 million, is the largest single Catholic area with an estimated 500 churches still operating. Prior to its annexation into the USSR in 1940, well over 80% of the population of Lithuania belonged to the Roman Catholic Church.

Catholicism has been strong and influential in Lithuania through several centuries and is deeply engrained in the Lithuanian national identity. Unlike the Orthodox Church, whose spiritual head, Pimen, rules from Moscow, the Lithuanian Catholics fall under

the spiritual domain of the Pope, in Rome. Lithuanian Communist Party attempts to sever these ties by forming a state-sponsored National Lithuanian Church in 1952 were abandoned because of stiff resistance by church leaders. Although the church still remains within the spiritual realm of the Vatican, part of the price for its survival is the Lithuanian Catholic leaders' public support for Soviet foreign policy objectives.

The Moslems

Islam, next to Orthodoxy, has the second largest following in the Soviet Union. Official figures published in 1912, gave the number of Moslems in Imperial Russia as 16.2 million. According to Radio Moscow, following the 1959 census, there were some 30 million Moslems in the USSR. This figure is obviously based on nationality rather than on active religious affiliation. The most recent Soviet census, of 1970, lists the greatest percentage gains of population since 1959 for those areas inhabited largely by Moslems, so that today the number of ethnic Moslems in the USSR may be well in excess of 40 million. There are no reliable figures on the number actively engaged in Islam worship. In 1912, however, there were over 26,000 mosques in Imperial Russia, whereas in 1959 the last date for which official figures are available, Tashkent Radio placed the number of mosques at about 1200.

The position of Islam in the USSR is unique in several respects: it is the sole religion practiced by over 30 more or less compact but distinct nationalities, among whom it serves as a cultural bond. The traditional Islamic way of life, although to some extent affected by Westernization, especially in the towns, remains as a whole far more distinct and particularist than that associated with any other religion or ideology; the Moslem peoples of the USSR have much closer cultural, social and biological affinities with the non-Soviet Moslem peoples living adjacent to them than with any of the non-Moslem Soviet nationalities*.

Today, Moslem leaders give full support to Soviet policies as the price for the continued existence of their institutions and the practice of their faith. Like the other main religious bodies of the Soviet Union, the followers of Islam, too, are controlled by the Council for Religious Affairs which is centrally directed by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Some state repressive measures peculiar to Islam are:

*Religion and the Soviet State - A Dilemma of Power, Max Hayward and William C. Fletcher, 1969.

- The Hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca which is the canonical obligation of every believer once in his lifetime if he has the material means) has long been banned to the rank and file Soviet Moslem. For external propaganda purposes, small groups of usually not more than 20 Moslems, selected primarily for their devotion to the Soviet regime, are occasionally flown to Mecca at state expense amidst much publicity directed to areas of the Middle East by Radio Moscow.

- Since 1955, Soviet authorities have permitted the publication of only three small editions of the Koran. The latest edition came out in 1969 in 5,000 copies. It is printed in old Arabic, however, and therefore, cannot be read by most Central Asians, who do not even know the script in which their own languages were once written.

The Jews

Unlike the official status accorded to the other main faiths recognized in the Soviet Union, Judaism has not been allowed to establish any form of central organization to administer the Jewish communities scattered throughout the Soviet Union. The 1970 Soviet census lists 2.1 million ethnic Jews in the USSR. The number of active believers of Judaism is not available nor are official statistics on the number of practicing synagogues remaining in the USSR. One source gives the number of recognized synagogues in 1965 as 62. By contrast, the number of synagogues in 1941 was 1,011 while in 1926 1,003 registered Hebrew communities had existed in the Ukraine alone.

Official measures of persecution peculiar to Judaism included:

- The rite of circumcision, allegedly symbolizing the concept of the "chosen people" has been attacked with particular vehemance. Information on the medical value of circumcision reportedly does not even appear in Soviet medical journals.

- The observance of Passover with its national overtones, for example, the phrase "next year in Jerusalem" with which the Seder, the traditional Passover ceremony ends, has also been strongly discouraged.

- The baking of matzos (unleavened bread eaten by Jews during the Passover) has been made very difficult and except for a very limited supply baked in Moscow, it is virtually unavailable.

The Protestants

Officially Russian Protestantism was a protest against Tsarist state intervention in the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. It was made up of numerous sects, the two most important being the Evangelical Christians and the Baptists. In marked contrast to other religious groups in the USSR, the Evangelical Christians and Baptists, with a total membership of only about 100,000 in 1914, were treated with an attitude of positive benevolence by the new Soviet regime in the first few years after the Revolution. As a consequence, by 1928 there were about 4 million Evangelical Christians in some 3200 congregations in the USSR. The year 1929 marked the beginning of almost continuous severe repression of the sects, primarily over their resistance to the collectivization of agriculture. Many members of the sects were deported to Siberia. Many died en route to or in labor camps. By 1941 the number of congregations was reduced to approximately 1,000. In 1945 the Evangelical Christians and Baptists, together with several other small denominations, were united in the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian-Baptists (the VSEKhB, from the Russian initials). Since its inception, the VSEKhB, managed and controlled by the Council on Religious Affairs, has been at pains to preserve correct relations with the Soviet authorities. In 1962 the VSEKhB claimed 545,000 full members in its application for membership in the World Council of Churches. Today, outside sources estimate the figure as high as 1.5 million full members and a total community of 3 million.

In 1965, a group of Baptists calling themselves "Initsiativniki" broke away from the VSEKhB in protest of its leaders' compromises with the Soviet regime. Demanding complete freedom of religion, the dissident Baptists have established themselves into well organized illegal (unregistered with the Council of Religious Affairs) communities. In disregard for Soviet laws and repressive measures, they give religious training to their children, print and distribute their own religious literature, some of which attacks the Soviet state, and actively seek new members. Over 500 of their members have been imprisoned in the last ten years.

The Dilemma

Religious protesters play an increasingly important role in the growing civil rights movement in the USSR, as evidenced by the reporting on instances of religious persecution in the Chronicle of Current Events. The Chronicle is a clandestinely circulated samizdat publication issued on a more or less regular schedule of once every two months which, although not yet known to the Soviet masses, is rapidly growing in significance and influence among Soviet intellectuals.

Religion is a dilemma for the Soviet regime. The question faced by Soviet policy makers is not whether religion in general or any specific religion is compatible with communism. Rather, the question is how does religion influence the realities of Soviet power objectives. While Soviet foreign policy objectives require an image of progressive liberalism towards religion (as well as towards the closely related phenomenon of nationalism), Soviet internal objectives, stemming from the multinational make-up of the USSR and involving Kremlin attempts to foster an all-embracing "Soviet nationalism," demand the suppression of religion and nationalism because of their chauvinistic and irredentist tendencies. Since the complete liquidation of religious groups (if this were possible) would severely damage Soviet foreign policy objectives, however, the Kremlin is at pains to maintain a plausible tightly-controlled facade of constitutionally guaranteed "religious freedom" for all of its citizens.

The latter is no easy task, however, for it involves the manipulation of the most subtle human thought processes and emotions as well as the ethnic, racial and spiritual heritage of many centuries of human existence. It is furthermore complicated by a modern world in which racial, ethnic and spiritual identity are more universally sought after than ever before and technology in communications and transportation increasingly facilitates international human exchange.

There are many indications that Soviet attempts to maintain their delicately contrived balancing act regarding religious affairs are experiencing serious difficulties. Solzhenitsyn's Lenten Letter and the Lithuanian protest highlight these difficulties. The samizdat revelations on a continuing and ever-expanding basis, lend considerable substance to what appears to be an increasing interest in religion by a wide variety of Soviets but most pointedly on the part of Soviet intellectuals. The controlled Soviet press, itself, in admitting the ineffectiveness of its own anti-religious propaganda and in chastising youth, intellectuals and even Communist Party members for their interest in religion provides probably the best indication that the problems posed by religion for Soviet policy makers are far from resolved. Furthermore, while this growing interest in religion will almost inevitably tend to increase Kremlin measures of repression and persecution, the growing voice of protest resulting in worldwide publicity of Soviet ambivalence with a potential for damaging Soviet foreign policy objectives will, hopefully, act as a restraint on those in the Kremlin who might otherwise favor a return to Stalinist terror.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 April 1972

CPYRGHT

A Lenten Letter

Today is Easter by the calendar of the Russian Orthodox Church. This is the full text of the letter sent to Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and All the Russias by Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, expressing his deep concern over the state of the church, its subservience to the Soviet state and its failure to defend the cause of the faith in Russia.

By ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN

Most Holy Master!

That—which presses upon the head like a gravestone and crushes the breast of a moribund Russian Orthodox people—is the subject of this letter. Everyone knows this, and it has already been shouted aloud, but everyone has again reverted to a doomed silence. And a small stone needed to be placed on top of the large one to make it no longer possible to remain silent. I was weighed down by such a small stone when I heard your message on Christmas Eve.

I felt a pang at that point when, perhaps for the first time in half a century, you finally spoke about children, suggesting the following precept: that, along with infusing their children with love for their country, parents should foster in them a love for the church (and apparently for faith itself?) and they should strengthen that love by setting a good personal example. I heard this—and saw before me my early childhood, spent in attending many church services, and remembered that initial impression, exceptionally fresh and pure, which later could not be erased by any millstone or mental theory.

But what is the purpose of all this? Why is your earnest appeal directed only to Russian émigrés? Why do you call only on those children to be brought up in the Christian faith, why do you admonish only the distant flock to “discern slander and falsehood” and be strong in truth and justice? And we—what should we discern? Should we or should we not foster in our own children a love for the church? Yes, Christ taught us to search even for the hundredth sheep that is lost—when the remaining ninety-nine are found. But when even the ninety-nine are missing—should we not concern ourselves, first of all, in their behalf?

Why was it necessary for me to show my passport when I came to church to baptize my son? With what sort of canonical demands must the

Moscow Patriarchate comply in registering the souls of those who are being baptized? One must wonder at the spiritual strength of the parents and at the fathomless spiritual resistance inherited through the ages with which they go through this denunciatory registration and must later face the persecution at their place of employment or the public ostracism of ignoramuses.

At this point persistence runs out; after the baptizing of infants all of the child's associations with the church usually cease. The doors to a religious upbringing are tightly shut against them. They are barred from participating in church services, taking communion and, perhaps, even from attending church. We are robbing our children by depriving them of that unrepeatable, purely angelic perception of the church service, which in adult life can never be recaptured nor even understood as to what has been lost.

The right to propagate the faith of our fathers has been broken, as well as the right of parents to bring up their children within the precepts of their own world outlook. And you, leaders of the church, have yielded to this and condoned it by accepting as reliable evidence of religious freedom the fact that we must place our defenseless children not into neutral hands but into those of the most primitive and unscrupulous kind of atheistic propa-

**“The right to propagate
the faith of our fathers
has been broken.”**

gandists. You find evidence of religious freedom in the fact that adolescents torn away from Christianity (God forbid that they should be infected by it) are left with the ravine between the agitator's manual and the criminal code for their moral upbringing.

Half a century of our past history has been neglected. I do not even speak of rescuing the present but how can we save our country's future—the future which will be constituted by today's children? In the final analysis the true and profound destiny of our country will depend on whether the idea of the rightness of power shall be irrevocably implanted in the people's consciousness or whether that darkening

eclipse shall be cleansed and the power of righteousness radiate once again. Will we be able to reinstate within ourselves at least some of the traces of Christianity or shall we lose them completely and surrender ourselves to the calculations of self-preservation and profit?

A study of Russian history in the last few centuries will show that it might have been incomparably more humane and harmonious if the church had not surrendered its independence and the people had listened to its voice, as for example, in Poland. Alas, with us it has been different for a long time.

We were losing and have lost that bright, ethical Christian atmosphere in which our values, way of life, world outlook, folklore and even the word “peasant” have been founded for thousands of years. We are losing the last traces and signs of a Christian people—is it possible that this should not be the main concern of the Russian Patriarch?

The Russian Church has its indignant opinion on every evil in distant Asia or Africa, yet on internal ills—it has none—ever. Why are the messages which we receive from the church hierarchy traditionally tranquil? Why are all church documents so complacent, as if they were issued among the most Christian of peoples? One serene message follows another, in the course of the same inclement year. Will not the need for these messages soon cease altogether? There will no longer be anyone left to whom they should be addressed; the flock will disappear, with the exception of the Patriarchal Chancellery office.

Almost seven years have passed since two honest priests, Yakunin and Eshliman, wrote their famous letter to your predecessor in which they demonstrated through personal sacrifice that the pure flame of the Christian faith has not as yet been extinguished in our country. They described in an extensive and convincing fashion the voluntary internal enslavement of the Russian Church which has reached the point of self-annihilation and asked that anything which was untrue be pointed out to them. But every word was true; none of the hierarchs took

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**"Half a century of
our past history has
been neglected."**

It upon himself to refute them. And how was their letter answered? In a most simple and crude manner: for telling the truth they were forbidden to conduct services. And up to this very day you have not corrected this. The frightening letter of the twelve believers from Vyatka has also remained unanswered; they were only put under pressure. And the only fearless Archbishop, Yermogen of Kaluga, is still in monastic seclusion. It was he who had forbidden the closing of his churches and the burning of icons and books, an accomplishment in which degenerate enraged atheism achieved great success up to 1964 in other diocese.

It is almost seven years now that all of this was said aloud, but what has changed? For every functioning church there are twenty that have been razed or irretrievably ruined and another twenty are in a state of neglect or profanation. Is there a sight more harrowing than these skeletons, the sole domain of birds and store-keepers? How many populated places are there in this country where the closest church is one hundred or even two hundred kilometers away? And our north—that age-old repository of Russian spirit and, perhaps, Russia's most dependable future—is left entirely without churches. Any attempt on the part of church activists, donors

or bequestors to restore even the smallest church is blocked by the one-sided laws of the so-called division of church and state. We dare not even ask about the pealing of church bells. Why is Russia deprived of her ancient adornment, her most beautiful voice? But how can we speak of churches? There are even no gospel books—these are brought to us from abroad, in the same way as our own preachers used to take them to the Indigirka.

This is the seventh year—and has the church asserted itself on anything? The entire administration of the church, the appointment of priests and bishops (including even sacrilegious churchmen who make it easier to deride and destroy the church), all of this is secretly managed by the Council for Religious Affairs. A church dictatorially ruled by atheists is a sight not seen in two thousand years. Also under their control is the church economy and the use of church resources, those coins deposited by the fingers of the devout. Five million rubles are donated to outside funds with magnanimous gestures, while beggars are chased away from the portico and there is no money to repair a leaking roof in a poor parish. Priests are powerless within their own parishes; only the conduct of church services is still entrusted to them, and even then, only if they remain within the church building. But if they wish to visit the bedside of the sick or a cemetery they must first ask for approval of the city council.

What sort of reasoning can be used to convince oneself that the consistent destruction of the spirit and body of the church by atheists is the best

means for its preservation? Preservation for whom? Certainly not for Christ. Preservation by what means? Falsehood? But after falsehood—what sort of hands should perform the Eucharist?

Most Holy Master! Do not scorn entirely my unworthy outcry. You will probably not hear one like it every seven years. Do not let us suppose, not make us think that for the high priests of the Russian Church earthly authority is higher than heavenly authority, earthly responsibility more frightening than responsibility before God.

Let us not deceive the people, and more importantly, let us not deceive ourselves while praying, by thinking that external fetters are stronger than our spirit. It was not any easier at the time of Christianity's birth, but it has survived and flourished and has shown us the way: that of sacrifice. He who is deprived of all material power is always victorious through sacrifice. The same martyrdom worthy of the first centuries was accepted by our priests and fellow believers in our living memory. But at that time they were thrown to the lions today one can only lose well-being.

During these days, when the Cross is brought out to the middle of the church and you kneel before it, ask the Lord: What other purpose could there be for your serving a people which has lost the spirit of Christianity and the Christian image?

—Great Lent, Sunday of
Veneration of the Cross, 1972.

Translated by Ludmilla Thorne

**Solzhenitsyn Says
The Russian Church
Neglects Its Flock**

Special to The New York Times
MOSCOW, March 22—The

author Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, in a "Lenten letter" circulating in Moscow, has accused the Russian Orthodox Church of forsaking its flock and of being a tool of the atheist state.

The letter, addressed to Patriarch Pimen, leader of Russian Orthodoxy, also contains an impassioned plea to the church to bring the Christian spirit back to the people.

"A gravestone presses upon the head and rends the breast of a moribund Russian Orthodox people," the letter begins, according to a copy made available to Western newsmen.

Written in the ecclesiastical language customary in communications with the church, the letter lists limitations on the rights of priests, the closing of churches and the repression of dissident churchmen as examples of submission to the authorities.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn's novels, best sellers in the West, have been banned in the Soviet Union since the middle sixties on the ground that he has painted the country's Stalinist past in dark colors.

While continuing to write for publication abroad, the 52-year-old novelist and Nobel laureate has also become increasingly vocal on issues of civil rights. His open letter is believed to be his first protest on church matters.

He depicted a land in which, for every functioning church, "there are 20 that have been razed or irretrievably ruined and another 20 in a state of neglect or desecration." He was presumably referring to a practice common after the Bolshevik Revolution of converting churches to secular uses.

"How many populated places are there in this country with no church within 100 or even 200 kilometers?" Mr. Solzhenitsyn asked.

Charging that restoration of even the smallest church was

being hampered by what he termed the "one-sided laws of the so-called division of church and state," he said that he did not dare ask about the renewed pealing of church bells, no longer tolerated in the Soviet Union.

"And yet," he went on, "why should Russia be deprived of her most ancient adornment, her most beautiful voice?"

The novelist, accusing the church of taking orders from the Council for Religious Affairs, wrote:

"The entire administration of the church, the appointment of priests and bishops, including even sacrilegious churchmen, who seek to deride and disrupt the church—all these are secretly managed by the Council for Church Affairs.

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"A church dictatorially directed by atheists is a sight not seen in 2,000 years."

Mr. Solzhenitsyn said that Patriarch Pimen, in his first year in office, had done nothing to reinstate two dissident priests, Nikolai I. Eshliman and Gleb P. Yakunin, who were defrocked in 1965 for having questioned the church's collaboration with Soviet authorities.

Archbishop Yermogen of Kaluga is still being kept in mon-

astic seclusion for his refusal to close churches in his diocese, the letter said.

In an allusion to occasional church statements on world issues, apparently at the Soviet Government's behest, Mr. Solzhenitsyn said: "The Russian church has an impassioned opinion about the slightest evil in far-away Asia or Africa, but never about its own domestic troubles."

Deploing restrictions on the

rights of priests, he said:

"Priests are powerless within their own parishes, with only the conduct of church services entrusted to them. And if they should ever wish to visit the bedside of the sick or a cemetery they must first ask for an ordinance by the city council."

Referring to a message by Patriarch Pimen apparently read in orthodox churches at Christmas, Mr. Solzhenitsyn berated him for calling on Russian Orthodox abroad, to teach their

children to love the church but avoiding such a recommendation to believers in the Soviet Union.

Russian history might have been "incomparably more humane and harmonious in the last few centuries," Mr. Solzhenitsyn said, "if the church had not surrendered its independence and had continued to make its voice heard among the people as it does, for example, in Poland."

WASHINGTON POST
27 March 1972

CPYRGHT

17,000 Baltic Catholics Cite Soviet Persecution

CPYRGHT

Los Angeles Times

MOSCOW, March 27 —

More than 17,000 Roman Catholics from Lithuania have sent petitions to the United Nations, charging Soviet religious persecution. It was the largest open protest of its kind in the Soviet Union.

An inch-thick stack of petitions, bearing over 17,000 signatures of "believers," was sent to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim last month after Soviet officials in Moscow ignored their earlier protests, according to dissident Russian sources who made copies of the papers available to Western newsmen today.

Lithuania, a small republic on the Baltic Sea that was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, is known as an area where traditional religious beliefs persist despite official harassment by the Communist regime.

The petitions suggest continued strength of the Catholic Church in Lithuania despite steady anti-religious propaganda. It also seems to be a part of a growing effort by religious communities to induce the government to implement religious freedoms guaranteed by the Soviet constitution.

Last September, 2,000 persons from the town of Prenai,

which has less than 10,000 population, signed an open letter to the Soviet leadership charging that freedom of religion was being curbed by local authorities in Lithuania.

Three other open letters with a total of 5,000 signatures were sent last fall to Party leader Leonid Brezhnev but police "using threats, arrests and handcuffs prevented the mass collection of signatures," the letter to Waldheim said.

"Such action by the authorities prompted the conviction that the present memorandum, signed by 17,000 believers, will not attain its aim if it is sent by the same means as previous collective declarations," the letter said.

The Catholics were taking their complaints to the United Nations, the letter went on, because "believers in our republic cannot enjoy the rights set out in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The declaration, passed by the United Nations with the Soviet Union abstaining, calls for the recognition of religious freedom by all countries.

[At the United Nations, a spokesman had no comment on the petitions today.]

In their petition, the Lithuanians complained that So-

viet officials limit the number of new priests to be trained and control the assignment of priests to parishes. They said no more than 10 youths a year can enter the seminary.

"There are so few priests in Lithuania, the letter charged, that one must often serve two or three parishes and that 'even invalid and aged priests must work.'"

The Lithuanian authorities do not enforce a law which would punish those who persecute church-goers, the petition claimed.

In addition, Catholics have not been allowed to rebuild churches destroyed during World War II and have difficulty in getting permission to hold services in private homes.

"At the same time, a dance hall was allowed to be built in the parish of Andreivas where the church stood," the petition said.

It repeated charges made last November that two parish priests were sent to labor camps for providing religious instructions to youngsters. Two bishops were also exiled without trial, it said.

More signatures would have been included in the 123 separate, identical typed petitions if the Soviet police had not re-

acted so strongly against the dissidents, the letter said.

"If in the future, the organs of the state take the same attitude toward believers' complaints as they have until now, we will be obliged to address ourselves to international bodies, the Pope, the head of our church, or the United Nations as an authoritative institution defending human rights."

In addition to repressing religion, the Catholics said, the "forcible atheistic upbringing" of Soviet society has also caused increases in juvenile crime, alcoholism, divorces, abortions and suicides.

The Lithuanians' protest comes at a time of improving relations between Moscow and the Vatican. Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko have called on Pope Paul VI, and the Most Rev. Agostino Casaroli, who is tantamount to a Vatican foreign minister, visited Moscow last year.

There are an estimated 3.5 million Roman Catholics living in the Soviet Union, most of them Lithuanians and Poles. Catholics are situated in Lithuania, and in western parts of Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

Lithuania is the largest single Catholic area, with nearly 500 churches still operating there.

LE MONDE, Paris
29 March 1972

CONTRE LA POLITIQUE ANTIRELIGIEUSE

Dix-sept mille catholiques lituaniens s'adressent à M. Brejnev

CPYRGHT

Moscou minimise l'émigration juive

Les catholiques lituaniens, lassés de voir sans réponse diverses pétitions envoyées aux autorités soviétiques, viennent d'adresser à M. Brejnev un mémorandum portant dix-sept mille signatures. La police a vainement essayé d'en empêcher la collecte. Les signataires ont adressé copie de ce document à M. Kurt Waldheim, en priant le secrétaire général de l'ONU de le transmettre lui-même au chef du parti soviétique.

Le jour même — le 27 mars — où le texte des catholiques lituaniens était communiqué aux correspondants occidentaux à Moscou, un porte-parole officiel faisait des déclarations sur l'émigration juive. En minimisant le chiffre des départs, il a voulu apparemment rassurer les Etats arabes.

De notre correspondant ALAIN JACOB

Moscou. — Les catholiques lituaniens — dont le mémorandum est daté des mois de décembre 1971 et janvier 1972 — se placent sur le terrain des droits de l'homme et constatent que « pour les croyants de notre peuple, la liberté de conscience est toujours absente et l'Eglise sujette à persécutions ». Les faits qu'ils citent peuvent se résumer ainsi :

● Le clergé : « Nos évêques Ju. Stepanovitchus et V. Sladkiavitchus ont été exilés sans procès », tandis qu'en novembre 1971 « les prêtres You. Zdepiskis et P. Bubnis ont été condamnés à la privation de liberté parce qu'ils expliquaient les fondements de la foi à des enfants, sur la demande de leurs parents ». Le manque de prêtres s'accroît d'autre part du fait que « les autorités ne permettent qu'à dix étudiants par an d'entrer au séminaire » (de Vilnius) et que celui-ci « n'est pas entre les mains de notre évêque, mais du pouvoir ».

● L'éducation religieuse des enfants est non seulement entravée par des mesures telles que les arrestations, mais l'« athéisme est inculqué de force dans les écoles soviétiques ».

● En violation du code criminel de la République soviétique de Lituanie, des croyants sont victimes d'ostracisme — ils perdent notamment leur emploi, — en raison de leur foi : « Les croyants de l'intelligentsia craignent de pratiquer leur religion ouvertement. » De plus, « les représentants des autorités interdisent aux croyants de restaurer

même à leurs propres frais, les églises brûlées », et les fidèles « doivent obtenir avec de grandes difficultés, des autorités, la permission d'exercer le culte à leur domicile ».

Les signataires concluent en déclarant que des efforts du gouvernement soviétique pour remédier à cette situation « nous aideraient, nous, catholiques, à nous considérer comme citoyens de l'Union soviétique à part entière ».

Annexée à l'U.R.S.S. en 1939, la Lituanie comptait encore, il y a une dizaine d'années, environ deux millions et demi de catholiques, soit près de 85 % de la population. M. Nikita Struve, qui cite ces chiffres dans son ouvrage *Les Chrétiens en U.R.S.S.* (de Seuil), ajoute cependant que les effectifs du clergé ont diminué de moitié entre la fin de la guerre et le milieu des années 60 et mentionne plusieurs arrestations de prêtres en 1961 et en 1962. D'après l'annuaire du Vatican, seul l'évêque de Kaunas, Mgr Matulaitis est actuellement en fonctions.

Quelques jours à peine après la lettre de l'écrivain Soljenitsyne au patriarche Pimène, chef de l'Eglise orthodoxe (le Monde du 24 mars), le mémorandum des catholiques lituaniens contribue à attirer l'attention sur le problème des rapports de la religion et de l'Etat en U.R.S.S. Le cas des catholiques soviétiques est plus difficile encore que celui des orthodoxes. Le catholicisme romain, en effet, ne représente qu'une petite minorité en U.R.S.S. et ne bénéficie pas des tolérances relatives

accordées à l'Eglise nationale russe. Au contraire, il prête le flanc à des amalgames — justifiés ou non — avec la survivance de sentiments nationalistes et séparatistes dans des communautés plus ou moins récemment annexées à l'U.R.S.S. — dans les Pays baltes, notamment — mais aussi dans les anciens territoires polonais. L'Eglise romaine est d'autant plus « suspecte » aux yeux des autorités de Moscou qu'elle est liée au Vatican. Enfin, le sort des catholiques peut ici se comparer à celui des baptistes ; l'activité apostolique est beaucoup plus essentielle pour l'Eglise catholique que pour l'Eglise orthodoxe, ce qui provoque des conflits plus aigus avec le pouvoir, qui propage l'athéisme.

En dépit d'une certaine prudence et d'une grande discrétion, les autorités soviétiques cherchent à éteindre ce que les communautés catholiques ont de plus vivant sur les « marches » du territoire de l'U.R.S.S. Les uniates de Galicie en font l'expérience au même titre que les catholiques lituaniens. Si le sens diplomatique du Kremlin s'est manifesté par les égards avec lesquels Mgr Casaroli, sous-secrétaire d'Etat au Vatican, a été accueilli à Moscou au mois de février 1971, les arrestations de prêtres signalées par le mémorandum des catholiques lituaniens datent de novembre de la même année, comme les pétitions de plusieurs communautés demeurées sans réponse de septembre, octobre et décembre.

Un autre document, tout à fait officiel celui-là, a été publié lundi. Il s'agit d'une interview

de M. Choumilline, vice-ministre de l'intérieur de l'U.R.S.S., à l'agence de presse Novosti sur la question de l'émigration des juifs soviétiques à destination d'Israël. Le porte-parole du ministère se défend contre les accusations « prévaricatrices » dit-il, selon lesquelles cette émigration atteindrait des proportions « massives » et aurait pour résultat d'« accroître le potentiel militaire israélien ». L'auteur de l'interview croit mettre les choses au point en admettant qu'un « nombre limité » de juifs soviétiques ont demandé à partir pour Israël : « Ces personnes, explique-t-il avec un parfait sang-froid, peuvent quitter l'U.R.S.S. au même titre que les autres citoyens soviétiques, sans distinction d'appartenance nationale, ethnique, de sexe et d'âge. Leurs demandes de départ sont soigneusement étudiées par les organes du ministère de l'intérieur de l'U.R.S.S. selon la procédure en vigueur et, en règle générale, satisfaites. »

Le porte-parole soviétique donne le chiffre de dix mille — sensiblement inférieur aux estimations reçues d'autre part — pour le nombre total des départs en Israël en 1971. Il estime apparemment contribuer à une meilleure appréciation de ce phénomène en rappelant que « pendant toute la période de l'après-guerre, environ vingt et un mille personnes ont quitté l'U.R.S.S. pour Israël » — alors que « le nombre total des immigrants venus dans ce pays durant la même période a atteint deux millions ».

D'après le texte de l'interview, les limitations actuellement imposées aux demandes de départ

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des juifs soviétiques « tiennent au Proche-Orient ». En conséquence, « les limitations concernent surtout ceux qui possèdent une instruction militaire ou qui ont un travail touchant de près les intérêts de l'Etat ». « Peu de demandes de départ, ajoute le porte-parole, ont été déposées par les habitants de grands centres de l'U.R.S.S. tels que Moscou, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, et de régions telles que la République socialiste soviétique de Moldavie, etc.

les faits. Ces déclarations paraissent essentiellement destinées à alimenter une contre-propagande rassurante pour les pays arabes en même temps qu'à défendre — avec l'adresse que l'on voit — l'U.R.S.S. contre les accusations dont elle est l'objet dans de multiples pays occidentaux.

ALAIN JACOB.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 April 1972

CPYRGHT

Nationalism stirs in Baltic States

By Charlotte Saikowski

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Local nationalisms are smoldering in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and getting increased attention from Soviet authorities these days.

Whether ethnic sentiments are actually on the rise in these tiny republics, once independent states that were incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940, is difficult to know. It could be they are simply getting to be more of a problem for the regime because Soviet society as a whole is harder to control without Stalinist methods of repression.

In any case, some recent developments point to continuing nationalist discontent in the Baltic region:

- More than 17,000 Lithuanian Roman Catholics have signed a memorandum to party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev charging persecution of their church, according to unofficial sources this week. The Catholics call on the Soviet leadership to ensure the freedom of conscience guaranteed in the Constitution, "which until now does not exist in practice."

Ethnic issue discussed

- In Estonia early in March the party leadership called a special plenum to discuss "interethnic indoctrination of the working people," indicating a concern about relations between Estonians and the growing number of Russian migrants.

- An underground letter from 17 Latvian Communists charging the gradual russification of Latvia was published in the West in January. The letter has been discussed (and denounced) in the local Latvian press, and recently Latvian party leader August Voss called on party propagandists to combat "manifestations of nationalism, localism, and separateness."

Although the Lithuanian petition concerns religion, it has strong nationalist overtones, for Lithuania was predominantly Roman Catholic before the Soviet annexation. The Soviet press itself has complained that loyalty to Catholicism has fed anti-Russian nationalism in the republic.

The Catholic memorandum, sent to United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim for forwarding to the Soviet leadership, catalogs a host of grievances. It says two priests were imprisoned in 1971 for giving religious instruction to children and that two bishops have been exiled for 10 years without trial.

It also charges that atheism is forcibly inculcated in Lithuania's Soviet schools, that Soviet authorities rather than the bishops handle seminary affairs, and that Catholics are not permitted to rebuild burnt-out churches.

"In the years of Soviet power in Lithuania," an appendix to the memorandum states, "such vices as juvenile crime, alcoholism, and suicide have grown tenfold, and divorces and abortions have taken on threatening proportions as well. The further we are removed from the Christian past, the clearer become the terrible consequences of forcible atheistic upbringing and the more widespread becomes an inhuman way of life deprived of God and religion."

In Latvia and Estonia, for their part, there has long been resentment about the influx of Slavs, mainly Russians, into the republics. Some local officials have even resisted the expansion of industry so there would be less need to import Russian manpower — an attitude that has been sternly assailed in the official press.

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The concern of some Estonians and Latvians is that Russians, who account for 30 percent of the population of Latvia and about 25 percent of that of Estonia, will eventually dominate every aspect of indigenous life.

Thus the letter from the 17 Communists (which was addressed to Communist parties in the West and smuggled out last summer) bitterly charged that only Russians or "Soviet Latvians" hold the top party posts, that the share of Latvians in the population dropped from 62 percent in 1959 to 57 percent in 1970, that most of the radio and television programs are in Russian, and that few all-Latvian kindergartens and schools remain.

Political observers cite a number of factors that could account for what seems to be a stirring of nationalist activity generally (in the Ukraine, and other areas as well): The success Soviet Jews have had in agitating to emigrate to Israel, the influence of Western broadcasts and tourism over past years, and the spread of underground publishing.

Some observers believe that the general

ideological apathy in the country may play a role. After so many years of Marxist indoctrination and a less than stimulating leadership, it is suggested, people may be seeking spiritual nourishment in religion and in their traditional cultures.

Failure to inspire youth seems to be particularly troubling to the regime. In recent months party leaders in the Baltic region have placed great stress on bolstering ideological indoctrination in the schools and universities.

It is possible, too, that ethnic feelings are coming to the fore more because the regime is reluctant to deal as brutally with the problem as it would have in Stalinist times. It continues to crack down on political dissent but seems to apply only enough force to keep it under control.

In the case of the Lithuanian memorandum, for instance, Soviet authorities knew it was being circulated, and although they reportedly interfered with the collection of signatures, they did not move with full force to stop it.

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BALTIMORE SUN
27 November 1971

Lithuanian trial reportedly bloody

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By DEAN MILLS
Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—Several Lithuanians were injured early this month in a melee that resulted when police broke up a crowd of several hundred Catholics who rallied to the support of a priest on trial, reliable sources reported yesterday.

The incident is described in an unofficial account of trials November 11 and 12 in which two priests were sentenced to one year in a labor camp for teaching children the catechism. The underground document, made available to Western correspondents, gives this account of the trials and the events that preceded them:

The Rev. Juozas Zdebekis, the pastor of a parish in the city of Prenai, was arrested August 26 and placed in a police lock-up. He was beaten so badly by policemen that his mother "barely recognized him." Other Lithuanians arrested

hooliganism and placed in the next cell heard the priest "beg the policemen not to beat him about the face."

Case moved to Kaunas

The case was moved from Prenai, where it would have been tried normally, to the city of Kaunas. "Probably," the underground report states, "the authorities wanted to avoid a confrontation with those people whom the priest had served, whose respect and love he had won."

But all the same, many people learned about the trial. From early morning, people hurried to the courthouse. By 10 A.M. nearly 600 people had gathered.

Although the trial was ostensibly open, the report says, in fact only court officials, school officials, and employees of the KGB, the secret police, were let

Several injured

"Believers filled the corridors, the staircase, people crowded into the courtyard and onto the street. Shortly before the beginning of the trial policemen began to push people roughly outside and chase them away. During the 'clearing' of the staircase, several people were injured. One woman lost consciousness from a blow on the head, another broke a rib.

"On the street, policemen seized men and women. The girls with flowers suffered the worst—the policemen seized them and shoved them into police vehicles. Those who resisted were beaten, thrown to the ground, dragged by their legs."

About 20 persons, including priests, were arrested. Formal charges were brought against about 10.

Father Zdebekis was charged with the "organization and sys-

tematic work of the underground lessons for minors." The priest admitted that he had given religious instruction to the children of parents who requested it.

The prosecutor argued that the priest had violated Soviet regulations requiring the separation of church and state by interfering in the educating of children.

Vague answers

About 10 children from Father Zdebekis's confirmation classes were called to testify, but gave vague answers to the prosecutor's questions. A few refused to talk at all or simply cried on the witness stand. One 10-year-old girl said she and her friend had attended two lessons, then stopped because people had photographed them near the church and warned them not to return.

In a 10-minute speech interrupted frequently by admonitions from the judge, Father Zdebekis argued that constitu-

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tional guard. Religion give him the right to offer religious instruction.

Father Bubins sentenced

The other one-year sentence was given the following day, November 12, by a court in Raseiyan to the Rev. B. Bubins, parish priest at the village of Grakalis. Along with other priests in the area, Father Bubins had offered to examine children on their religious knowledge after the bishop in Raseiyan was given official permission to confirm children.

On the days children were to be examined, local authorities drove around to the churches. On July 25, officials burst into Father Bubins's church while he was questioning a boy on his religious knowledge as 30 other children waited in line.

The officials, the underground report says, "began to seize and drag them crying and frightened—into the fire station. Locking them in the fire station, they gave the children pencils and paper and dictated a written accusation against Father Bubins."

No details, other than the sentence, were given of the Bubins trial.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 April 1972

Religion persists in U.S.S.R. despite Kremlin drive

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

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Religion is strengthening its hold on the thinking of many people in the Soviet Union.

"The religious mist not only does not disappear, but on the contrary, begins to encompass our youth," the Byelorussian youth journal Znamya Yunosti recently complained.

In response, one atheist conference follows another, and antireligious militancy does not cease. The latest effort to snuff out religion was a national seminar of college and high-school teachers of "scientific atheism." It was convened March 14 by the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Education.

Last June, a similar conference deliberated for four days. Its findings were published in the atheist monthly Nauka i Zhizn (Science and Life). The main reasons for the tenacious survival of religion were said to be the indifference of part of the country's youth, Western influences, a conciliatory attitude within the Komsomol (Communist youth organization), youth's gullibility, family influences, and the spreading of underground religious literature.

The objection atheist agitators most frequently come across — even among non-believers — is that "religion helps." This way of thinking recently came out in a survey made by the administration of the Vinnitsa medical institute.

Survey question

The question asked in the survey was, "What is your attitude to religion?" The

results of the survey were discussed on Feb. 4 by the Vinnitsa radio in Ukrainian.

Out of 350 students questioned, only 163 stated firmly what they knew the administration wanted them to say, namely that they do not believe in God.

More than half of the students, exactly 180, stated that their attitude could be described as indifferent. A different 180 said they came from families who maintained religious traditions. And 83 students said they had believers, meaning church members, in their families.

In an attempt to explain the continued influence of religion, the broadcast went on to describe the "missionary activities" of "some sects, such as the Adventists and the Baptists, who try to instill in man's conscience a social program of their own."

Especially singled out were so-called "medico-missionary" activities:

"One frequently encounters in hospitals a nurse or a sister who secretly whispers to the patient: 'Pray to God, for only He can help you.' Although the patient subsequently recovers thanks to the ingenuity of the doctors, he will nevertheless have in his conscience traces of the nurse's brainwashing and will begin to believe that he was saved by God."

Priorities suggested

"That is why," the broadcast continued, "believers give priority to medical establishments when sending their children to institutes of higher learning. The formula of

these 'medical missionaries' is: 'The doctor merely bandages the patient; it is God who cures him!'

"Medical establishments should pay more attention to the atheist education of students," the broadcast warned. This is precisely what last month's Moscow seminar was supposed to bring about, through atheist "enlightenment" and militant antireligious propaganda.

That is the Soviet line toward its own citizens. Its line toward the Arab world is different. In a series of talks entitled "Against Imperialist Attempts to Exploit Religion for Reactionary Purposes," Dmitry Ponomarev, candidate of historical sciences, proclaimed March 27 that among the Afro-Asian people, "religion may serve a noble purpose under certain circumstances."

"Men of religion currently exercise great influence in mobilizing Egyptians for the struggle against Israeli aggression. . . . Many men of religion, Muslims included, have expressed their sympathy for the struggle for peace and justice."

"Marxist-Leninist parties call for alliance with believers in the common struggle for just objectives."

On the following day Mr. Ponomarev sought to dispel any qualms Arab Muslims might have about the Soviet attitude toward religion in their own country: "The Communists show respect for the feelings of believers," he said, "including Muslims. The true democracy of Soviet society lies in the fact that every Soviet person is free to believe in God or to disbelieve."

NEW YORK TIMES
13 December 1971

CPYRGHT

Islamic Past of Azerbaijan Republic Frustrates Moscow's Marxist Plans

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

BAKU, U.S.S.R.—Half a century of Soviet power has done much to modernize the Azerbaijan Republic, but the Azerbaijani style of life, reflecting centuries of Moslem influence, refuses to conform to the Communist model.

As an institution the Islamic faith is weak here. The veil has virtually disappeared. Women as well as men have been educated and moved into jobs in numbers unheard of before the Bolshevik take-over in this region of the Caucasus on April 20, 1920.

The industry of Baku has been modernized and diversified and new plants have been installed in district towns. Phalanxes of square-faced apartment houses surround Baku and have sprouted in new industrial towns like Sumgait. Some Western economists have reckoned that, for many, health care, education and standards of living are higher in Soviet Azerbaijan than in neighboring Iran, where several million ethnic Azerbaijanis live.

But vestiges of the past remain to bedevil and frustrate determined Marxists.

'For Mercenary Reasons'


No less a figure than Geidar A. Aliyev, the Communist party chief, has been complaining about nepotism, forced child marriages, corruption on a grand scale, the urge for private ownership and the penchant for private trading—"plundering of socialist property for mercenary reasons," he called it—and the practice of bribing examiners at universities for entrance or graduation.

In two unusually tart speeches in March and October, Mr. Aliyev castigated ideological backsliders of all kinds. He was upset by commercialism in local theaters, painters who copy "the worst models of modern art of the West," the undue pessimism of some novelists, non-Marxist probing of local history, worrisome curi-

osity about religion among the young and even financial donations to mosques by leading intellectuals.

"One reason for bribery is the striving for private property, the basis for which is individualism and selfishness, and worrying only about one's own benefit, and the wish to get as much as possible for oneself and less for society," the party chief declared. "One should not undervalue the influence of bourgeois ideology."

The clannishness of the Azerbaijanis, their skill at ar-



The New York Times/Dec. 17, 1971

ranging deals under the table and their generally undisciplined ways have long been a problem for Communist leaders—apparently at a greater scale than in many other regions. Some local Communists blame centuries of Moslem domination over this southern territory during the conquests by Persians, Arabs and Turks.

"Islam is more aggressive and more reactionary than other religions," asserted Gasham Aslanov, editor of the Communist party youth newspaper Yunost, which circulates 350,000 copies three times a week. "This religion teaches people to think about themselves and their families."

The former party instructor,

haired and younger looking than his 37 years cited what he said were Moslem proverbs to demonstrate the selfishness fostered by Islam.

"We have these proverbs," he said. "He who sacrifices all of his efforts for the benefit of the people suffers more." "First it is necessary to build up the inside of the mosque and then the outside." "Each man tries to gather coal under his own stove."

"We lived about 1,300 years by this religion, by this ideology," he explained during a chat in a hotel cafe. "We have lived under Soviet power only 50 years. During 50 years it is very difficult to change human nature."

City With a Hybrid Past

Actually Baku is an international city with a hybrid past. Its Victorian-style balconied apartments and its tree-lined promenades facing the Caspian Sea give it a Mediterranean flavor.

Russian influence dates from 1806, when the czarist empire won this region from Persia. Attracted by oil, Russians made up a fourth of Baku's population or percentage today. Azerbaijanis constitute just half of the city's 1.3 million people.

The language of commerce, politics and advancement is Russian, spoken by most people regardless of ethnic origin. Major public speeches are delivered in Russian. A young journalist recalled his older brother's insistence that he learn Russian at school not only for the sake of his career but so he could date Russian girls.

Nonetheless, it is Islamic tradition and the Azerbaijani character that give the region its distinctive personality. Beside the vast homes of one-time oil magnates, put up on a scale to rival Fifth Avenue mansions, are buildings with the graceful arches of the Islamic world. And the faces of the Azerbaijanis, dark, lively, honey-colored, speak of the nearness

Formal Islam has withered under the pressure of militant atheism. Local specialists say there are only 16 mosques, two in Baku, for Azerbaijan's 5.1 million people. The Koran, it is reported, was last printed in Russian three years ago and is not available in local bookshops.

Some Youths Turn to Faith

Generally the mosques attract only the old, though the leader of the Communist Youth League complained recently that young people, including some of his members, were attending religious rites.

It is less the formal religious structure that disturbs Communist leaders than it is the social influence of Islamic customs—girls dropping out of school for marriages arranged by their families, women left at home by husbands going out to socialize and not advanced properly even in the Communist party, and the undisciplined economic style.

Privately, some people talk like unreconstructed capitalists, eager to display Western watches or fountain pens, boastful about their financial canniness, unashamed that bribes or contacts are the key to success.

"You've got to have money to get what you want," said a well-tanned director of a state farm. "It's the same everywhere—in America, in the Soviet Union, everywhere."

It is that style of life that Mr. Aliyev, formerly chief of the republic's secret police, has pledged to wipe out since being put in charge here in 1969.

He has removed up to 50 senior government and party officials for abuse of office or dereliction. A number of officials have been put on trial for bribery, among them a judge who allegedly took bribes from three men accused of fraud but was caught before he could fix the case. Nonetheless, some Azerbaijanis remain skeptical.

"Let them bring another and another and another," said a physician who described how payoffs helped speed surgical operations. "It will stay the same."

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, Moscow
26 January 1972

PAPER CONDEMNS ACTIVITIES OF OMSK BAPTISTS

[Article by Ye. Goloshumov: "The Poisoners"]

Omsk--Now his arrival in the commune of the followers of the so-called Council of Churches of the Evangelical Christian Baptists and the sermons and the meetings of brother-dissenters and much else seems like a delusion or a bad dream. But all this took place and lasted for many years. These years he, Gennadiy Skalyga, now regards as being erased from the 20 years of his life, as spent vainly, to no purpose. Or rather, there was a purpose and, according to his notions of that time, an extremely significant purpose--the service of God--but on verification it turned out to be no more than a mirage. His "spiritual fathers" themselves, however paradoxical it may seem, razed to the ground his religious world outlook which, in his opinion, was as firm and tenacious as the smell of incense in the church. But he had only to come into contact with the secular affairs of his mentors in the commune and nothing remained of this "world outlook."

...The beautiful and large city of Omsk where he went a few years ago from neighboring Tyumen Oblast to study at the road transport technical college seemed comfortless and unwelcoming to him. Who knows, it is possible that everything would have turned out differently if he had been in a hostel among his contemporaries. But he happened to settle in a private apartment. The shy, reserved and impressionable Gennadiy felt equally ill at ease in the noisy corridors and lecture halls of the technical college and the quiet, soothing apartment of his landlady and relation Ye. Koznacheyenko: he was homesick.

Koznacheyanko meanwhile gradually sized up her tenant. She sized him up not just for the sake of curiosity but to carry out the order from the ringleaders of the commune of followers of the Council of Churches to which she belonged--to swell the ranks of the dissenters, to agitate and to advance. From a distance, obsequiously and diplomatically, she talked with Gennadiy about God and about how it was only in God that he would find his solace, how God would calm his soul.

At first Skalyga listened with surprise and indignation: "Stop putting all this nonsense into my head!" Koznacheyenko and her daughter Lyuba, also a commune member, did not take offense and were silent, but then they began all over again: subtly, unnoticeably and meekly. It all ended with Gennadiy going to a prayer meeting one evening.

The commune greeted him guardedly, distrustfully, although in a superficially affable manner. From the very start the elder "brothers" started to talk to Skalyga about the need for the strict observance of the church secret. What this secret was Gennadiy understood later, when he was accepted in at a general meeting as a commune member and had undergone the baptism ceremony and then become the leader of a youth group. But meanwhile he sawed and chopped wood and gathered potatoes in the dissenters kitchen gardens and learned religious verses.

At first Gennadiy did not understand why such secrecy, such mystery and reticence was necessary. Surely the religious feelings of believers in our country are guarded by law and nobody raises any obstacles before registered religious groups and sects providing, of course, that they do not violate the law. But then it gradually became clear that the whole point was in the antisocial provocative trend displayed in the activity of the ringleaders from the commune of the followers of the notorious council of churches--activity which they carry out illegally, hiding from people's view.

who are priests, these spiritual pastors. Here is A. Kozorezov, the commune's chief ideologist, who taught humility before God, obedience and readiness to bear one's heavy cross to the end. Behind his demagogic words he skillfully concealed selfishness and excessive ambition. "Religion for Kozorezov was a means of having power over people, of obtaining an advantage for himself and of insuring his own personal well-being," Pavel Dronyayevn, former commune member and now a soldier in the Soviet Army testifies. Kozorezov did not consider it shameful to profit by gifts from believers or to make use of believers to work on his private farm. Hostile to Soviet society, Kozorezov had created an underground printing office in the apartment of the Garms sisters where the illegal journals "Chronical of Salvation" [Vestnik Spaseniya] and the "Brotherly Leaflet" [Bratskiy Listok], and sermons were printed and other hostile ideological materials were prepared. For this Kozorezov ended up in exile 5 years ago. When he returned he set about his former occupation, and naturally he again got his reward.

The other "mentors?" N. Savchenko was tried for marauding, A. Popov and P. Pererva were tried as criminals, and I. Yefimenko served time for betraying his motherland. F. Poyunov and others were brought before the court not because of their belief in God.

The ringleaders of the sect pay special attention to recruiting young people. At the prayer meetings the members of the youth group recited reactionary verses and songs which contained veiled, and indeed open, anti-Soviet appeals.

In addition to the dissemination of foreign radio broadcasts and postcards, literature obtained illegally from abroad was studied. The efforts of the commune ringleaders did not go unnoticed by foreign "well-wishers." Letters of thanks and parcels began to arrive from somewhere in the Netherlands addressed to Kozorezov's wife Aleksandra and Savchenko's wife Lyudmila.

As the leader of the youth group Gennadiy Skalyga frequently had occasion to visit the communes of other cities, including cities outside Siberia; the sect leaders attach special significance to contacts with young people. Everywhere he saw one and the same thing: the hypocrisy and demagogy of the commune leaders and their antisocial activity. They poison the souls not only of the young people who have fallen into the sectarian snares but also the souls of the children of believers who are educated "in the fear of God." Special underground school groups according to age are created for them, where illegally printed anthologies of religious stories, verses and songs are studied.

"Why should I be in the same company with such obscurantists as A. Kozorezova, N. Savchenko, Yu. Terekhov and E. Gossenrik? Why should I deprive myself of the joys of life? Why should I hate my motherland which has nurtured me and given me an education?" Gennadiy Skalyga asked himself these questions with ever increasing frequency. He left the sect.

...I met Gennadiy in the hostel of the machine unit plant where he works. It was a rainy fall evening. Skalyga was hurrying to the road transport institute where he is studying in the evening department. Gennadiy is a Komsomol member. In addition to the institute he is engaged in the "Metelitsa" ensemble with which he went on tour to Mongolia last summer. His life is now interesting and full-blooded. He is glad that Pavel Dronyayev, Galina Poyunova, Lyudmila Kolchanova and many others have left the sectarians.

But the obscurantists continue to poison unsophisticated people. Ivan Vins, Vladimir Fedorchenko, the sisters Olga and Yelizaveta Kolosova, Lyudmila Stanova and Lyudmila Galaktionova whisper prayers on their knees at secret meetings.

"It is necessary to struggle to help the deceived people rise from their knees, see the joy of life, and realize the happiness of creation," Gennadiy says. "The poisoners should be deprived of the opportunity of continuing their black deed."

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, Moscow
17 October 1971

PRACTICES OF RELIGIOUS SECTARIANISM VIOLATE SOVIET LAW

[Article by S. Gusev, Moscow Oblast prosecutor and state legal adviser 3d class:
"The Strict Letter of the Law"]

The behavior of brothers Voloda and Sasha worried their teachers. At first the brothers, under a variety of pretexts, refused to accompany the class on a visit to the museum. Then they declined a cultural visit to the movies and, finally, when the time arrived for them to join the pioneers, they categorically refused to wear red ties.

The worried teachers went to see their parents and asked them: "What is the matter with your children?"

"They are different from all the other boys." The parents however, were not in the least surprised and were even pleased to hear this.

This was explained by the fact that the parents of Voloda and Sasha were members of a strict Baptist sect and brought up their children in a specially created religious circle.

A certain N. Voronova was the leader of this circle. She got the children of members of the sect to go to her house or to someone's apartment, read religious sermons to them, taught Biblical dogma, made them learn religious verses, psalms, and prayers, and organized special childrens' prayer meetings. This was a flagrant violation of the legislation on religious cults.

It was instilled into the children that they must not learn or sing Soviet songs, listen to the radio, watch television, read the newspapers, go to the movies, theater, or the circus, or in any way participate in any of the school's mass social functions whatever. In a word, an attempt was made to turn the children into juvenile recluses and deprive them of all human pleasures.

Voronova was warned of her responsibilities and required to cease the illegal meetings. However, the members of the sect replied that they were answerable only to the laws of God. It got to the stage where, without permission of the authoritative organs, they arranged open-air baptisms of adults. Children were brought to these ceremonies, which were an insult to social conduct, and Voronova took an active part in all this.

The prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings, and a people's court sat in justice on her and sentenced her to imprisonment. . . .

Prosecution organs, local soviets, and social organizations perform a considerable amount of work in suppressing the illegal activity of members of sects. Talks and lectures are organized on their behalf, and individual work is conducted.

Many members of sects, when they realize their mistakes, refrain from infringing the legal norms in force. Those who shamelessly and maliciously infringe the laws are brought to justice.

Sect members Semen Tabachkov from Zhukovskiy and Vasilii Ryzhuk from Krasnogorsk have been sentenced to imprisonment at different times. These people represented themselves as defenders of the believers and actively worked against the Soviet legislation on

cults. They maliciously condemned the "sinfulness of the world"--something which they themselves concocted--and tried to completely isolate the believers from society and instill in them a negative attitude toward our reality. Moreover, they tried to provoke conflicts and deepen the gulf between the sect and all the rest of our fellow citizens.

Sectarian leaders strive to be permitted to propagate religion unrestrictedly and to stop antireligious instruction in schools. They demand that rank-and-file believers undertake not to acknowledge the state laws and they frustrate their implementation.

But maybe the sectarian leaders teach their flock to acknowledge no Soviet laws--without exception? Such is not the case. They by no means refuse to accept wages from the state, concession trips to rest homes and sanatoria, paid leave, apartments, or pensions. They acknowledge their right to free medical services and willingly and without relying on the grace of the almighty enjoy these and other benefits available to all our citizens irrespective of sex, age, nationality, or religion.

Our laws protect the rights of believers and the freedom of their religion. However, these laws impose on believers an obligation, the same as on atheists, to fulfill their civil duty as defined by the USSR Constitution.

Our state is particularly concerned to protect the interests of children and young citizens of the country, in whom we see our future. Hence in allowing adults freedom of religion, regarding this as a matter of conscience and the personal view of each individual, the state allows no one to impose his religious views on children.

The RSFSR Council of Peoples' Commissars decree signed by V.I. Lenin on 23 January 1918 "On the Separation of the Church From the State and the School From the Church" pointed out: "Nobody may refuse to fulfill his civil obligations by reason of his religious views.... Freedom from the performance of religious ceremonies is secured provided that they do not infringe social order and are not accompanied by encroachments on the rights of citizens of the Soviet republic. The local authorities are empowered to take all necessary steps to safeguard social order and security in such cases."

The position of religious organizations was clearly defined by subsequent legislation. Primarily they were allowed to engage in their activities only after appropriate registration in accordance with established procedure and were allowed to function only for the purposes of jointly satisfying citizens' religious needs.

Here they were forbidden to organize prayer meetings and groups and circles for religious instruction specially for children and young people, arrange excursions and childrens' recreational areas, or open libraries or reading rooms. Ministers of religion were categorically forbidden to conduct propaganda aimed at alienating believers from active participation in social, cultural, and state activity.

A certain Petr Rumachik, one of the leaders of the strict Baptists, systematically infringed all these legal requirements. For months he did not work anywhere, traveled around cities and villages, met sectarians, and supplied them with illegally published literature containing direct appeals not to observe the Soviet legislation on cults. In the so-called "Brotherly Advice to Young Christians" young believers were called on to alienate themselves from Soviet society, renounce the study of modern science and technology, and observe only the laws of God and not Soviet laws... naturally the prosecutor instituted legal proceedings against him.

Methods of persuasion should be more broadly used with regard to the rank-and-file believers, who frequently do not realize the real aims of their leaders. Local authoritative organs and party, Komsomol, trade union, and other social organizations should conduct special meetings arrange for the most respected local citizens to meet believers, and intensify individual explanatory work in homes and in enterprises where there are sectarians. In this scheme a large role can be played by teachers--it is much easier for them to make personal contact with the students than with the pupils.

It is up to all of us to realize profoundly that although sectarianism has demonstrated its utter hopelessness, this must not give us cause for complacency. The struggle against religious ideology is an integral part of communist education. It was and still is the party's program requirement. It is an ideological struggle based on atheistic propaganda and on methods of persuasion. However, those who systematically and maliciously infringe Soviet laws under cover of the demands of their faith, who incite other citizens to infringements, organize them into nonregistered communities, and commit other illegal acts will continue to be held responsible, with the full severity of our laws.

ZARYA VOSTOKA, Russia
31 August 1971

STRICT PARTY CONTROL OF ATHEISTIC PROGRAM DEMANDED

Increasing attention is being given, in the process of building a communist society in our country, to questions on the further cultivation of communist morality; further development of the culture of Soviet man--mainly spiritual culture; overcoming the survivals of the past in the consciousness of the people--including eradication of religiosity and the formation of a scientific-materialistic outlook for all members of the socialist society without exception.

Religious prejudices are the most vital survivals of the past, the struggle against which demands special sensitivity, caution, and perseverance.

Even under socialism the struggle against religious prejudices does not cease to be a difficult matter, although with each decade our people are becoming more educated and enlightened. False and pernicious is the opinion that survivals of the past will die out when we are able to offer everyone a sufficient education. Religious prejudices cannot vanish by themselves. They cannot be repealed. Administrative measures are important here. They can only lead to intensification of religious fanaticism. Persuasion is the only correct and the only necessary measure in atheist propaganda.

It is no secret that a trend to idealize the church way of life and church rituals has begun to manifest itself among the youth in recent years. There have been instances when Komsomol members have participated in the performance of religious rites.

Just what attracts a person to the church? Curiosity? The quest for "poetry" or "romance"? How can one explain that long-forgotten ceremonies are being revived in a number of populated points of Adzhariya and Abkhaziya, and that the youth is participating actively in this?

Komsomol and trade union organizations are not participating sufficiently actively in atheistic propaganda. Many cultural-educational establishments are doing a poor job in such participation. This is especially important in Abkhaziya, Adzhariya, Rustavi, and several other areas in the Georgian SSR where religious sects exist.

Atheistic education, being a composite part of the work in communist education, requires constant strict party control. Moreover, certain party organizations forget that the path to success lies through systematic and consistent work, and they engage in it incidentally, mainly during religious holidays. Religious views are incompatible with a materialistic world outlook and with social and scientific-technological progress. Resolute struggle against them is an important condition for the formation of the man of the new society.

WASHINGTON POST
12 March 1972

CPYRGHT

Soviet Jews: A Different View

By John Dornberg

The writer, Newsweek's correspondent in Munich, was the magazine's Moscow bureau chief until his expulsion in October, 1970. This article is excerpted from his forthcoming book, "The New Tsars."

DESPITE THE OUTCRY against their treatment, Jews in the Soviet Union have actually fared as well or better than most minority groups there. Perhaps this is because there are 10 times as many as there are, for instance, Crimean Tartars. More likely it is because they have influential brethren abroad and the force of world public opinion behind them.

Propaganda in and outside the Soviet Union has contributed to a distorted picture of the plight of the Jews in the U.S.S.R. As long as Jewish militants in the United States and elsewhere scream hysterically "Let my people go," threaten Soviet diplomats, disrupt performances by Soviet artists (most of them Jews themselves) and vandalize Soviet diplomatic, journalistic and commercial offices, as long as the Soviet authorities trumpet the lie that there is no anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R. and that Jews in the Soviet Union have never been as well off, that picture is not going to be in focus.

In one sense the plight of the Jew in the Soviet Union is that of the Jew anywhere, except in Israel. If his situation in Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia and Uzbekistan, where anti-Semitism has a long and violent tradition, is worse than his position in France, Britain or the United States, it is largely because as a Jew he is a member of a minority in a country in which all minorities are more or less oppressed. His nationality is stamped into his passport. Often his physical appearance identifies him. He is subjected to a delicate system of quotas designed to maintain a balance of pro-

portional representation of nationalities in the economy and in high government and party organs such as the council of ministers, the politburo and the central committee. He is scorned and discriminated against in a society of more than a hundred nationalities, nearly all of whom scorn and discriminate against each other.

In some ways his situation is worse than that of the other nationalities: a consequence of the confusion, first of all, whether his is a nationality, an ethnic group or a religion. Undeniably, it is the only nationality group that is also a religion, an inherently difficult situation in a state that professes atheism. Moreover it is a religion that has been the traditional object of intense discrimination in Russia, where chauvinism and orthodoxy went hand in hand. Furthermore it is a religion that tends to be tribal rather than ecumenical. Jewish culture as a whole presents difficulties for Soviet ideology.

Finally, he is the only member of a minority group that is genuinely extra-territorial. Not only do most of his brethren live outside the Soviet Union, but 2.5 million of them live in a state that calls itself his homeland and competes for his loyalties. Worst of all, that state is at war with a group of countries whose principal ally and supporter is the Soviet Union. Because of the Soviet Union's propaganda against that state, anti-Semitism has again become acceptable, if not actually fashionable, in the U.S.S.R.

The plight of no other Soviet minority group has received as much atten-

tion outside the U.S.S.R. as that of the Jews. Some of it has been justified. Some of the attention has been blatant propaganda and the product of confused emotions growing out of the belligerent relationship between two sovereign states: Israel and the U.S.S.R.

Overstating the problem has merely worsened the predicament of the Jews in the U.S.S.R. And to assess their real situation, fact must be separated from fiction.

It is a fact that for many years very few Jews were able to leave the U.S.S.R. But some *did* leave: at an average rate of 150 monthly, even after the Six-Day War in 1967. At times the number rose to 300 a month, at times it was as low as 80. This figure is the highest emigration rate of any nationality group of the U.S.S.R. Israel has been receiving the highest number of Soviet emigration since 1967. The United States is a poor second, Canada, sought out mostly by Ukrainians, is an even poorer third.

It is also a fact that in early 1971 the number of Jews permitted to leave increased sharply, as a consequence, apparently, of intensified propaganda abroad and more militant agitation in the U.S.S.R. itself. Most of the *émigrés*, however, were those Jews who had aggressively pressed their demands. Between January 1 and May 31, an estimated 3,500 had emigrated. The Kremlin apparently decided to get rid of "troublemakers," particularly those Jewish militants who had formed links with the dissident movement.

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BUT IT IS A FICTION that Jews are being discriminated against in their desire to leave and a deliberate distortion of the facts to imply that vast waves of Jews are just waiting for exit visas.

The Kremlin sees the desire to leave as an expression of disloyalty and makes little distinction between Jews who want to go to Israel, Ukrainian who want to emigrate to Canada and Russians who want to leave for anywhere because they are weary of an economically deprived life in one of the world's most regimented dictatorships.

Who wants to leave and why? Israeli and Zionist sources have spoken of "tens of thousands." It is an accurate figure, but cloaked in a semantic play to the grandstands. Joseph Kazakov, the 50-year-old Moscow engineer who organized and led the letter-writing and petitions-signing campaign of Jewish dissenters until he was finally permitted to leave for Israel in February, 1971, told me that Jews who want to leave represent about 5 per cent of Soviet Jewry. That would mean approximately 103,000 people based on a 1970 Soviet census figure of 2,151,000 Jews.

"Perhaps," he said, "if all of them were suddenly allowed to emigrate without difficulty, others would be encouraged to apply for visas and the number might double. But 10 per cent is the maximum."

How many of these 5 or 10 per cent, I asked him, want to leave because they are Zionists, religious or consider themselves, as Jews, victims of special discrimination? How many simply want to leave the U.S.S.R. because it is an unpleasant place to live in, but have no special affinity to Israel? "I don't know," Kazakov said. "Maybe half and half."

Actually, hundreds of thousands of Jews would elect to remain in the U.S.S.R. Assimilated, prosperous and Sovietized, they consider themselves Soviet citizens first, Jews second: like most Jews in the United States, France and Britain. The Kremlin made this argument effectively in March, 1970, when it staged a press conference by a group of prominent Jews who professed their loyalty for the U.S.S.R. and their condemnation of Israeli foreign and military policy.

On the platform in Moscow's House of Friendship for the 2-hour news conference were 31 Jews from the Soviet establishment, led by Venyamin Dymshits, one of the U.S.S.R.'s nine deputy prime ministers and the highest-ranking Jew in the governmental hierarchy. Beside him were three uni-

generals; a kolkhoz chairman from the Ukraine; Alexander Chakovsky, the conservative editor in chief of Literaturnaya Gazeta; Aaron Vergelis, the editor of Sovietish Geimland; government officials; scientists; popular Soviet comedian Arkady Raikin, who had just stalked off the stage of a theater in the Ukraine because someone from the audience had called him a Yid. They delivered themselves of anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli diatribes which were repeated in a long statement, signed by those on stage and 22 others.

In the West this curious display of loyalty by prominent Jews was immediately written off as a "put-on" job by "tame-house Jews." Indeed, no American Jew would be likely to go before a press conference to beat his chest and proclaim his loyalty to the United States. On the other hand, why shouldn't these Jews have said what they did? They are among those who made it to the top and have a vested interest in the Soviet Union.

Many Are Assimilated

ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES did tell a Western journalist that he had signed the statement under threat of being denied a trip abroad. But on the whole, these 53 Jews represented hundreds of thousands of "tame" prominent Soviet Jews who did not care whether or not Jewish culture is suppressed or Yiddish theaters and magazines exist, whether or not there is a Yeshiva and whether or not prayer shawls and prayer books are available for the believers in the synagogues. They did not care because they are assimilated in the Soviet culture around them.

Dissenting Jews complain that "young Jews cannot read Jewish books because the Jewish language is not taught in a single school in the Soviet Union." That is true and that is part of the discriminatory picture, but it means little to the majority of Jews, who would not read a book in Yiddish if the Kremlin gave them out free. When assessing the status of Soviet Jews, Western observers find it difficult, if not impossible, to make objective judgments, to separate fact from emotion.

To draw an accurate picture certain facts should be borne in mind. The Jews are virtually the only minority—the Volga Germans are also an important exception—who did not become part of the old Russian Empire through conquest and colonialism. Anti-Semitism is deeply rooted, and reached exceptionally violent propor-

tions among many of the U.S.S.R.'s nationalities, especially the Russians and Ukrainians. The present Soviet regime is not anti-Semitic, but it is anti-Zionist and through its propagation of anti-Zionism it ineluctably kindles anti-Semitism because its propaganda is crude and the masses at whom it is directed cannot differentiate between the two.

On the other hand, professionally, Jews are very well off in many fields, including art, music, science, literature, engineering and law. Although they represent less than 1 per cent of the total Soviet population, they account for 14.7 per cent of all physicians, 8.5 per cent of writers and journalists, 10.4 per cent of all judges and lawyers, 7.7 per cent of actors, musicians and artists.

Of some 650,000 scientific workers in the U.S.S.R., 55,000 are Jews. Fourteen per cent of the Jewish population has a higher or specialized secondary education, a rate almost triple that of Russians. In the U.S.S.R. as a whole there are 166 students per 10,000 population in institutes of higher education. For Jews the figure is almost double—315. Of 844 Lenin Prize holders, 564 are Russian, 184 represent all the other nationalities and 96 are Jews. And where else but in Israel itself would one find that many Jewish generals?

Yet Jews seem to be deliberately barred from the government and Communist Party hierarchy and their role in both has decreased steadily since the days when most of the Bolsheviks were also Jews. In 1939 Jews accounted for more than 10 per cent of the central committee membership; today they represent less than 1 per cent. They are proportionally underrepresented in the Supreme Soviet and the republican soviets. They have almost no role in the foreign service and in journalism many Jews feel they must adopt Russian-sounding pseudonyms to get ahead.

Most of the nationalities have their own territories, where the language is their own and where most officials are of their nationality. Theoretically the Jews have Biro-Bidzhan, the Jewish Autonomous Region on the Chinese border, established in 1934. It is about as Jewish as a ham sandwich. Of a total population of 180,000 only 20,000 are Jews and of these only 30 per cent give Yiddish as their mother tongue. Until 1970 the first secretaries of the regional Communist Party committees have been Russians and Ukrainians. Now, at last, the party chief is a Jew.

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Agents of Russification

CULTURALLY AND POLITICALLY the dominant role in Biro-Bidzhan has been played by Russians, not Jews, and only in 1970 was an attempt made to redress the balance. In the libraries and bookshops there are few shelves of Yiddish books. There are no shops catering to kosher requirements and there is in the city of Biro-Bidzhan itself only one synagogue, called "the prayer house for Judaists," which serves the whole region. Yiddish is not taught in any of the schools, no special courses in the history of the Jewish people are given, there are hardly enough settlers left who write Yiddish well enough to contribute to the region's small daily newspaper *Shtern*, and of the five deputies which the region sends to the Soviet of Nationalities, only two are actually Jewish.

The Jew thus is the eternal stranger. Since Jews tend to assimilate into the Russian culture rather than the indigenous culture of the non-Russian areas in which they live, they are further suspected as agents of Russification. Thus, in areas of traditional anti-Semitism such as Moldavia and the Ukraine, the Jew is doubly damned: for being ethnically Jewish and culturally Russian. In Russia, they are suspected of harboring dual political and psychological loyalties to a homeland other than the U.S.S.R., a suspicion that Israel and Zionist propaganda has not allayed but merely fostered.

Jews flocked in great numbers to the revolutionary banner in the early 1900s. The overthrow of the tsar gave them a chance to leave the Pale of Settlements and to escape, hopefully forever, from the threat of pogroms. Jews like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sverdlov and Litvinov were indispensable to Lenin in making the Revolution. And as long as Lenin lived anti-Semitism was held at bay.

By 1939 anti-Semitism in all its varied manifestations had receded into the background. True, Stalin had purged the party leadership of most of its Jewish members, but the motivations were political and his own surge for ultimate power.

An ominous reversal followed the Hitler-Stalin pact. Foreign Jewish Communists who had found refuge in Moscow and survived the purges of the Comintern membership suddenly found themselves being shipped to Germany and Hitler's concentration camps. Soviet propaganda swung onto the Nazi line.

After the war, Stalin cracked down in earnest. His campaign against "rootless cosmopolitans" resulted in the shutting down of virtually all Yiddish cultural institutions, from theaters to newspapers. In 1952 approximately 30 leading Jewish writers and intellectuals were liquidated as Stalin set the stage for the "anti-Zionist" purges that gripped his satellites Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Finally the "Doctors' Plot" was in motion. If Stalin had lived it would surely have led to pogroms.

Khrushchev once denied publicly that anti-Semitism exists in the U.S.S.R. But it was under Khrushchev that dozens of Jews were shot as economic speculators and their Jewish names prominently published in the press. It was under Khrushchev also that the furor started over Yevtushenko's poem "Babi Yar."

What Stalin started and Khrushchev finished, in his own way, was the destruction of Jewish cultural life. Under Brezhnev, as a consequence of the Six-Day War and Soviet commitments to the Arab countries, anti-Zionism and an official anti-Israel policy have been unleashed. Until 1967 the dilemma of the Jews in the Soviet Union had been that the majority were ceasing to be Jews.

Now, as a consequence of Moscow's campaign against Israel and Zionism even some assimilated Jews have been reimbued with a sense of their own Jewishness.

Most significant of all, however, are the spirit of militancy which has gripped the Jewish communities in the U.S.S.R. and the draconian measures which Soviet authorities have employed to suppress it. Scores of Jews have sent and signed petitions to the Kremlin demanding exit visas. Dozens have staged hunger strikes in Riga, Vilnius and Moscow and dozens more have engaged in sit-in strikes in both the reception offices of the Supreme Soviet and the Central Telegraph building in Moscow. In August 1971 an estimated 3,000 Lithuanian Jews staged a march to commemorate the deaths of Soviet Jews killed in World War II. Dozens of others all around the U.S.S.R. have been arrested, questioned, intimidated, convicted and jailed for demonstrating or demanding their rights and emigration visas.

Inadvertently, the Kremlin has fostered Jewish awareness, and thereby added yet another ingredient to the simmering melting pot of national and racial unrest.

Inadvertently, the Kremlin has fostered Jewish awareness, and thereby added yet another ingredient to the simmering melting pot of national and racial unrest.

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From the forthcoming book "The New Tsars: Russia Under the Heirs of Stalin," to be published by Doubleday.

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May 1972

SOVIET YOUTH: BORED, CYNICAL, RESTLESS

In 1953 the world was much moved by photos of desperate East German youths battling Soviet tanks with nothing but stones. In 1956 even 12-year old Hungarian youngsters manned barricades in the hopeless battle against Soviet armed suppression. In 1967 students issued a bold challenge to the Czechoslovak regime, symbolic of the national sentiment which eventually ushered in the doomed but courageous 1968 experiment of Communism with a human face. Not only had Communist institutions patently failed to mold these youths into the new Communist man, a conforming servant of the State in which they had virtually no voice, but their bold protests threatened the stability of other Communist regimes whose youth might catch the same infection.

In 1968 and 1969 when youthful rebellion and unrest in the non-Communist world was making headlines, the Soviet reaction was ambivalent. However much they deplored and distrusted the anti-authoritarian attitudes, the inexplicably classless nature of the demonstrations, and the occasional Maoist slogan, they were also beguiled by their revolutionary potential. At the same time, the Soviet Union was fearful of the reaction of their own population, more than half of it under 30. So the Party press turned reportorial somersaults to explain that western radical youth was, of course, rebelling solely against capitalism.

To protect their own people against contamination, they tightened controls on foreign travel (even to the East European Communist countries where life styles were a bit more casual and westernized, as in Poland), forbade reading of foreign periodicals and limited controversial foreign news coverage. Word of foreign cultures does reach the Soviet citizen, however, via radio, foreign tourists, and occasionally by an oversight in the Communists' own propaganda films and literature.

Official reluctance -- sometimes refusal -- to admit the existence of anti-social behavior in USSR is typified by Party Chairman Brezhnev's pep talk to a 1970 Komsomol conference. Soviet youth, he declared, is "healthy, energetic, ambitious...full of enthusiasm for the cause of the Party and Communism" (see attached New York Times article, 27 May 1970). Such wishful thinking is understandable. For a Party leadership whose average age is now over 60, the spectacle of ever-greater numbers (though still a small percentage) of its youth turning away from political concerns despite all the Party and government pressure, must be extremely alarming and conjure up fears for the future. One Politburo member, P.Y. Shelest, was more candid when he called

on all public organizations to fight the intolerable, shameful hippy who "scorns work" ("khippi" in Russian transliteration) under the influence of bourgeois propaganda and morals (see attached New York Times article, 30 June 1971). All indications, including scathing comments in the Party press, are that Shelest spoke more accurately than Brezhnev.

In 1969 more than 80% of juvenile offenders were drunk when picked up; hooliganism and vandalism are increasing; western dress and hair styles, western music are enormously popular and are seen as inherently evil by the authorities. Most disturbing of all is the fact that idleness and apathy are more and more a way of life among the educated youth. Many thousands reportedly go as far as the Siberian plains to avoid the stultification of life in the Soviet labor force. Agricultural lands, suffering from the inefficiencies of centralized, bureaucratic management and emptiness of rural Soviet society, now lose as many as 19 of every 20 youths to the cities where many of them are content to work only enough to provide a bare subsistence. The age of the Stahkanovite is over; the age of the parasite may be ascendant. "Parasitism" is the official term for refusal to do approved work, a definition which is easily stretched to include all non-conformist activities. Penalties for parasites include being shipped off to "special locations" for two to five years.

Soviet youth is manipulated, politicized and bureaucratized, starting at an early age, by four institutions: the schools, military services, Pioneers and Komsomols (Communist Youth League). The last two are especially significant. At age 10 nearly all Soviet children join the Pioneers. Supervised by Komsomol leaders, Pioneers are indoctrinated with group discipline and patriotism along with being taught a wide range of recreational games and skills. The Komsomol, the junior Communist Party, has traditionally been a more elitist organization but is now moving toward all-encompassing membership of youths from 15 to 28. Directly controlled by the CPSU, the Komsomol provides an interesting window on authoritarian Communism. Its paid professional officers are directly responsible to the Central Committee of the CPSU and are not accountable to the membership. Komsomol structure apes that of the CPSU and like that body is managed from the top down through "democratic centralism."

"In pluralistic societies, the term 'youth organization' brings to mind a voluntary association of members with common interests and shared goals -- a description that should not be applied to Komsomol. Its existence depends not upon massive popular support, but upon the power and authority of the Communist Party. The Komsomol is the antithesis of a youth movement. It is an organization sponsored

by the Party precisely in order to monopolize the field and to forestall the emergence of what are viewed as authentic youth movements in democratic societies. This characteristic of the Komsomol is of fundamental importance in evaluating its role in the Soviet system and in attempting to account for its successes and failures."* [emphasis added].

Like their mentors in the CPSU, Komsomol leaders are aging. Although regular membership is limited to those under 28, leaders stay on (at one Komsomol Congress, over 50% were over 28). Two recent Komsomol chiefs were later rewarded with leadership of the KGB, the Soviet secret service, on the strength of their work in the Komsomol!

In addition to the schools, the Pioneers and the Komsomol, pre-military training is mandatory for all students, beginning at nine years. Further enhancing the patriotic, dutiful-citizen model emphasized by other institutions, military training during school years is so thorough as to permit reducing the term of regular, mandatory military service for adults.

Despite these years of regimentation, or more probably because of it, a rising number of Soviet young people are disenchanted with the reality of Soviet life after school, which they compare unfavorably with the selflessness they have been trained to cultivate.

While many of the worlds' youth are questioning their parents' values, their elders, their teachers and leaders are experimenting with responsive reforms. The Communist reaction to problems with their young people contrasts vividly with some non-Communist efforts. Instead of trying to understand youthful attitudes and problems, they deny their validity; instead of trying to bridge a generation gap, they deny its existence. Instead of examining educational institutions for their contribution to humanistic needs in a technical society, they establish more boarding schools for closer control over students. Instead of exploring the basis for apathy and cynicism, they try to repress its manifestations. Instead of questioning their own restrictive training methods, they blame disaffection on western influences. Instead of helping the individual to achieve the highest possible level of education, they require students to augment factory labor forces. Instead of practicing the egalitarianism they preach, they award the best schools, the best jobs to the political activists. Instead of opening the political process to youthful participants, they close it further

*Allen Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, Harvard University Press, 1965.

by denying secret ballots to regular Komsomol members and excluding students from decisions about their own lives, just as they exclude the average Party member from important decisions.

Realistically, little else can be expected. In education and youth training, as in politics and every phase of Communist life, to decentralize command, to permit individual choices or experiment along untried lines is to invite the loss of Party control over every field of public activity. There is little likelihood that the Soviet Union, or any of its East European subordinates feels strong enough to run that risk.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 May 1970

Brezhnev Compares Unrest of Youth in West With Calm in Soviet

By BERNARD GIVERTZMEN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, May 26—Leonid

I. Brezhnev, the head of the Communist party, said at the opening session of a congress of the Young Communist League today that the "stormy upsurge" of youth in the West provided evidence of the "deepening social crisis of capitalism."

The 5,000 delegates—most of them between 25 and 35 years of age—cheered as Mr. Brezhnev compared this "crisis" with the situation in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Brezhnev said that in the West "youth does not want to put up with a system of exploitation and with the bloody adventures of imperialism." Urging more contact with these "progressive" forces, he said protests in recent years "have become a serious factor in the political fight in the capitalist countries."

Mr. Brezhnev said that Soviet youth, meanwhile, "is growing up morally healthy, energetic and ambitious."

"Soviet youth is full of energy and enthusiasm for the fight for the cause of the party, for the cause of Communism," he said.

Politically Most Active

The delegates in the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses represent the country's 27 million members of the Young Communist League, known in the Soviet Union by the acronym Komsomol.

Their election as delegates indicated that they were the "most politically active of the Komsomol members. They form the traditional training ground for future party leaders. They have a reputation of being the most ideologically orthodox, certainly more so than their nonactivist fellow members."

They enthusiastically shouted

in rhythm, "Glory to the party," and "Lenin is with us," waiting for the meeting to open.

Mr. Brezhnev, in his speech to the quadrennial congress, drew the attention of the delegates to the economic problems that he has underlined in many of his speeches this year.

He said the first years of the Soviet system were like "a primary school" compared with the difficulties facing the people today.

The main report was given by Yevgeny M. Tyazhelnikov, the First Secretary of the Komsomol. He said that although Soviet youth was basically on the right track, "we cannot say that the poison of anti-Communism does not pose dangers." He then said that the Komsomol could not tolerate "some appearances of skepticism, apolitical behavior, a scornful attitude toward work study, school or civil obligation."

CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES
30 June 1971

CPYRGHT

Ukraine Leader Urges Soviet to Get Rid of 'Khippis'

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 29—Pyotr

Y. Shelest, a Soviet Politburo member, has called for a public campaign to rid the Soviet Union of what he regards as the latest Western scourge—hippies.

At a Central Committee meeting of the Ukrainian party organization last week, Mr. Shelest, the Ukrainian leader, said every Communist and every public organization must join in the fight.

This was believed the first time that a leading Soviet official has used the word "hippies" in public. In Russian and Ukrainian it sounds almost the same as it does in English—"khippi."

"Many youths by their unworthy behavior have brought shame on themselves, their comrades, parents and collectives," he said, "which they work or study," Mr. Shelest said, according to the latest issue of the Ukrainian party paper to

reach Moscow.

"Under the influence of bourgeois propaganda and morals, part of the youth for this or that reason has slipped from under our influence," he complained. "Phenomena not unlike the so-called hippies who scorn work have developed. This is harmful to the Socialist world view."

He said that "these shameful phenomena are intolerable in our society."

All Communists and all public opinion must join in the fight against them. The goal of party organizations is to raise decisively the responsibilities of all Communists for the education of our youth," he said.

Mr. Shelest did not say how extensive he thought the hippy influence was. But it has been quite clear that in major Soviet cities, the young people are gradually moving toward a hippy look. Part of the reason for this is the desire of Soviet youth not to be out of step with young people in other countries.

Although long-haired youths are no longer curiosities and blue jeans are even manufactured in the Soviet Union, there is nothing like the hippy cult of the West in the Soviet Union. Restrictions on movement and residency in most cities prevent the communal arrangements of

the West, and authorities are not tolerant of any public show of disorder.

There is also little sign of any interest in marijuana among Soviet youth.

What Mr. Shelest seems most upset about are the interest in Western fads shown by Soviet youth and a certain skepticism toward official ideology exhibited by some of them. Thus, in fashions, the miniskirt, the midi and even some maxis are seen here, and all sophisticated young people listen to Western popular music.

Ironically, the interest in hippies was in a sense fostered by the official propaganda.

Hippies Seen in Films

Soviet television and movie theaters have shown many films about the anti-war movement in the United States and almost all the young people in the films

have the hippy look. Soviet efforts to encourage tourism have brought some Western hippies here as well.

In addition, quite a few Hungarian and Polish hippy types have been here on official youth exchanges, much to the consternation of officials of the Soviet Young Communist League.

The proper appearance for young Communist men includes short haircuts, dark suits, and either white shirt and tie or a white turtle-neck shirt. Girls are expected to wear a sober suit, or blouse and skirt, with the hem just above the knee.

There have been some reports that a number of people, not all of them young, have been migrating to Siberia, where there are fewer restrictions and where they can live a sort of hobo existence. These Russians are called "bichi," as distinct from hippies.

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
18 August 1969

CPYRGHT

YOUNG GENERATION: SOVIET WORRY

CPYRGHT

Now it is Russia where grown-ups are beginning to look at their brash youngsters with disbelieving eyes.

Widening, there, is the gap between young and old as Marxism's children learn about protest—and miniskirts.

MOSCOW

The "generation gap" that has brought anguish to millions of American parents and educators is also becoming a major problem in Communist Russia.

Here, in a country supposedly ruled by Marxist discipline, fathers and mothers despair increasingly over their children.

Small groups of students have staged illegal demonstrations over such issues as minority rights, and have circulated petitions denouncing the persecution of dissident intellectuals.

The challenge. As in America, an "underground press" flourishes among students here—mocking the "establishment" and its ways.

Little is seen of a drug problem among Soviet youngsters. But their elders complain constantly about drinking and "hooliganism" among the young.

Russian youths often register apathy when their elders try to instill Communist ideology in them.

They adopt Western fads such as miniskirts and long hair, and display what older people generally regard as sexual looseness.

These youngsters are accused of failing to appreciate the sacrifices of their elders in making possible the "good life" which they appear to take for granted.

Russian parents, no less than their U. S. counterparts, seem baffled in dealing with such attitudes. Their reactions range from official crackdowns and stern admonitions to attempts at sympathetic understanding.

Politely, Russia's young are playing a major role in protests demanding that citizens be given, in practice, the rights accorded to them in theory by the Soviet Constitution—freedom of speech, press and assembly, and the right to a fair trial.

Communist authorities, from the aging men in the Kremlin on down, are responding with jail, exile and other repressive measures.

Occasionally, however, an older person's voice rises in defense of the young and their demands. Typical is a letter sent by Ivan A. Yakhimovich, chairman of a Latvian collective farm, to the prominent theorist and Politburo member Mikhail A. Suslov. Commenting on the trial of four youthful dissidents in Moscow, the writer said:

"I believe that the persecution of young dissenters in a country where more than 50 per cent of the population is younger than 30 years of age is an extremely dangerous line: adventurism. It is not toadies, not a public of 'yes men' (Lord, how they have multiplied), 'mama's boys' who will determine the future, but rather those very rebels, as the most energetic, brave and high-principled members of our young genera-

tion. It is stupid to see in them the enemies of Soviet power, and more than stupid to let them rot in prisons and make mock of them. For the party, such a line is equivalent to self-strangulation. Too bad for us if we are not capable of reaching an understanding with these young people. They will inevitably create a new party."

Worry over the future course of Russia's young was indicated when the Soviet leadership recently accused the country's official youth organization, the 23-million-member Young Communist League, of failure to enlist youthful enthusiasm for Communist ideals and causes.

Concern over morals. Soviet elders also are paying much attention to sex among the young.

An "Izvestia" article reported a court case of 15-year-old girls who had sexual relations with 40-year-old men. The article brought a flood of letters from readers.

These are some excerpts:

"I would ban the showing of all foreign films, as well as some of our own."

"This idiotic short-skirt fashion must be prohibited. A man can't ride in streetcars any more." . . . "Isn't it time that the content of books were carefully checked? I. Meras's novel, 'What Makes the World Go Round,' glorifies a girl who gave birth to an illegitimate child. It would be better for young people to read the classics."

One reader wrote:

"There is need for discipline. When father used to lay on with the saddle girth, you didn't easily forget it. And it's too bad that the custom of smearing tar on the doors [of delinquent girls] is being made fun of."

"If it didn't help one particular girl, at least it scared off others."

L. Ochakovskaya replied with this editorial opinion:

"Nonsense! As though it were possible to instill morality with a saddle girth. . . . Communist morality can be instilled only by a lofty goal, by serious work, by nobility on the part of those who surround you."

"All the bare knees." The miniskirt,

especially, stirs indignation among older Russians.

In an unsigned letter to the "Literary Gazette," a reader recently denounced short skirts as "a great shortcoming and a harmful thing in our society." The letter added:

"When I see all the bare knees everywhere, I see nothing elegant about it. I am being pursued by miniskirts. They are everywhere—in buses, in parks, in theaters, in streets, in planes, in trains, on land and on the sea. . . . The emotions of a normal man develop in the wrong direction."

Replying to this, one A. Raskin urged the anonymous author to calm down and argued that although he, himself, did not care for miniskirts, women should be free to choose their own fashions.

Less tolerantly, the Soviet daily "Leninist Banner" recently attacked Soviet youths who imitate Western dances such as the "shake." The newspaper said:

"The boys are shaking their bodies as if their pants are nailed to a fence and they are trying to tear them off. . . ."

"After such a hot dance, the wornout partners return to their places and embrace. There is nothing surprising about this, since the lack of modesty in the movements of the 'shake' and the 'twist' are creating relations which can cause anxiety. . . ."

"Shakes' and 'twists' are not an innocent amusement, but a means of building ideological bridges."

Lush life. Complaints also are being heard about young people's "spoiled" insistence on high living.

A recent article by T. Kozhevnikova in "Pravda" criticized lavishness of graduation parties, citing the case of a girl who presented her parents with the following ultimatum:

"Either a dress of white guipure [heavy lace] or I won't go to the party!"

Said the writer:

"What is it that creates excessive demands on the part of someone who is still a minor and who has not earned a single kopeck? Is it the growing material well-being of the family, or considerations of prestige, or the implacable laws of fashion? Probably all three. Also, apparently, there is the absence of reason-

ably priced and yet modern merchandise, and also the fact that recurrences of philistine conceit, vanity and exhibitionism often go unchallenged by public opinion at the school, and by a firm 'No' at home."

In a recent article in "Pravda," E. Kostyashkin, an educator, said:

"Present-day schoolchildren, especially in the city, and most students as well, freed from labor obligations, sometimes take it for granted that their parents should unquestioningly fulfill their needs and even their whims. We are witnessing a kind of inflation of material values for adolescents. They make less and less of a connection between the results of labor and labor itself. . . . According to our observation, expenses for children grow more rapidly than income of the parents, and absorb an ever-larger part of the family budget. . . ."

"Children often dress much better than their parents. Many have expensive cameras, transistors and tape recorders—without even having learned what it is to earn a ruble."

Comrade Kostyashkin found nothing wrong with this, provided a corrective was introduced in the form of physical labor which should, he thought, accompany a youngster's schooling from childhood onward.

A recurring complaint is that today's youth in Russia pays no mind to the work and sacrifices of its elders, not only the "men of the '40s" who defended the country in war and rebuilt it from ruins, but the "men of the '30s" who laid the foundations for Russia's industries.

Clowns and guitar players. This point was made strongly by a spokesman for the older generation, the well-known writer Nikolai Gribachev. In a poem, "No, Boys!" that appeared in "Pravda," he told Russia's young that their elders did not toil and sacrifice "so that you could become clowns in the marketplace and guitarists for languid girls."

An American would immediately grasp the thought, if not the imagery, of Comrade Gribachev's complaint—which reveals much about the "generation gap" rapidly developing within the world's No. 1 Communist power.

CPYRGHT
EVENING STAR
27 July 1969

CPYRGHT

YOUTH HAS KREMLIN WORRIED

By ANTHONY C. COLLINS
Associated Press Staff Writer

MOSCOW — Angry student demonstrations in the West seem like scenes from another world to Russia's tightly reined students.

Yet, despite Communist party control which prevents any massive student rebellion, Kremlin rulers see a few signs of youthful restlessness here — and they're worried.

A tiny handful of students has taken part in recent illegal demonstrations over minority group rights and has signed petitions protesting the persecution of dissident intellectuals.

A larger number read, and sometimes contribute to, underground literary magazines which are free of Communist censors.

An even larger number of youths expresses its restlessness not in intellectual or political dissent but in drinking and "hooliganism."

Soviet rulers have shown their concern by arresting the few demonstrators, trying to suppress the underground magazines and seeking new ways to combat juvenile delinquency.

One new proposal on combatting crime gives a rare inside look at the frustrations of Soviet youth and the problems Moscow has in controlling its young citizens.

Two women jurists, N. Bukovskaya and E. Melnikova, proposed that the regime's existing controls on youth be expanded to cover their after-work or after-school hours.

Under existing controls, the party's 24-million-member Komsomol-Communist Youth League, keeps a sharp eye on young people at school, at work and in the army. This is not only to combat crime but also to prevent copying the political agitation of Western youth—seizing school buildings, striking, disobeying military orders.

No Control Now

But the Komsomol does not now control the average Soviet youth on his neighborhood streets, the two women wrote in Komsomolskaya Pravda, the official Komsomol paper.

"Only on the street does he feel 'free,'" they said.

This leads to spontaneously formed groups, and about 80 percent of juvenile crimes are committed by them.

The solution, the women said, is for Communist youth officials to work with the manager of each apartment building — the most widespread type of housing — "to organize groups of youths of the same age, education and interests."

Closely watched groups of 15 to 20 youths each should be encouraged to go ice skating together, visit museums and movies, and go with Komsomol volunteers to work on farm or construction sites, the two women said.

This has been tried in Leningrad, second biggest city after Moscow, they added, and has helped cut teen-age crime in half.

Such a system of tighter party control would "cultivate the spiritual needs of minors and their moral ideals," the writers maintained.

They said their studies at a crime institute showed that most juvenile crime resulted from "spiritual poverty, combined with unorganized leisure activities."

This fits in with previous complaints by the press and youths themselves that often there's nothing interesting to do.

Deprived of many Western consumer goods such as cars and good clothes, some youths complain that cultural outlets such as records, TV shows and movies are either in short supply or weighted down with propaganda.

On collective farms, increasingly abandoned by youths for the cities, the boredom problem is worse, other articles have said.

Although studies of home life are lacking, Western observers see some strains on youth stemming from crowded one-room apartments and working mothers.

This makes the lack of adequate leisure facilities more critical.

The debate in the West over youthful marijuana users is unheard of here, and there is no pub-

lic evidence of a drug problem.

Added to the lack of leisure activities, young people face other limitations more constricting than those which Western youths rebel against.

Two years of military service are mandatory for all 18-year-olds, although those lucky enough to get into college can defer active duty.

Travel Curb

After college, or one of the many vocational institutes, students are expected to "repay their debt to society" by working at least a year in some unpopular, labor-short area such as Siberia. Many find ways to quit before the year is up.

Soviet young people travel more than in the past, but few are allowed out to the West or even to Eastern Europe. A lucky one, Yuri, saw East Germany and reports: "Life is better there." The travel curb, like restrictions on studies, apparently stems from a Kremlin fear that contact with foreign ideas might turn young people's thoughts toward rebellion.

Possibly for a similar reason, Soviet news media which usually delight in U.S. troubles have largely ignored America's student upheaval.

But observers do see some signs of a Soviet-style generation gap. One sign is a taboo on even discussing the problem, called "The fathers and sons question."

When one writer in Moloday Kommunist-Young Communist, a party youth journal, dared to suggest a conflict existed, the Journal's next issue attacked him. "No other society has ever known such solidarity between 'fathers and sons,'" it claimed.

As proof that the new generation shares the Communist ideals and patriotism allegedly held by the previous one, the press cites school group trips to World War II cemeteries.

At the same time, cartoons in the regime's own satire magazine, Krokodil, ridicule young people for wearing long hair or miniskirts, shirking work, drinking vodka or listening to Western pop music.

CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES
6 July 1969

CPYRGHT

YOUTH'S PACIFICISM SCORED IN SOVIET

Army Journal Asks 'Hatred' for Nation's Enemies

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, July 5 — The Communist party journal of the Soviet armed forces complained this week that some young people were pacifist and lacked the "hatred" of older generations for the Soviet Union's enemies.

The journal, *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil*, said it was mandatory for young recruits to be educated in "hatred for the enemy" led by the United States.

The journal, published every two weeks, is read primarily by military officers and political

commissars of the armed forces. It generally reflects an ultrapatriotic conservative line

reactionary and anti-semitic groups had developed in Czarist Russia.

The May issue contained unpublished poems by Miss Akhmatova and the first publication in Russian of Albert Camus's story, "The Fall," with a postscript that justified the publication of this ruminative work as an example of contemporary Western thought.

Memoirs Are Begun

Tsetsiliya Kin started her memoirs about her husband, Viktor Kin, a Soviet journalist and writer who was executed in 1937 during the Stalinist purges.

The conservatives seek to discourage reviving memoirs of the Stalinist purges in Soviet

publications.

Perhaps the most interesting article was by one of Novy Mir's more controversial critics, Vladimir Lakshin who eulogized Mark Shcheglov, a close friend of his.

Although the works of liberal writers have become known in the Soviet Union since Mr. Shcheglov's death in 1956, Mr. Lakshin mourned that his friend and fellow critic had not lived to write of them and their work.

Listing many authors who were either unpublished in Stalin's time or severely attacked, but who have gained acceptance among the country's liberal intelligentsia since then, Mr. Lakshin said of Mr. Shcheglov:

"About all this he would have written. He truly would have written, and would have written better than we."

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LISTY

NUMÉRO SPÉCIAL

Mars 1972

EDITION FRANÇAISE

Bulletin de la résistance socialiste tchécoslovaque

PROCLAMER LA VÉRITÉ

par VERCORS

La tragédie tchécoslovaque n'a pas été seulement celle d'un pays de douze millions d'habitants. Elle reste celle peut-être de toute l'espèce humaine. Avant l'intervention, en 1968, un parti communiste avait réussi à secouer, de l'intérieur, la masse énorme d'erreurs, d'injustices et de mépris de l'homme qui, depuis quarante ans, altéraient si gravement le visage du socialisme que l'opinion publique, à travers le monde et dans la grande majorité, assimilait le socialisme aux crimes commis en son nom. En quelques semaines, au cours d'un printemps prodigieux, des centaines de millions de gens sur la terre assistaient à la démonstration que le socialisme était tout le contraire de ce monstre froid et, cessant soudain d'en avoir peur, s'ouvraient à plus d'espoir même qu'en 1917. Après un demi-siècle pendant lequel, avec Staline puis sans lui, le socialisme s'était lentement et parfois cruellement dénaturé, voici qu'éclatait à Prague une joie toute nouvelle, à laquelle participait toute la population, tchèque et slovaque, une explosion de liberté dans les idées, les arts, les lettres, le théâtre; une explosion surtout de la vérité, et pas seulement pour quelques-uns, mais de la vérité pour tous, celle chantée par Eluard, tandis qu'un renouveau économique, et de nouvelles conditions de gestion auxquelles participaient les travailleurs, ouvraient les perspectives d'une merveilleuse prospérité. Toute cette allégresse avait, hors des frontières, un tel pouvoir de conviction, un tel attrait sur les populations d'une so-

ciété capitaliste en voie de décomposition, que l'Europe en restait tremblante, non de crainte, mais d'espérance.

Le 21 août a détruit tout cela, en un instant.

Il l'a détruit pour le moment. Car il demeure que cette joie a eu lieu. Qu'elle a été possible. Qu'elle a été produite par une prise de conscience d'un parti de son appareil. Ce qui s'est produit une fois, sous la contrainte des réalités, peut se produire de nouveau, sous la contrainte de réalités analogues. L'histoire ne se répète pas, mais la vie ne cesse d'évoluer; et ce qui a produit le printemps de Prague peut susciter des réactions de même ordre dans d'autres partis communistes, dans d'autres appareils affrontés à des impasses équivalentes. Le moment venu, un même besoin de jugement sain, une même contestation, une même aspiration à la franchise, à la vérité, peuvent balayer semblablement les éléments têtus et sclérosés, les obliger à lâcher le pouvoir, à le céder à des hommes plus lucides, à des communistes plus clairvoyants.

Mais cela se prépare. 1968 ne s'est pas fait tout seul, ni en un jour. Ce fut l'effet d'un long et persistant effort de l'intelligentsia communiste au cours des années précédentes — et le nouveau pouvoir installé à Prague par les baïonnettes russes le sait si bien que ses coups ont été et sont de plus en plus dirigés contre ceux-là, contre ces intellectuels qui leur ont fait lâcher les leviers de commande, les ont précipités à bas du pouvoir. Et com-

ment ? Par la seule vérité. En proclamant la vérité. Aussi la vérité est-elle pour eux la menace dont ils ont le plus peur, puisqu'ils savent bien qu'elle est révolutionnaire, et tout ce qu'ils l'ont depuis quatre ans, c'est de l'empêcher par tous les moyens de sortir de son puits, et d'y fourrer, dans le puits, tous ceux qui pourraient la faire briller une fois encore. Alors on empêche les écrivains d'écrire, quand on ne les met pas en prison, on ne publie pas leurs nouvelles œuvres et l'on met les anciennes au pilon, on les réduit à la misère et à la mort civile, à la disparition intellectuelle, on vide les universités, on fait, selon l'expression d'Aragon, un Biafra de l'esprit, dût-on ramener la nation au désert culturel, au dernier rang des connaissances de tous les pays du monde. Mais un tel crime ne peut être commis que par des hommes au cerveau pétrifié, à l'esprit corrompu, aux yeux desquels seul compte l'exercice du pouvoir, quelles qu'en doivent être les conséquences. Autrement dit, tous les vieux crocodiles, les revenants staliniens qui s'accueillent mutuellement, comme Novotny, avec des roses et ne rêvent que de rétablir les bonnes vieilles méthodes, les procédés drastiques du bon vieux temps. S'ils se sentent retenus encore de les appliquer à pleins gaz, s'ils se contentent encore de réduire leurs victimes à la liquidation sociale, faute de pouvoir déjà, comme autrefois, recourir à la liquidation physique ce n'est pas — ils en riraient — au nom du respect de la vie, de considérations humanitaires ; mais seulement pour des raisons tactiques, provisoires. Il ne faut pas effaroucher trop vite les âmes sensibles des partis frères, qui croient encore, les pauvres, au XX^e Congrès. Alors la tactique est simple : bien sûr on ne renonce pas aux arrestations ni aux procès, on assure seulement qu'ils n'ont pas lieu. On jure qu'ils n'auront pas lieu dans le moment-même où ils se font, sans se soucier d'une contradiction que tout le monde peut voir en lisant le journal. A l'envoyé du P.C.F. que ces nouvelles inquiètent, on répète qu'il n'y aura pas

de poursuites pour les faits remontant à 1968-69, justement quand l'auteur d'un article de 68, approuvé par le comité central, est condamné pour cet article, en même temps que vingt et un autres, dont l'ancien commentateur à la télévision, porte-parole du bureau politique. Sait-on que cette promesse, ce mensonge pris sur le fait, que ce propos a été tenu par M. Husak — mais non pas seul à seul, mais en présence de son ennemi M. Bilak ? Car on ne laisse pas M. Husak parler à un camarade français sans témoin. M. Husak est surveillé. C'est de nouveau le règne de la méfiance généralisée, où chacun surveille l'autre. C'est l'ambiance des années 50, au pire moment de la dénonciation mutuelle — lorsque Slansky laissait pendre Clementis et que Gotwald laissait pendre Slansky de peur d'être pendu lui-même. Car forcément tout recommence, les mêmes causes produisent les mêmes effets. Seulement, des effets, après vingt ans de déviation dans la terreur, ils ont fini par causer, à leur tour, la réaction subite et salutaire du printemps de Prague...

Mais ils ne l'ont pas causée sans aide. Il a fallu la témérité de quelques écrivains et la confiance qu'un Smrkovsky, un Dubcek leur ont faite. Il a fallu la proclamation incessante, quotidienne, de la vérité, de toutes les vérités. Ce fut là l'honneur et la gloire de la presse tchécoslovaque. Ce fut l'honneur au premier chef de Literarny Listy — et qui explique l'acharnement du nouveau pouvoir contre la rédaction de ce journal courageux. La presse est morte en Tchécoslovaquie, et avec elle la vérité. Il n'est qu'un moyen pour faire renaître la vérité, c'est de faire renaître aussi la presse. Voici le premier numéro du nouveau Listy traduit en langue française. C'est le premier espoir, la première pierre de cette renaissance. Saluons-le.

VERCORS

LISTY

Listopad 1971 č. 6

Časopis československé socialistické opozice

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Politika cukroví a biče

Oficiální politika se odehrává v podobě kampaní a tak jsme přes prádnou téměř nepozorované z kampaní povjedené v kampani předvolební. Uprostřed prádnou vyjel švestkový člunek na tému, kde je hlavní nebezpečí a kde hlavní těžší boj o vědomí lidu, který obsahoval některá zajímavá přiznání. Je to přepracovaný text projevu k ideologickým informacím. Švestka přiznává, že nebezpečí "pravice" dosud trvá. Nepřestala jako politická síla existovat, a "její koncepce" mají dosud značný vliv na vědomí lidu. Uznal také, že mnori zůstávají v pasivní rezistenci nebo pomýšlejí na aktivní odpor a část z nich je již nyní programově aktivní. Dal proto ideologické frontě úkoly: 1) zápas o dávkání dělnické třídy, zejména ze svých rámců, 2) zápas o vědomí mládeže. Švestka byl v tomto projevu — až na lastné propagandistické úkle, kdy dával do jednoho pytle "pravici" a "kriminalitu a vůbec proti-

společenské hlavy" — zřejmě blife skutečnosti než Husák. Ten v několika posledních projevech, již zřejmě předvolebních, vzbuzuje dojem, jako by s výjimkou pár "politických exhibicionistů" celé Československo pospívalo jeho politiku. Ještě nedávno se potohl vyjadřovat Novotný i o Husákově a dával ho do souvislosti se zahraničními centrami, zejména s Buržanským. Byrokrati jsou jako Bourboni — nepouštělní.

Husák v nedávném projevu k mládeži (ve Strátních) dával za příklad Zátopkův politický obět. Zřejmě by chtěl vyvolat jakési "zátopkovské imitace" v morální angažované. Zátopek sám v dopisech přátelům tvrdil, že byl vystaven existenciálnímu tlaku, brezl z soudního stíhání atd. Jiní tlaku odolávali. Věra Čáslavská odmítla reprizovat. Záměrem "bojovní" v Rudém právu. Příkladem je postoj českých spisovatelů: přeměna přípravného výboru v nový Svaz spisovatelů

se musela již po několikaleté odložit. I Husák o předloženém scénarii dlel řekl, že v něm nikoho nezná. Kromě toho, že v návrhu nejsou známá jména, je i průměrný věk ochotných kandidátů svazu 60 let.

Oficiální politika se tak potácí mezi silovou hrnou a podbízením. Silou se má hrát s těmi, kteří trvali na svém. Tím se mají strasit i ostatní a títo postrašení mají zase dostat nabídku laskavého zacházení — půjdou-li k volbám. Hlavní je dostat voliče, zejména mládež, k urnám. Výsledek voleb se již snadno upraví, jen nečistat se těžko zastírá. Předvolební společné zasedání ÚV KSČ a NF tato politiku husákovského cukroví a biče chce představit voličům pokud možno v laskavém balení. Neboť — jak vykládá lidra námětníkům — volby budou plebiscitem. Nepřijde vskutku o volbu, nebude nic kým volit. Vešlení nemá hluc ani o hodnotě hlasů pro. Chce pouze vědět, že bylo málo těch,

kdo se odvážil postavit aktivně proti, at už krtem nebo především neúčastí na volbách.

Nikdo a nás nebude odmítat třeba vyjádření staromilých důchodů, byl je trochu trapné, že k němu dochází v podobě volebního guliče. Přijímáme však všechno, co se nám v předvolebních námluvách nalazí. Chodíme na předvolební schůze a pořádáme — zmlu tiěba jen ve věrech námluv, komunalních, závodních či okremních. Aktivita voličů, po níž úřady volají se tak může změnit z argumentu propagandy v opak toho, co úřady sledují. Vešlení potřebuje minimální účast na předvolebních schůzích a maximální na volbách, a čeho vyplývá ponent.

Už teď se děje zajímavé věci. K 21. srpnu byly připraveny oslavy bratrské internacionální pomoci, ávodníky, rozhovory na téma "Koproli". V místech se novějším posádkou se připravovaly oslavy o vojenskou

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« LISTY » en français

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« LISTY » est le journal de l'opposition socialiste tchécoslovaque.

Il paraît tous les deux mois, dans différents pays étrangers et en Tchécoslovaquie même. Par lui circulent les informations sur la situation dans le pays, la répression, les luttes de la résistance.

Soutenu aussi bien par les hommes du « Printemps de Prague » qui furent contraints à l'exil que par ceux qui continuent la lutte dans le pays, malgré la répression du pouvoir « normalisé », le retentissement de ce petit journal tchécoslovaque est considérable.

A l'extérieur, il est la manifestation de la continuité du courant en faveur d'un socialisme à visage humain ; à l'intérieur, dans la Tchécoslovaquie occupée, il est le symbole stimulant de la résistance socialiste, le porteur des espoirs.

Le COMITE DU 5 JANVIER, constitué au début de 1970, en cherchant de nouvelles formes d'activité susceptibles de renforcer, en France, le courant croissant de solidarité avec le peuple tchécoslovaque, a pensé qu'il serait bon qu'une édition en langue française de « LISTY » fasse mieux connaître cette publication.

En accord avec nos amis tchécoslovaques, nous reproduisons ici quelques articles, informations ou échos parus dans « LISTY » en 1971. Il est bien compréhensible que les rédacteurs vivant en Tchécoslovaquie occupée n'ont pu signer certains articles de leurs noms réels.

Jiri Pélikan, éditeur de « LISTY », directeur de la Télévision de Prague en 1968, élu membre du Comité Central au XIV^e Congrès du Parti Communiste tchécoslovaque, le 22 août 1968, a rédigé spécialement un éditorial.

Le grand écrivain Vercors, dont la notoriété en Tchécoslovaquie est considérable, a bien voulu écrire la préface de ce numéro spécial.

En le remerciant, nous exprimons notre reconnaissance à celles et à ceux qui, répondant à notre appel, nous ont permis de réunir la somme nécessaire à la publication de « LISTY » en français. Nous avons tenu à donner à ce numéro le même aspect, format et mise en page, qu'au « Lisy » tchécoslovaque auquel il rend hommage, en promettant au peuple de Tchécoslovaquie et à sa résistance socialiste d'amplifier notre campagne de solidarité.

Une répression qui est

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dirigée contre vous ...

par Jiri PELIKAN
éditeur de « LISTY »

Pour ce numéro exceptionnel de « Listy », nous aurions voulu présenter au public français une sélection représentative d'articles analysant le « Printemps de Prague », des essais brillants et un programme pour l'avenir.

Mais la sortie de ce numéro coïncide avec une nouvelle — et malheureusement pas la dernière — vague de répression en Tchécoslovaquie.

C'est ainsi que nombre d'organisations plus de documents et d'articles sur la lutte de notre peuple que sur sa culture. Il le comprendra sans doute, même s'il nous est désagréable de nous représenter comme ceux qui, en exposant leur « cas », viennent troubler la conscience des autres.

Nous savons bien que de l'Histoire, les gens aiment à oublier les événements déplaisants, surtout lorsqu'ils risquent de leur donner un sentiment de culpabilité.

L'occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie, d'un pays situé au cœur de l'Europe et cela en plein dégel international, appartient sans doute à cette catégorie d'événements dont le rappel n'est pas agréable...

C'est sur cela que comptent les occupants de notre pays et les gouverneurs qu'ils ont placés à sa direction. C'est pourquoi ils ont considéré que le moment était opportun — à l'abri de nouveaux espoirs de détente — pour régler leurs comptes avec ceux qui voulurent, en 1968, un « socialisme à visage humain » et qui n'ont pas abandonné leur lutte au lieu d'accepter la « réalité ».

Mais nous serions injustes si nous ne voyions pas que beaucoup de femmes et d'hommes, dans le monde, se révoltent contre cette « règle » de l'Histoire et que leur solidarité avec le peuple tchécoslovaque est toujours vivante. La parution de cette édition française de « Listy » en est un des nombreux exemples.

C'est ainsi que de nombre d'organisations et d'amis ont élevé leurs voix, ces dernières semaines, contre la nouvelle vague de répression en Tchécoslovaquie. Nous leur en sommes profondément reconnaissants. C'est un encouragement moral dont la valeur ne peut pas se mesurer.

Un excès ?

Mais le problème est beaucoup plus profond. Quand on dénonce la répression à Prague, on a souvent tendance à la présenter comme un « excès » des groupes ou des personnes « extrémistes » — tels les ultras Bilak et Indra, ou la police secrète — qui iraient à l'encontre de la volonté de Husak et surtout en opposition avec la ligne de la direction soviétique actuelle. Ici, comme dit un proverbe tchèque, « le désir devient le père de la pensée »...

En effet, la répression policière aujourd'hui, en Tchécoslovaquie, est seulement une conséquence inévitable de l'occupation soviétique du pays, le résultat de la politique de grande puissance.

Un régime d'occupation, imposé de cette manière ne peut pas — indépendamment des personnes et de leur volonté — régner autrement que par la peur et l'oppression. Toutes les comparaisons avec la Pologne et la Hongrie sont fausses parce que — en dehors de traditions différentes — l'Armée soviétique était installée dans ces pays avant son intervention, alors que, dans le cas de la Tchécoslovaquie, il s'agissait d'une invasion pure et simple, avec toutes les conséquences psychologiques que cela suppose pour la population.

Certains observateurs étrangers continuent à répéter que Husak ne veut pas la répression, tandis que Bilak, Indra et d'autres la veulent. C'est une vision superficielle, même si on admet l'existence de contradictions au sein du groupe dirigeant de Prague.

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Chaque régime préfère que tous les citoyens l'acceptent et le soutiennent volontairement. C'est dans ce sens que Husak voulait, comme les autres, que les « hommes du printemps de Prague » fassent leur autocritique et se salissent eux-mêmes, leurs camarades et leurs idées défendues en 1968. A ceux qui auraient accepté cette humiliation publique, on promettait une bienveillance magnanime. Mais à ceux qui refusèrent et persistèrent à conserver leurs opinions, on a déclaré la guerre sans merci.

Guerre politique, tout d'abord : des accusations publiques de « trahison », sans la moindre possibilité de défense. Puis matérielle : expulsion du travail, transfert d'un poste à l'autre, discrimination envers leurs enfants chassés des Universités ou de l'emploi. Atteinte physique dans beaucoup de cas : interrogatoires, perquisitions, arrestations, condamnations, brutalités dans les prisons.

Il ne s'agit pas d'une « erreur » personnelle de Husak, d'un excès de Bilak ou d'un groupe « incontrôlé », mais des conséquences logiques de l'occupation soviétique. La seule différence entre G. Husak d'une part, et Indra-Bilak de l'autre, c'est que le premier pensait qu'il pourrait briser la résistance du peuple sans recourir à la répression, tandis que les seconds sont convaincus depuis le début qu'on ne pourra y aboutir, ni obtenir des « autocritiques » sans la peur résultant de la répression. Mais le but est le même : étouffer la voix authentique des peuples tchèque et slovaque et leurs aspirations à l'indépendance, au socialisme démocratique.

On sait que G. Husak a donné l'assurance qu'il n'y a pas, qu'il n'y aurait pas de procès « préfabriqués » et des arrestations en raison des opinions manifestées en 1968-1969, mais n'avait-il pas assuré aussi que « personne n'avait invité l'armée soviétique » ou bien « qu'il resterait ou tomberait avec le camarade Dubcek », pour affirmer tout le contraire un an après ?

« Les assurances » de G. Husak

La valeur de telles « assurances » a déjà été démontrée par de nombreux exemples connus — de la condamnation du général Pechlik en 1971 à celle du journaliste Lederer en février 1972 — sans parler des centaines de cas inconnus. Le ministère de la Justice tchèque a avoué, dans ses

statistiques, que dans la seule première moitié de l'année 1970, il y avait eu 506 personnes condamnées pour « activités contre la République ». On sait que, malheureusement, un ouvrier ou un étudiant a moins de chance de bénéficier à l'étranger de la publicité qui peut entourer la condamnation d'un journaliste ou d'un intellectuel connus hors du pays.

Si même une telle répression rétroactive n'existait pas, devrions-nous être reconnaissants parce qu'un régime qui se réclame du « socialisme » ne punit pas des dirigeants politiques ou des citoyens pour les opinions politiques qu'ils ont exprimées 3 ou 4 années auparavant ? Ces hommes politiques doivent-ils accepter volontairement la fin de leur vie politique et professionnelle alors qu'ils ne sont pas révoqués par ceux qui les ont élus après une lutte politique interne, mais renversés par une invasion armée étrangère ? Est-il normal de les contraindre à accepter en silence les accusations les plus monstrueuses diffusées publiquement contre eux et contre le peuple qui les avait spontanément soutenus ? N'est-il pas de leur droit et même de leur devoir de militants et de patriotes de se défendre par tous les moyens, de dénoncer les crimes contre leur pays, contre tout le mouvement socialiste et donc de parler à haute voix.

Et si ce droit leur est refusé par le régime, ils n'ont d'autre recours que de s'exprimer dans une presse clandestine — ce qu'ont fait tous les fondateurs du socialisme — et aussi dans la presse internationale. Devrait-on accepter des « lois » imposées par la force d'une occupation et considérer toute activité contraire à cette occupation comme étant « hors la loi » ?

C'est la force morale de Dubcek, de Smrkovsky, de Kriegel et des autres dirigeants ou militants du « Printemps de Prague » qui refusent « l'autocritique » et demeurent ainsi des symboles de la résistance, une alternative possible pour l'avenir. L'information est parvenue jusqu'à la presse occidentale que Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Kriegel et des milliers d'autres ont refusé de participer à la farce électorale de novembre 1971 ; un geste qui a sans doute aggravé leur situation, mais augmenté leur prestige dans la population.

Une opposition socialiste

C'est alors la seule vérité dans les « assurances » de Husak qu'il n'y aura pas de

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procès « préfabriqués », parce qu'il y a et il y aura des procès politiques contre une opposition politique réelle. Une opposition organisée ou spontanée qui — pour la première fois dans un pays de l'Est — n'est pas une opposition anticommuniste, mais une opposition socialiste.

Il ne serait donc pas juste de parler de la répétition mécanique des procédés des années 50. Car Slansky et les autres dirigeants exécutés alors n'étaient pas en opposition consciente à la ligne du Parti et c'est pourquoi on devait « fabriquer » cette opposition et leurs « aveux ». Cette fois, on arrête et on persécute des communistes, des socialistes, des patriotes qui sont consciemment dans l'opposition et qui se battent pour un socialisme différent de celui qui existe en U.R.S.S.

C'est aussi la raison pour laquelle il n'est pas possible aujourd'hui de faire des grands « show procès », car la plupart des accusés s'y défendraient ouvertement — à part une minorité qui se laisserait briser. Et le public refuserait de croire aux accusations, mais s'identifierait plutôt aux accusés qui exprimeraient ses sentiments. Devons-nous, pour autant, être satisfaits de ce progrès ?

Le schéma des procès

Certains faits, comme l'arrestation du journaliste italien Valerio Ochello, la campagne développée autour de ce « cas » par la presse officielle tchécoslovaque — et aussi soviétique — laissent prévoir la construction artificielle de futurs procès politiques, qui se préparent à Prague, à Brno, à Bratislava. Le régime, imposé de l'extérieur, ne peut pas accepter que les hommes de l'opposition agissent par leur propre conviction et s'appuient sur le peuple : il sent la nécessité de les présenter comme des « agents corrompus » dirigés « de l'étranger ». De là résulte le schéma :

— d'un côté, l'opposition intérieure qui prépare « un coup d'Etat » ;

— de l'autre côté, les émigrés tchécoslovaques qui envoient des « instructions » à l'opposition intérieure et qui, naturellement, travaillent « pour les services de renseignements impérialistes » ;

— enfin, les journalistes et touristes étrangers qui, comme « courriers », font la liaison entre les deux groupes.

Sur cette base, les oppositionnels peuvent être artificiellement condamnés non pour leurs « opinions politiques », mais pour leurs « activités criminelles ». Et M. Husak peut dire qu'il a respecté les « assurances » qu'il avait données...

On peut se demander pourquoi cette peur de l'opposition et des hommes proclamés plusieurs fois « battus » et « oubliés » et aussi si cette répression n'est pas en contradiction avec les efforts soviétiques pour la Conférence Européenne de sécurité. Il n'y a pas de contradiction, mais plutôt une logique de fer : l'ouverture vers l'Occident suppose la liquidation de l'opposition et de toutes les « dissidences » à l'intérieur du bloc, et le renforcement de l'hégémonie absolue de Moscou. Une opposition, même minoritaire ou « potentielle », exprimant des sentiments de la population, peut se transférer subitement à l'occasion d'une crise intérieure ou internationale qui transformerait « l'étincelle en grand incendie ». Cela est particulièrement vrai en cas de tension ou de confrontation avec un autre pays, comme la Chine Populaire par exemple.

Telle est la vraie raison de la répression actuelle contre tout ce qui ressemble à une opposition politique dans les pays de l'Est, et particulièrement en Tchécoslovaquie, qui est aujourd'hui le maillon le plus faible du bloc et où l'opposition est enracinée le plus profondément dans le peuple.

Brejnev, Husak et les autres dirigeants du néo-stalinisme savent bien qu'ils peuvent seulement affaiblir, mais non détruire cette opposition par la répression. Ils ont donc besoin de la complicité de l'opinion publique occidentale pour étouffer la voix de l'opposition.

Les vraies questions

Cette situation pose un dilemme difficile à certains, parfois même tragique et toujours inconfortable. Comment exiger, à juste titre, la libération d'Angela Davis et des antifascistes espagnols ou grecs, en se taisant sur la répression qui frappe des communistes et des patriotes tchécoslovaques ? Peut-on — à juste titre — demander le retrait de l'armée américaine en Indochine et ignorer l'occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie par l'armée soviétique ? Est-il possible de se taire par crainte d'être

taxé d'« antisoviétisme », alors que ces crimes discréditent le socialisme dans le monde entier ?

Les Tchèques et les Slovaques — et pas seulement eux — attendent la réponse de l'opinion publique occidentale à ces questions. Avec espoir mais non inquiétude ni angoisse. En attendant, ils continuent leur lutte avec obstination, car elle a ses racines dans leur Histoire.

Faut-il rappeler qu'en 1938 un homme d'Etat français, avec son homologue bri-

annique, ont sacrifié la Tchécoslovaquie à Munich, l'abandonnant à Hitler pour « sauver la paix pour une génération » ? Cette illusion — si ce ne fut que cela — ne dura pas plus d'une année. La répètera-t-on ?

Combien de temps faudra-t-il, cette fois, pour comprendre qu'on ne peut pas servir la détente internationale en étouffant la voix d'un peuple et de la liberté, et que la répression en Tchécoslovaquie est dirigée aussi contre tous ceux qui, dans le monde, luttent pour le progrès ?

GAZETTE DE LAUSANNE
10 February 1972

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Chasse aux réfractaires en Tchécoslovaquie. — III Obstacle à la détente européenne

● *Durcissement idéologique en URSS, arrestations et répression en Tchécoslovaquie, l'hiver en Europe de l'Est est décidément très rigoureux. (« Gazette de Lausanne » du 9 février). M. Husak, qui semble vouloir en finir avec les oppositionnels irréductibles, laisse la bride sur le cou à la police d'Etat. L'arbitraire du régime n'épargne personne comme le relate notre correspondant.*

(D'un correspondant pour les affaires de l'Est)

Le cas de Jan Bzoch, ancien rédacteur de la revue hebdomadaire « Kulturny Zivot », montre bien quelle est la perfidie des accusations. Jan Bzoch a été arrêté sur le simple fait qu'il

portait dans sa serviette le numéro de la revue communiste italienne « Vie Nuove-Giorni » contenant la fameuse interview de Joseph Smrkovsky.

Fait alarmant, des hommes comme Vladimir Skulina, d'autre part, gravement malade, et Vaclav Prchlik, directeur à l'époque de Dubcek de la Section des forces armées du Comité central, qui vient d'être condamné à 3 ans de prison, sont soumis à toutes sortes de mauvais traitements.

Les derniers événements devaient servir d'avertissement au monde libre. Le jour même ou l'agence de presse CTK publiait un premier communiqué sur les arrestations elle com-

mentait également la réunion à Bruxelles de la conférence consultative des représentants de l'opinion publique européenne, conférence au cours de laquelle le chef de la délégation soviétique Alexei Sitikov, appuyé bien sûr par la délégation tchécoslovaque, demandait que l'opinion publique européenne soutienne activement le projet de mise en place d'une commission internationale chargée de convoquer une conférence sur la coopération et la sécurité européenne.

Il existe une contradiction manifeste entre la volonté forcée des pays du Pacte de Varsovie de convoquer une conférence européenne de sécu-

rité et la chasse aux sorcières à laquelle ces Etats se livrent chez eux. Un rapprochement et une détente authentique ne sont guère concevables s'il n'y a pas possibilité de garantir un libre échange d'informations honnêtes. Le renforcement du black-out sur les informations dans les Etats de l'Est et les persécutions auxquelles sont soumis ceux qui dévient, ne serait-ce que d'un pouce, de la doctrine officielle font que l'on peut se demander si les Etats du Pacte de Varsovie s'intéressent réellement à la sécurité européenne ou s'ils n'ont en tête qu'une nouvelle ruse tactique.

FIN

LONDON OBSERVER
12 March 1972

Czech purge as Husak blames Italian comrades

A. Czech dissident reports on a new Prague drive to crush the underground.

THE Czechoslovak leadership is seeking to connect the Italian Communist Party with the underground opposition in Czechoslovakia.

According to information from Prague, not only political detainees but even members of the Central Committee of the Party have been questioned about their personal and official contacts with the Italian Communists, who continue strongly to condemn the 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

This attempt to collect damaging evidence against the Italians may be a search for grounds eventually to demand the excommunication of the Italian Communists from the world Communist movement. The search could not be conducted without the implicit approval of Moscow or at least a group in the Kremlin.

For a Party leader who has constantly promised 'no political arrests,' Dr Gustav Husak, the First Secretary, has achieved the remarkable score of more than 200 arrests since last November's elections. In most cases, no charges have been laid. The group arrested in Brno, for instance, has been held for over three months although a new law allows detention without charges for only 90 days.

The pattern of the arrests is startling. It is not the non-Communists of 1968 who are being

arrested, but genuine socialist organisations labelled as 'counter-revolutionary' after the invasion—'KAN', the 231 Club, the Social-Democratic Party—has been held.

Some of those arrested are ex-Communists, like Hucbl and Sabala, both former Central Committee members; the journalists Karel Kyncl and Jiri Hochman; the historians Bartosek and Kaplan; the lawyers Samalik and Sochor; the sociologists Siklova and Kiofac; and the eminent ideologist Karel Kosik. The others are former students' union officials.

known for New Left views: Mravec (already sentenced), Jaroslav Jira and the well-known Jiri Mueller, who headed the Student Committee for Co-operation with Workers, created after the invasion.

The arrests are a bid to crush the underground, whose very existence proves that the official policy of 'consolidation' is a dead duck. But to Party astonishment, the underground continues to circulate leaflets and even regular bulletins in Bohemia and Moravia. The level of their information indicates that Party members and even secret sympathisers in the Central Committee are in touch with the opposition.

The secret police are trying primarily to unmask these sources of information. House searches are increasing, typewriters and mail are examined and loaded questions during interrogations prove that letters from abroad—even letters

from other socialist countries—are police (STP) is trying hard, so far fruitlessly, to find out how financial assistance to the families of political prisoners is being organised.

Even some members of the Central Committee, and close friends and relatives of President Svoboda, were not informed about the latest arrests. This suggests that a situation reminiscent of the 1950s is arising in which a small, anonymous and uncontrollable group within the ruling clique is usurping power. This group may be directed from the Ministry of the Interior and by Soviet advisers.

The dissidents will probably be tried by small groups, in trials given little publicity. Official statements will go on insisting that they are being tried for offences committed after 1968, hoping to placate criticism from Western Communist Parties.

The authority of Dr Husak has waned, but not vanished. The February meeting of the Central Committee was a minor victory for him: it discussed the economy instead of the report on 'political given a forum for his hard-line consolidation' which would have opponents like Bilak and Kapek. But Husak's harping on economic shortcomings—excessive increase in production costs, non-fulfilment of some areas of the plan, chronic emphasis on quantity at the expense of quality—was a partial admission of defeat.

Worried economists demand the installation of highly qualified

managers and the profit criterion in marked improvement in the next two years. They hint that 'the consolidation policy should not be allowed to impede this progress.' It seems that features of Professor Sik's old economic reforms are to be surreptitiously introduced again.

In the leadership there is stalemate, and apparently the warring factions have declared a truce for several months. For the present, no major personnel changes are to be made.

Moscow is still willing to support Husak as long as he can put the economy on its feet and keep the lid on the political crisis in the country. If the crisis boiled over, he would become dispensable.

It is sometimes argued that underground opposition is counter-productive because it undermines Husak and opens the way for the hard-liners. Such pragmatism may interest historians and Western 'experts on Communist affairs,' but the opposition feels it cannot afford to compromise on principles. The dissidents do not wish to degenerate—as Kosik put it—into a mere 'Czech- and Slovak-speaking population producing steel and grain,' devoid of political identity.

Those who protest publicly lay themselves open to arrest for subversion. Members of the opposition in Czechoslovakia want it to be known that it is protest by Western Communists and prominent left-wingers, above all, which might reduce the severity of the sentences on those now in prison.

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Victim of Prague's machinery of revenge

Vaclav Pravda is the pseudonym of a Czechoslovak journalist who was an orthodox communist propagandist until 1968, when he came out strongly in favour of Mr Dubcek's reform movement. In this remarkable letter to a friend in the West he explains how he came to change, why he will not change again, and what it feels like to live in Czechoslovakia today. The text has been edited and shortened, mainly to avoid easy identification.

Prague, January 16, 1972

Dear X,

At last I have managed to sit down at this borrowed typewriter. Even to own a typewriter is a luxury for criminals like myself because the police will always prove very easily that this or that illegal pamphlet has been written on a particular machine.

But somehow I feel I do not care any more. There seems no point in being a "good boy". The machinery of revenge for 1968 is working in the traditional manner. First they invent the guilt, then they stage the crime and order evidence and testimony. The judge and the prosecutors are instructed by the Party, and the Party secretariat fixes the length of the sentence and chooses the defendants who, anyway, were placed on prepared lists long ago.

It is true that in Moscow, and where necessary in Prague too, they promised the Italian and the French communists that there would be no political trials in revenge

care to have people sentenced not for what they did in 1968 but for "later activities".

You must understand that I have no idea what my fate will be. If I am still sitting in my house a month from now I shall not know why they let me sit here. They have already spent so much money on me that I feel they must somehow bring the whole matter to an end and get something in return for all that expense.

They check on any car which stops in front of my house, and every person who walks here is immortalized on film. The moment I drive away the boys step on their pedals and a convoy is formed. I have an escort to the food shop, the shoe shop, the butcher, the supermarket, the barber, the cinema....

By now I know all their faces, and recently I criticized them for all wearing the same type of sweater. Three times I was obliged to get lost, and I have an advantage here because of my excellent knowledge of the city. Now we have snow and the cold continues. There

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is no point in the whole thing. It must cost a hell of a lot of money. Surely they do not think I am such an idiot as to organize the overthrow of the Government when I have the police on my heels. Clearly I will do this when I am left alone.

In December and this month they struck at many of my closest friends. All of them had also been closely watched in recent months. Under some pretext even the driving licences of some of them were invalidated. One of them had a recurrence of ulcer troubles and was twice in hospital in January because his blood count is lousy and his liver does not function properly. Our great police force also follows my wife wherever she goes. Poor girl, on one occasion she noticed someone eyeing her and thought he was making passes at her, but not so; it was a comrade!

Now I have a special system for quickly destroying what is necessary when the police come. I know already what they are after and what they like to take. For instance, they take Solzhenitsyn from the libraries, so I have already sent these books to safe places. I have also removed—as all other candidates for the gallows did—all documents from the past era, all my correspondence, and naturally all newspapers and magazines of 1968-69, because that is what they always steal. All incoming mail I burn. There are, of course, some things I want to keep at home until the last moment, like drafts of letters and unfinished manuscripts, and my address book, which I have transcribed on to one little sheet of paper. All these things I keep in one place and they will be thrown into the flames the minute the first agent of the Holy Congregation shows up. We have begun to lock and secure our front door, which was not done here in the past. That gives me at least 30 seconds. I am only sorry I can never keep a whole manuscript here, for that means that working is no fun.

In the past two years I have also learnt to distinguish sounds. At night, for instance, I can distinguish the sound of a car which is going to stop from that of one that is merely slowing down. I can recognize whether a car stops at the front or the back door. It reminds me of the war, when I was a teenager and my father was arrested by the Gestapo. My mother cursed the Czech policeman who accompanied the Germans. He looked exactly like the present ones. I am glad that I inherited much of my mother's courage and strong will and that I managed to

overcome the kindheartedness from my father's side.

We all agree that the comrades from the secret police are worse than those immortalized by Hasek in *The Good Soldier Schweik*. We try to convince ourselves that we should not underestimate them, but it is hard not to. Certainly they will be able to organize perfect trials, like Bukovsky's, but if there were really an organized opposition, or even resistance, they would just pack up. But this is probably true of any political police wherever and whenever there exists that institutional absurdity a political party with absolute power which puts between itself and the population not arguments but policemen.

This brings me to some debates of the past. What was wrong with me was that I was biased in favour of the Russians. You know that I was very critical of the rigidity of their foreign policy, and I found their primness, prudery and exaggerated pathos ridiculous, but I always found excuses for all this simply because I wanted to. Perhaps it was because they practically saved my life and my father's in May, 1945. Also, I was born in a working class family. My recollections of life in the pre-war republic are negative, and it has taken me a long time to learn to understand it objectively. My father, by the way, was an old-time communist and always had a sober attitude, but I began to understand things only much later.

To be quite frank, I never felt that the post-revolution dictatorship should be a permanent arrangement. I could never convince myself that all that nonsense was necessary, but I had only a very vague notion about the scope and the methods of the dictatorship and its impact on the opposition. I was locked in my study and was interested only in the big world issues. I never really grasped what was going on in my country. Having had an injustice to a friend of mine put right, I thought that justice could always be achieved if one tried. I ardently believed that socialism was good, that the dictatorship was only temporary, that the horrible and limited apparatchicks would be sent to hell, and that people would again speak with human voices.

I refused to believe that this was the way the Russians wanted it. On the contrary I judged them by the few I met—the Khrushchev people—and I thought that they detested the spittle-licking Czechoslovak Communist Party.

slovak Communist Party.

Years ago I came to the conclusion that a democratically elected team would replace the idiotic dictatorship run by an established, incompetent clique, and that a political opening would have to be started in a situation when there was no longer an exploiting class. It took me a long time to understand that Khrushchev's fall meant a turn towards conservatism, because I was disgusted by his excursions into the cultural field and I was only sorry that with him the last human face disappeared from Russian politics.

I read Marchenko only last year, *The First Circle* and *Cancer Ward* only in 1969. But I had to be conditioned to understand all this, and only after the Russian invasion was I able to understand, or perhaps a few weeks before, when I began to grasp the scope of Russian pressure. Another influence was the Kolder Report and the Piller Report on the Prague trials (of the 1950s) which I read in full only in 1969. People who were gaoled in the 1950s spoke frankly with me only in June, 1968. That was a real shock for me. I realized that our type of socialism bore the same relation to my ideals as the inquisition did to Christianity. I remembered what my father said in February, 1948: "Now we are going to have socialism according to Stalin, and that will be no fun." At that time I thought this was heresy.

Now I am sitting here staring out of the window, and I realize that 30 years of my life have been wasted, I have used up my energy and my health in the cause of a great fraud. I never for one moment cherished the idea of emigrating. I feel I don't have the right to do that. I know I will have to go through it here until the bitter end, but nothing will rid me of my feeling of complicity. Mind you, I never had any position of power in the regime, but I peddled all that nonsense about a happy future at a time when millions were suffering, eating my daily ration of half a pound of salami, which any day was getting more expensive every year.

When people ask me now if I am still for socialism I usually answer indirectly: let the Czechs choose what they consider basic—that the right of choice must be guaranteed for ever. If I am ever allowed to write again this is what I will advocate above all. Democracy is basic. The Social Democrats knew this 50 years ago but we did not

understand it. I am assured will I claim the right to speak out on other things, and only if others are allowed to speak equally freely and frankly. If they are not allowed to do that I will shut up too. I have written gibberish long enough. Personally, I still advocate public ownership of the means of production as the foundation of social justice. In that respect I shall never change. I reject classical capitalism even if under it democracy is corrupted negligibly compared with under our bureaucratic dictatorship.

The whole nation is silent. It is a silence of a kind I have never experienced before. People are totally disgusted but at the same time there is surprising optimism. Most people pin their hopes on the European Security Conference, expecting that the Russians will be forced to leave and that once the regime has to face the people alone it will have to climb down a lot. The Mobile Guard is, it is true, being feverishly built up, but everyone knows what an unreliable element it is in our country. According to the experts the economy is going to the dogs. Sometimes I meet people who compare our situation with that of the 1950s, when Stalin was still alive. I do not think this is correct. For instance, look at my situation compared with the situation of communists ostracized in the fifties. They were completely isolated. The anti-communist majority had no reason to sympathize with them because it had no reason to believe in their guilt (how could we have believed in it?), and the communists and their fellow travellers were absolutely hostile to them.

Now the situation is different. During that one year, 1968, the whole nation

was built on that foundation. Rejection of the occupation and the dictatorship. Ninety-five per cent supported that. After the "restoration" only a small part of the majority was bought. The great mass of people cannot be bribed. They are the nation and if they accepted the new state of affairs it would be an act of suicide. This is why the leaders remain isolated.

When I enter a shop or go somewhere I have never been before, when I pick up a hitch-hiker, or when I hitch-hike myself, whenever I get among people I do not know, I have the great and rewarding feeling that people think exactly the same as I do. And once you get a little closer to the people you find they speak the same language. I have the great advantage that my views are publicly known, so that people who know my name immediately start speaking with me quite openly and frankly. This was a new discovery three years ago. I realized that for 20 years people had not talked to me honestly. I was flabbergasted how many people had rejected this regime from the very beginning. Now I know.

If there are any anti-communist sentiments in this country they emanate in the first place from what official propaganda calls the working class. There are among the workers, it is true, a few who for a few thousand crowns are willing to perform heroic labours, but the general situation is quite clear. If the Politburo knew the real thoughts of the class in whose name it pretends to govern it would jump into the lake. Or, more likely, it does know but we shall have to throw it in the lake.

The bourgeoisie's only support is the bureaucracy and even that is very doubtful except in the sense that the bureaucrats are always the last to sneak out and the first to shut up. But these people also know the facts from their figures and papers, and they see the economic mess, but of course it is better to spend the winter near the stove than to be sent with a shovel into the fresh air.

The technological intelligentsia has always opposed the regime. The intelligentsia of the liberal arts is a relative newcomer to opposition. So all the regime has got is the police, the officer corps, the managers and their deputies, the proper servants of the dictatorship. They have to pay people even for joining parades and waving flags. Otherwise the chief method is fear. Here methods are being improved. People are shown how large is the scale of things they should be afraid of. Nervous tension must be kept up. People are led to feel there is nothing they can be sure of. It starts with children...

I listen to the foreign broadcasts in Czech and I often feel that they do not have any real idea what things are like here. They do not seem to realize the enormous dimensions of this farce and how people are playing at Schweik. But probably this has to be so, once you have no direct contact.

I spent three evenings writing this letter. I hope it will arrive.

Vaclav Pravda

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May 1972

PEKING'S STAKE IN EUROPE

Last October a Radio Prague commentary, denounced the visit to France of Chinese Foreign Trade Minister Pai Hsiang-kuo as an example of China's efforts to obstruct a pan-European detente. According to Prague, the purpose of this visit (the first of ministerial level to a West European country) was to foment tensions in Europe which would "preoccupy the Soviet Union politically and limit the influence of the peace policy of the socialist countries." The broadcast also criticized China's silence on the Berlin agreement (September 1971) and the Soviet proposal for an all-European security conference. That this commentary should have originated in Prague (rather than Moscow which inspired it) was particularly appropriate, since the arrival in Europe of a high level Chinese delegation was directly related to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia three years before.

Until the end of the nineteen sixties, Peking's foreign initiatives were concentrated on the under-developed countries of Asia and Africa. Europe was not a priority area, although the Chinese made some attempts to cultivate potential East European dissidents following the Polish and Hungarian uprisings of 1956. By the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, China had close ties in East Europe only with Albania, while in West Europe it had diplomatic relations with France, the U.K., the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries. It was also in the process of developing commercial relations with West Germany. The Cultural Revolution disrupted these initiatives. Peking's excesses of this period strained relations with both East and West Europe. (For example, the British Chancery in Peking was sacked and burned in 1967.) China's stridently anti-Soviet policies made it difficult for any of the Soviet bloc countries to maintain close relations with Peking. And Tito was alienated by Chinese diatribes against Yugoslav "revisionism." All China's ambassadors in Europe were recalled at the time of the Cultural Revolution.

Alarmed by Moscow's aggression (1968) against its fellow "socialists" in Prague, as well as by the ideological formula which Brezhnev developed to justify this action, China began to adopt more realistic and flexible tactics in its foreign relations. The objective was to counter any Soviet initiatives in Asia; however, Peking was also concerned that the U.S. and the USSR would reach an agreement regarding Europe. Therefore, the Chinese moved quickly to improve their relations in Europe, giving particular priority to those states which they thought were trying to resist Soviet and U.S. hegemony.

At the time of the Sino-Soviet border talks and the renewal of the Sino-U.S. meetings in Warsaw (1969), China's approach to Europe became more active. The French were singled out for special attention. Great Britain, for its part, was no longer portrayed by Chinese media as a supine tool of Washington but, increasingly, as an independent European state seeking to resist U.S. domination. Peking lauded British efforts to join the Common Market and switched its line on the European 'community' to one of approval. (In early 1971 China inquired about establishing formal relations with the Common Market in Brussels.) It also became more circumspect in its support to European Maoist groups.

Although West Germany is China's most important trading partner on the continent, neither has yet agreed to establish diplomatic relations. Moreover, Peking has continued to oppose the Soviet concept of a detente between the two Germanys, as well as Moscow's demands for a pan-European security conference (which the Chinese interpret as an effort to break up West European unity and expand Soviet influence). Peking is also appealing to East Europe's anti-Soviet sentiments and its traditional fears of a united German state.

In East Europe there were also indicative changes in China's approach. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Moscow was threatening wayward Rumania with consequences similar to those suffered by the comrades in Prague, China publicly assured Rumania of its support and -- to make its point clear -- dispatched a high ranking Chinese official to Bucharest. Later, in 1970, Peking signed an aid agreement with Rumania, its first formal assistance to a Warsaw Pact country since 1957. During this period, China also put an end to its attacks on Tito, signed a ten-year trade agreement with Yugoslavia, and in 1970 cemented the new relationship between the two countries by receiving a high level Yugoslav delegation. (China has not agreed, however, to restore party -- as opposed to state relations with Tito.) In Albania, the Chinese continued their large scale military and economic assistance program. Chinese efforts vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc countries of East Europe (as opposed to Albania and the independent-minded governments of Yugoslavia and Rumania), have encountered strong Soviet opposition.

What are the basic reasons behind Peking's renewed efforts vis-a-vis the advanced states of East and West Europe? Obviously, the men who run China are not motivated by any altruistic concern for the well-being of countries they regard as unsavory capitalist or "revisionist" relics. First of all, there are sound economic reasons: China has admitted it needs access to the advanced industrial products and techniques of the West. Also, renewed diplomatic and commercial contacts with Europe are helpful in restoring China's image as a responsible world power. Above all, Peking would like to make sure that the USSR is confronted by a

strong and independent power on its western flank, since the more Moscow is challenged from this quarter, the fewer resources it will have to devote to the critical eastern frontier with China. Similarly, if the United States has to shore up its position in Europe, it may be obliged to curtail some of its Far Eastern activities which China considers a threat. For these reasons, then, China is encouraging both Europes to develop independently of the United States and the USSR, and is discreetly taking advantage of a changing situation to bring to bear its limited but growing influence.

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May 1972

CUBA-USSR: REVOLUTION AT THE SUMMIT

Next month Fidel Castro goes to Moscow. It will not be an easy trip for the no longer youthful dictator. Nineteen years of "revolutionary" leadership have taken their toll. When Castro and Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev sit down to review just where Latin America stands today and what changes they have been able to bring about in this portion of the globe, it would be understandable if Castro felt a little discouraged. Great changes are shaking the area from Mexico to Tierra del Fuego. But where can Castro point and say, "I caused this change?" Even more discouraging must be the realization, if he can bring himself to admit it, that Cuba's potential as a revolutionary catalyst is diminishing with each passing year.

In a lesser man the impact of this realization might bring with it a retrenchment, a lowering of sights. But Castro, as the Soviets have long realized, is unique -- egotistical in the extreme. His life style, as he showed in every phrase and gesture during his three-week barnstorming tour of Chile late last year, is active and aggressive, with wild swings in moods from depression to ebullience. At the start of his visit to Chile Castro tried to stay away from his usual revolutionary rhetoric and to give at least indirect endorsement to the Soviet doctrine that a peaceful path to socialism can be found in some countries. Few believed him. More typical were his reactions to the defeat of the leftist front in Uruguay or the overthrow of the leftist regime of Gen. Juan Torres in Bolivia: "Bourgeois institutions can never reform themselves and the idea of a peaceful road to revolution is a farce." Most recently Castro has been telling visitors to Havana that he believes the days of his friend in Chile, President Salvador Allende, are numbered since Allende has vacillated about smashing his Christian Democratic opposition and their middle class supporters.

Meanwhile, guerrilla movements that Castro has backed over the years in Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru and Brazil have either been wiped out or reduced to mere nuisances by the governments in power. And yet he cannot face fact. In Venezuela, for instance, after four guerrillas were caught by government forces in February of this year, their interrogation revealed that they were part of a group of Venezuelans who had been in Cuba since 1967 being trained in rural and urban guerrilla warfare. They had recently been dispatched from Cuba with specific instructions to form a nucleus around which other guerrilla groups

could unite in order to wage terrorism in the urban areas of Venezuela in the period leading up to the 1973 elections.

For the Soviets Castro's guerrilla adventures are a nuisance but not a serious threat to their strategic plans for Latin America. They have succeeded in taming him to the point where he will begrudgingly give vocal support to popular front tactics in some areas. A second factor is that, for all the dimming of Castro's luster, Brezhnev knows that he is still an important inspiration for Latin American revolutionary movements. In some instances the Soviets probably see positive benefits to be gained by letting Fidel play guerrilla. First, it gives Moscow a counter to the new threat they see from the Communist Chinese in Latin America. Peking already has (or will soon have) representation in Chile, Peru, Argentina, Guyana and Mexico. While the Chinese have demonstrated only the most correct behavior so far, the Soviets must be anticipating that their strongest competitor for leadership elsewhere in the Communist world might soon become involved in subversive activity in Latin America. If, however, Cuba remains the main source of training, arms, money and inspiration to the guerrilla and urban terrorist movements of Latin America, the Chinese will be to some extent pre-empted. Even though the Soviets have expressed doubts about the wisdom of some of Castro's involvements, they must be saying, "Better Fidel than Mao."

The essential difference between Castro and the Soviets when it comes to guerrilla warfare seems to be mostly a question of timing. The Soviets see the revolutionary process in a longer time frame. They believe that precipitous violence, such as Che Guevara's fatal escapade in Bolivia in 1967, can result in a strengthening of the forces of "repression" and severe setbacks for the left.

Bolivia today is still a point of contention between Castro and the Soviets. Their differences about it may figure in the upcoming Moscow talks, particularly in view of the Bolivian government's ouster of a large number of Soviets during April. Those who know Castro say he is absolutely determined to see a leftist regime take power there through armed revolution, regardless of the cost in time, money and manpower. They attribute his compulsion to see a guerrilla movement succeed in Bolivia to his inability to admit that he and Che Guevara were wrong when they chose that country as the point from which to launch a continent-wide revolution. The overthrow of the leftist regime of General Jose Torres in 1971 only enraged Castro further.

Bolivian exiles in Chile are now being marshaled by Castro forces to try again for the goal that Guevara failed to reach -- to communize Bolivia. Five months ago they set up an "Armed Revolutionary Front" (FRA) dedicated to the development of an insurgent movement in Bolivia and the overthrow of the government

of Col. Hugo Banzer Suarez in La Paz. FRA is made up of a conglomerate of radical groups including the Soviet-oriented Communist Party of Bolivia, pro-Chinese Communists, Trotskyites, and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The ELN is an organization of Bolivian and other Latin American exiles directed, trained and financed by Cuba -- and, if Bolivian suspicions are justified, indirectly by the Soviet Union.

Cuban intermediaries between the Bolivian exiles and the Chilean government work for the "Liberation Directorate" of the Cuban Ministry of Interior. This is a new organization which was broken out of the regular Cuban intelligence organization about two years ago to work exclusively on exporting the Cuban revolution. The head of this special group of Cuban Embassy officials in Chile is Luis Fernandez Ona, husband of Allende's favorite daughter, Beatrice. While personal relations between Allende and Castro are very close, Allende has tried to maintain a tight lid of security over both Cuba's involvement in Chilean internal security and the efforts of Castro to use Chile as a safe haven for guerrilla operations against neighboring countries. Allende does, however, understand the strategic value of using Chile as a base of operations against contiguous areas such as Bolivia. The Chilean President was told by General Giap of Hanoi, whom he met when visiting North Vietnam in 1969, that the reason for Guevara's failure two years earlier was that he did not have support bases in the countries around Bolivia to which to retreat if hard pressed.

While Castro and Brezhnev may find that they do not agree on supporting armed insurgency at the moment in Bolivia, they will have less trouble when they discuss Guatemala and Colombia. The tactics of the Soviets and Cubans towards these two countries run closely parallel. Both countries are run by conservative governments, both have had a history of violence over the years, and both now confront guerrilla terrorist movements. The pro-Moscow Communist Parties in Guatemala and Colombia are supporting guerrilla groups in the countryside and terrorist units in the cities with money that is received from Moscow as part of the regular stipend that each party gets. The Soviets probably figure that, given the special history of violence in these countries, if they do not permit the local Communist Parties to sponsor armed insurgents, they will lose most of their appeal to the young and disaffected.

Cuba has long maintained its own guerrilla groups in these countries -- the Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia and the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in Guatemala. Most recently, the Cubans have sent their own paramilitary personnel to work directly with the Guatemalan FAR to resuscitate from the blows being received from the Arana government.

Recent information gathered by the Guatemalan and Colombian governments shows that the pro-Cuban and the pro-Moscow guerrillas are meeting and planning strategy and tactics together, a little suspicious of each other to be sure, but nonetheless overcoming old hesitations. These two countries, where violence is already a way of life, may well be the best example of the concerted Soviet-Cuban "liberation" warfare to which other Latin American countries will be subjected in due course when "the masses have matured politically."

One sector in Latin America presents both opportunity and possibly problems to Castro -- and to the Soviets behind him. This is the social-minded, "progressive" military now in power, as exemplified in Peru and Panama, and perhaps (if is early yet) in Ecuador. The military junta in Peru and the hyper-nationalist general Torrijos in Panama both are determined on reform and have grudges against the United States -- to the point of strained relations with that country. The nationalization of U.S. companies in Peru's case and the colonial status of the Canal Zone in Panama's both have afforded Castro diplomatic openings to exploit. Castro has maintained quasi-diplomatic personnel in Peru as "earthquake relief advisors" ever since the quake in 1971. He has hopes that Ecuador's new military regime -- itself wrangling with the U.S. over fishing rights -- will follow suit once Peru breaks the logjam. Castro is maintaining close relations with Torrijos in Panama and is advising him on the canal treaty negotiations with the United States. These ties are prized in Panama as a counter to U.S. weight. At the same time, none of the three regions is pro-Soviet or pro-Castro in ideological or strategic terms. To a degree they are partners of convenience because their disputes with the United States offer common ground. Castro's (and Brezhnev's) problem is how to play these issues to "lock in" these regimes to their long-range purposes.

CASTRO TAMED
By Fred Stokes

The constantly rising numbers of Russians in Cuba, occupying more and more important positions, and always carrying their cameras and large briefcases, is the most typical feature of Cuba's existence. They dine in special places; they make purchases in special shops; they travel in special vehicles; and they hold special positions. According to the most conservative estimates, there are some 5,000 Russians there; perhaps as many as 12,000, if one counts the military personnel.

This penetration, though nothing new, has become especially intensive during the past 6 months, coinciding with the presence, in Cuba, of a group of special envoys and delegations assigned to discuss with Castro the specific terms for the continuation of the trade pact with the U.S.S.R.

Forced by the failure of Castro's attempts to industrialize the country to depend exclusively on the sugar industry, Cuba is now completely under the control of the U.S.S.R. Two years ago, the Soviet diplomat, Rudolf Shiliapnikov, who now resides in Caracas, was assigned to threaten Castro with the total stoppage of petroleum supplies from Baku, which would have paralyzed Cuba's sugar industry if Castro had not agreed to a certain amount of Soviet control over the country's administration. See, for example, page 1475 of Hugh Thomas' book entitled, Cuba, the Pursuit of Freedom. Since that time, the Russians have been exerting increasing amounts of pressure, with the support of Kossygin who, for several years, has been known in Cuba as "the man who insists upon collecting," a phrase that Castro himself let slip out in the presence of foreign journalists.

In everyday life, the increasing pressure to control Castro is felt in the harsh antipathy that now prevails in Cuban-Soviet relations which, up until a few years ago, were cordial. At first, when there were only a few volunteer Soviet advisers, a wave of sympathy arose; but now that they are being sent to control and direct, the Soviets have become increasingly bureaucratic. They are almost not on speaking terms with the Cubans, who react with sullen disdain. Even the military advisers live totally apart from Cuban officialdom.

Elimination of Castroites

Soviet pressure on domestic political affairs has taken the form of constant elimination of Castro's cronies, who are gradually occupying positions of lesser practical importance. Men such as Armando Hart and Faustino Perez Almeida have been removed from positions that bore some direct relationship to production and administration, and have been assigned as figureheads on the Central Committee. The Soviets' confidence has turned exclusively in the direction of the technocrats trained in the U.S.S.R., who are specialists of humble origins who returned from their study grants with the habit of obeying the Russians. Their confidence has also been directed toward Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Raul Castro or Sergio del Valle, who enjoy a certain amount of trust on the part of Moscow, in high-ranking positions.

The Soviet Union's preference for Carlos Rafael Rodriguez damaged Moscow's good relations with Dorticos. The latter, who at one time was the favorite of the Soviets, chose to remain loyal to Castro at the time of the friction between the two governments. The consequences are that he has lost the complete confidence of the new owner of Cuba's sugar industry, Kosygin.

The presence of the Soviets in the economy and in intermediate positions is even more evident. Since Kosygin's second visit and the ratification of the trade agreement between Cuba and the U.S.S.R., all the nation's administrative posts now have their built-in "Russian." All the sugar refineries have a Soviet administrative expert controlling their expenditures. During January 1972 alone, four key Soviet missions, headed by General Nikolay Shchelokov, the U.S.S.R.'s Minister of Internal Affairs, and, another, by Andrey Kirilenko, from the Central Committee's Political Bureau, toured Cuba to ascertain the efficacy of these controls. The other two delegations were headed by the Central Committee's Deputy Chief of Propaganda, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, and Lieutenant General Leonid Batrushevich, from the political directorate of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.

Following these visits, which checked the efficiency of Soviet penetration into all areas (the economy, education and the Army), a veritable wave of high-ranking experts practically took over the Cuban Central Planning Junta, the National Bank and the Ministry of the Sugar Industry. And, simultaneously, a series of agreements on technical cooperation which had been suspended for several months, were signed, with additional changes, and went into effect.

It is difficult to determine to what extent the Soviet pressure will succeed in subduing Castro, in whose view the Russians hold only a secondary figurehead status, without any real authority, but who has kept the support of his own internationally advertised image that is practically impossible to tarnish without a collapse of the regime.

Rise of the Pro-Soviets

However, the Russians are even taking an active part in the affairs of internal repression, protecting their own, and eliminating those who are opposed to Soviet influence. For example, there are specific reports that, during Castro's visit to Chile, over 50 individuals who had been arrested in connection with the case of the pro-Soviet "micro-faction," headed by Anibal Escalante, were released as a result of pressure from the Russians and orders from Raul Castro himself. These men, the "Anibalistas" of the so-called micro-faction, had been given long sentences of forced labor; and the principal charge was that they were "pro-Russian." All, or nearly all of them were old Communist militants who, faced with the choice of obeying Castro or the Russians, had decided in favor of the latter. Two years ago, Castro could have repressed and imprisoned them. Their release and return to industries and positions is like the omen of an about-face that Castro cannot prevent.

Those fond of impressive talk see in all this an act of submission by Castro to Moscow; but, in fact, all that is involved is acceptance of the fact of the failure of Cuba's economy. Che Guevara, opposing Castro, maintained that Cuba must be industrialized, at any cost. However, the inefficiency of the regime, Castro's madness and the paltriness of Soviet aid brought the industrialization effort to disaster. It has, by now, been

At the start of the revolution, Camilo Cienfuegos, who foresaw the problems involved in drastic change, tried to defend the theory of a democratic revolution that would not break off relations with the rest of the continent; but Camilo died under mysterious circumstances.

The result is that, 13 years after his rise to power, Castro is dependent upon sugar, just as all Cuban rulers in the past had to depend on it to support the country. Hence, the fruit of these 13 years has been just a change in masters. Many Cubans are of the opinion that the only thing which makes the new master different is that, not only is he poorer, but more gloomy and aloof.

Thirteen years of hard work, a million exiles, the loss of tobacco markets, the disappearance of tourism and the increased political repression seem too high a price to pay for such an insignificant and disadvantageous change. But no amount of pondering can now prevent more and more Russians from arriving in Cuba each day, aimed at preventing further waste and at controlling the economy, education and the Army on what Castro, but a short time ago, loudly proclaimed "free territory of America."

Meanwhile, the Russians have assigned Castro the role of sales agent in Latin America. A completely tamed Castro, who continues to play the guerrilla fighter inside Cuba, but who works in Latin America as Moscow's errand-boy, with the sole purpose of expanding the U.S.S.R.'s trade relations, and of destroying the Communist groups that are pro-Chinese, independent, or suspected of hostility toward the U.S.S. R.

BOHEMIA, Caracas
28 February 1972

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

Moscú ha sometido el "comunismo nacional", registra cada paso de la política y la economía cubanas y ha reducido a Castro al papel de jefe de ventas en América Latina.

Por Fred Stokes

El constante aumento de rusos dentro de Cuba que ocupan más y más cargos importantes, siempre con sus cámaras

fotográficas y sus grandes portafolios, es el signo más característico de la vida cubana. Comen en lugares especiales, compran en tiendas especiales, viajan en vehículos especiales y ocupan cargos especiales. Hay en el orden de cinco mil rusos según los cálculos más prudentes. Tal vez doce mil, si se incluye a los militares.

Esa penetración, aunque no es reciente, se ha intensificado en el último semestre, y ha coincidido con la

presencia en Cuba de una serie de enviados y delegaciones especiales, cuya misión ha sido discutir con Castro las condiciones específicas para la continuación del tratado comercial con la URSS.

Condenada por el fracaso de los intentos castristas de industrializar el país, a depender exclusivamente del azúcar, Cuba está ahora totalmente en las manos de los rusos. Hace unos años, el diplomático soviético Rudolf Shillapnikov, ahora

residente en Caracas, fue el encargado de amenazar a Castro con el cierre total de los suministros de petróleo de Baku, que hubiera paralizado la industria azucarera cubana, si Castro no aceptaba un cierto control soviético de la administración del país. Ver, por ejemplo, p. 1475 en el libro de Hugh Thomas, "Cuba, The Pursuit of Freedom". Desde entonces, los rusos han ido presionando más y más, apoyados por Kossygin, quien desde hace

Domesticado

varios años, es conocido en Cuba como "el hombre que insiste en cobrar", según frase que una vez dejó escapar el propio Castro ante periodistas extranjeros.

En la vida corriente, se siente la presión creciente por controlar a Castro a través de la ruda antipatía que rige ahora las relaciones entre cubanos y soviéticos, que hace unos años eran cordiales. Al principio, cuando los asesores soviéticos eran pocos y voluntarios, surgió una corriente de simpatía. Pero ahora, enviados para controlar y dirigir, los soviéticos se han vuelto más y más burocráticos. Casi no hablan con los cubanos y éstos les pagan con un hosco desprecio. Inclusive los asesores militares viven totalmente apartados de la oficialidad cubana.

ELIMINACION DE CASTRISTAS

En la vida política interna, la presión soviética ha tomado la forma de una constante eliminación de los amigos de confianza de Castro, que cada día ocupan puestos de menor importancia práctica. Hombres como Armando Hart, Faustino Pérez, Almeida, han sido separados de los cargos que tenían alguna relación directa con la producción o la administración, y asignados a puestos figurativos en el Comité Central. La confianza de los soviéticos se ha orientado exclusivamente hacia los tecnócratas formados en la URSS, especialistas de origen humilde que volvieron de sus becas con el hábito de obedecer a los rusos. Y también hacia Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Raúl Castro o Sergio del Valle, que en los altos niveles gozan de cierta confianza por

La preferencia de la URSS por Carlos Rafael Rodríguez ha golpeado también a la buena relación de Moscú con Dorticos.

Este, que en un tiempo era el favorito de los soviéticos, prefirió mantenerse fiel a Castro durante las fricciones entre ambos gobiernos. El resultado es que ha perdido toda la confianza del nuevo propietario del azúcar cubano, Kosigyn.

En la economía y los puestos intermedios, la presencia soviética es todavía más notable.

A partir de la segunda visita de Kosigyn y de la ratificación del acuerdo comercial entre Cuba y la URSS, todos los puestos administrativos del país tienen ahora su "ruso" incrustado. Todos los centrales azucareros tienen su experto soviético en administración llevando el control de los gastos. Sólo en enero de 1972, cuatro misiones soviéticas de importancia, encabezadas por el General Nikolai Shchelokov, Ministro de Asuntos Interiores de la URSS y otra por Andrei Kirilenko, del Buró Político del CC, recorrieron Cuba para comprobar la eficacia de esos controles. Las otras dos delegaciones fueron encabezadas por el Diputado Jefe de Propaganda del CC, Yuri Aleksandrovitch, y por el Teniente General Leonid Batrushevitch, del directorio político de las Fuerzas Armadas de la URSS.

Posteriormente a esas visitas, que controlaron la eficiencia de la penetración soviética en todos los renglones —la economía, la educación y el ejército— una verdadera oleada de técnicos de alto nivel ocupó prácticamente la Junta Central de Planificación de Cuba, el Banco Nacional y, el Ministerio de la Industria Azucarera. Y simultáneamente, una serie de acuerdos de cooperación técnica que llevaban varios meses suspendidos, fueron firmados con nuevas modificaciones y comenzaron a funcionar.

Es difícil determinar hasta qué punto la presión soviética podrá

doblegar a Castro, para quien los rusos sólo reservan un papel secundario de figurón sin autoridad real, pero que conserva el respaldo de su propia imagen internacionalmente divulgada y prácticamente imposible de desvirtuar sin que el régimen sufra un colapso.

AUGE DE LOS PRO SOVIETICOS

Pero inclusive en los asuntos de la represión interior, los rusos están participando activamente, protegiendo a los suyos y eliminando a los que se resisten a la influencia soviética. Por ejemplo, hay noticias concretas de que, durante la visita de Castro a Chile, más de cincuenta detenidos por el caso de la "micro facción" pro-soviética, que encabezaba Anibal Escalante fueron liberados por presiones rusas y órdenes del propio Raúl Castro. Estos hombres, los "anibalistas" de la llamada micro-facción, habían sido condenados a largas penas con trabajo forzado, y la acusación principal era la de "pro-rusos". Todos, o casi todos, eran viejos militantes comunistas que ante la alternativa de obedecer a Castro o a los rusos, se habían decidido por lo segundo. Hace dos años, Castro pudo dominarlos y encarcelarlos. Su liberación y retorno a las industrias y cargos, es como el signo de un viraje que Castro no puede impedir.

Los partidarios de las grandes palabras sonoras, ven en todo esto un acto de sumisión de Castro a Moscú, pero en la práctica, se trata sólo de la aceptación del hecho del fracaso de la economía cubana. Frente a Castro, el Ché Guevara, sostuvo la necesidad de industrializar a Cuba contra toda dificultad, pero la ineficiencia del régimen, las locuras de Castro y la mezquindad de la ayuda soviética, condujeron al esfuerzo industrializador al desastre. Hoy

está ya abandonado y Cuba ha vuelto a la dependencia del azúcar. Al principio de la revolución, Camilo Cienfuegos, que preveía las dificultades de un viraje excesivo, intentó defender la tesis de una revolución democrática, que no rompiera con el resto del Continente, pero Camilo murió en circunstancias misteriosas.

El resultado es que, a los trece años de su llegada al poder, Castro depende del azúcar, igual como en el pasado todos los gobernantes cubanos dependieron para mantener el país. El fruto de esos trece años ha sido, pues, sólo un cambio de dueño. Muchos cubanos piensan, que lo único que distingue al nuevo amo es que no sólo es más pobre, sino que es también mucho más hosco y lejano.

Trece años de duro trabajo, un millón de exilados, la pérdida de los mercados para el tabaco,

la desaparición del turismo, la creciente represión política, parecen un precio demasiado alto para un cambio tan insignificante y desventajoso. Pero ya ninguna reflexión puede impedir que, día a día, más y más rusos lleguen a Cuba destinados a impedir nuevos derroches y a controlar la economía, la educación y el ejército de lo que hasta hace poco, ruidosamente, Castro, llamaba "territorio libre de América".

Mientras tanto, los rusos destinan a Castro el papel de agente vendedor en Latinoamérica. Todo un Castro domesticado, que dentro de Cuba sigue presumiendo de guerrillero, pero en Latinoamérica trabaja como mensajero de Moscú en el propósito exclusivo de expandir las relaciones comerciales de la URSS y destruir a los grupos comunistas pro-chinos, independientes o sospechosos de antipatía frente a la URSS.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 January 1972

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Cuba's Treasury Remains in Moscow

By GEORGE VOLSKY

MIAMI—"It is more difficult to govern than to wage guerrilla warfare," Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba remarked last month.

The remark pointed up the extent to which the former guerrilla leader is bedeviled by the task of governing, which in Communist Cuba means directing the country's economy.

The 1971 performance of the sugar-dominated economy of the island must have been disappointing to Mr. Castro, who recently suggested that prospects for an economic improvement this year were not very bright.

As a result, Cuba's dependence on Soviet aid—estimated at \$750-million a year, or more than \$2-million a day—became greater than ever.

"Without [Soviet] fuel, raw materials, equipment, machinery and factories Cuba could not function," the Economics

Minister, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, said last April.

Thus the size of Soviet aid, negotiated annually in trade talks in Moscow, has become as important to Havana as the volume of the country's production.

Last year, Cuba registered some gains in the industrial sector and in fishing, and continued to invest heavily in expanding output.

But agricultural production declined. Intensive efforts to revitalize the sagging production of rice, coffee, tobacco, cattle and fruit proved unrewarding. Strict rationing of food and consumer goods continued, and on a few items it had to be tightened.

More important, the 1971 sugar output of 5.9 million tons was a million tons below the target, and Mr. Castro predicted that 1972 production would be even lower.

Western experts believe that Cuba will produce 5 million tons of sugar this year. A recent Soviet purchase of 200,000 tons of Brazilian

sugar was regarded as an indication of Moscow's concern that Havana might find it difficult to fulfill its sugar export commitments.

Sugar is, and according to Mr. Castro for many years will be, the basis of the Cuban economy. It represents about 85 per cent of the country's exports, with nickel accounting for 10 per cent and tobacco 3 per cent.

Because of declining exports and growing domestic needs, Cuba's annual trade deficits have been steadily rising, especially her imbalance with the Soviet Union, which provides 60 per cent of the island's imports.

United States economists estimate that Cuban exports in 1971 totaled \$1.4-billion, of which \$840-million came from the Soviet Union, \$200-million from other Communist countries and \$360-million from non-Communist nations.

According to these estimates, in addition to \$510-

million in economic aid, the Soviet Union last year supplied Cuba with \$240-million in military and other assistance. In all, Cuba is believed to owe the Soviet Union \$4-billion, a debt that Moscow cannot realistically hope to collect.

While a shortage of trained personnel along with governmental inefficiency has adversely affected production, the main economic problem seems to be the apparent apathy of Cuban workers and peasants, who do not respond with the required enthusiasm to constant governmental exhortations for harder work.

Last year, which Mr. Castro called "the year of productivity," a campaign was ordered against what he described as "laziness, loafing, disloyalty, parasitism, selfishness and bourgeois mentality."

At the year's end, a Cuban radio commentator reported that despite the shortage of manpower "loafers are on the rise."

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WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
19 February 1972

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Cuba in the red ink



CUBA'S Fidel Castro may log some priceless tube time when he plays basketball in Chile, but it doesn't do all that much to refurbish his tarnished image. His big negative in most Latin lands is Cuba's terrible economic flop.

His country's total indebtedness to the Soviet Union is in the range of \$3 billion, with upward of \$300 million owed to other communist nations. The red ink grows every year.

Firm reports from the island say malingering and job absenteeism are worse than in any Iron Curtain country. Castro is searching rather desperately for non-material incentives to spur more and better work.

There is no sign these are broadly effective, and Cuba now applies a two-year jail term to those convicted of "vagrancy," which includes what the regime deems to be avoidable unemployment.

The government's control over the Cuban work force is both rigid and sweeping. Identification cards are required of workers. Chronic slackers may find themselves in Castro's "corrective rehabilitation" camps.

...
NOTHING so pointedly revealed Cuba's economic shortcomings as Fidel's all-out 1970 effort to reach the long-promised goal of 10 million tons of sugar cane output per year.

His hard lunge for the goal came after years of failure. In the attempt, he pulled thousands of Cubans away from other jobs into the cane fields, thereby seriously disrupting the entire economy. And even then he didn't make it. Production in 1970 was just 8.5 million tons. Thereafter, output slid back toward 5 million tons and the newest harvest may well fall below that.

To get just that much, Castro has to rely on manpower from the strong Cuban armed forces for 15 per cent of the year's harvest.

His moves to industrialize quickly have drawn people from the cane fields. Still, they lack the training and skills for the new work—not to mention incentives. He is also short of management talent, not least because of the exodus of 250,000 Cubans from the island to the United States in recent years.

WHAT all this adds up to is an economy essentially stagnant since Castro took power in 1959. Cuba's annual population growth has been averaging around 2 per cent, despite the

outflow. Economic development has not offset this growth. Measured in real terms (corrected for inflation), the country's gross national produce — on a per capita basis — declined 9 per cent from 1958 thru 1970.

For contrast, a study of 18 major Latin American lands shows that their real per capita GNP shot up by 24 per cent from 1960 to 1970.

Maybe all this will change one day. Cuba has poured large sums into capital investment. Roads, electric power facilities, and other "infrastructure" elements of the economy have been markedly improved.

But, again, American specialists looking at this effort do not find it being translated into significantly higher output. There are countless Soviet advisers and technicians on the island, but they do not appear to compensate for the out-migration of qualified Cubans.

Even Castro sees no real upturn until 1975. Against this gray backdrop, he's no hero in most Latin lands. Says the same official in summary: "The Latins are not impressed. And Cuba is certainly no model in their eyes."

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON POST
13 February 1972

CPYRGHT

Cuban Housing Cheap, Scarce

No Buying Is Allowed, Only Trading

By Marlise Simons
Special to The Washington Post

HAVANA — "Under the trees" on the Paseo del Prado is the casual address of a vital Havana institution: the open-air housing exchange. Every morning scores of men and women mill around in the shade by the warty tree trunks along the avenue, some pinning up notices, others reading them eagerly.

Officially, the Havana Housing Exchange is behind impersonal office walls nearby, but since Cuban newspapers carry no advertising, "under the trees" has become a classified ads section.

"We have only two children," one neatly typewritten message reports. "Will exchange house with patio for apartment in the center. Must have bath." Another

hand-scribbled note in red ink says: "Urgent. Offer apartment with view of the bay for house in West Havana. You can only see me on Sundays."

When parties come to an agreement, the exchange office must come into the picture to formalize the deal, which it does free of charge.

In fact, an exchange of this sort is all that house owners or tenants can do in Cuba, since the buying or selling of real estate ended with the Urban Reform Law. No one, according to this law, may own more than one residence, and no one need pay more than 10 per cent of his salary in rent. After 10 years of paying rent, a tenant becomes the owner of the property, which, of course, he can only exchange, a local official explained.

Despite the post-revolution confiscations and the distribution of the thousands of homes vacated by the massive exodus of refugees, Cuba's housing shortage is still very serious.

Havana, the beautiful capital which Premier Fidel Castro has often called too large and too costly for Cuba, bears the brunt of the shortage. Most of the spacious emigrant homes have been turned into schools, kindergartens and boarding houses for high school and university students.

The high-rise apartments, built shortly after the Castro takeover, went to the homeless and the squatters who traditionally ring Latin cities. Since then, building has been reserved or the countryside.

But even in the country as a whole, the housing projects of the revolution have been few, compared to the population increase of 1.5 million. Yet in the last few months since Castro announced the formation of "microbrigades" and the new national target of "building 100,000 homes per year," there are signs of a drastic change.

Some weeks ago, "Granma," the official daily of the Communist Party, counted 274 apartment buildings going up at the hands of microbrigades in Havana province alone. These brigades are construction teams made up of factory workers who take time off from their ordinary jobs. A factory receives suitable land and building materials, its brigades go off and build the homes needed by its employees.

The advantage of such teams, according to Castro, is that construction workers need not be taken away from such indispensable projects as dams, roads, hospitals and agricultural warehouses. The plan is workable, Castro told a meeting of union leaders, since a government study has shown that the majority of Cuba's factories are overstaffed.

Foreign observers have dismissed the ambitious housing program as another Castro improvisation that cannot be ef-

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ficiently carried out because of its size and the use of untrained personnel. Yet, at the moment, apartment building is moving ahead full steam.

In Alamar, a construction site some 15 miles outside Havana, the improvised micro brigades seemed no different from professional hard hats. Huge Russian trucks loaded with sand were driven about with great dexterity, and rooftop workers looked steady despite the breeze coming off the Caribbean only a few hundred yards away.

Now 66 Days

The 18 apartment blocks, four floors each, were in different stages of completion and the roads were finished. "Luckily, these brigades learned very quickly," said Enigdio Diaz, the 30-year old building coordinator. "The first blocks took more than 80 days, but now we are reaching the fourth floor in 66 days."

The 2,000 men and women at work in Alamar are divided into brigades of 30, supervised by trained builders and architects. "We have all kinds of people here, except for astronauts," said an official as he led the way into a workshop where men were soldering pipes.

Andres Regera, in blue overalls and covered with soot, said he ordinarily worked as an administrator in a Havana factory. He gets the same salary here as he did behind his desk, and his job is kept for him until he jets back. In the meantime his office colleagues have to do his share of the work.

Regera does not know whether he or other members of his brigade will be living in Alamar. "When the apartments are finished they become property of the factories," he explained, "and the workers' assembly will decide who gets them, depending on

individual needs and merits."

The first families are supposed to start moving in this month. Monthly rent, irrespective of the size of the apartment, will be 6 per cent of the tenant's salary. An additional 4 per cent of his salary will pay off the furniture, which comes with the apartment, including refrigerator and television set. Eventually he will own the furniture, most of which is built in the Alamar carpentry shop.

Neighbor Upkeep

When all of the 336 apartments have been handed over, neighborhood committees will be responsible for their upkeep. "With workers having made such a great effort themselves, we expect that the neighborhood will be well looked after," said supervisor Diaz.

"We do not want a repetition of what happened in East Havana, the new suburb built after the revolution. There the

people were given their homes for free, without any effort on their part, so they let the place crumble."

But for the time being Diaz's problems are to get supplies to finish the building. Most materials arrive without trouble though there are exceptions "like steel parts—tubes and sockets—that have to come all the way from Eastern Europe."

Food supplies for the workers are also sent by the government in Havana. However, Diaz explained, Alamar is finding its own solutions. "We have made a deal with the fisherman of Cojimar. We construct them a building, and they supply us with fish."

"But I'm not so sure now who has the better deal," laughed Diaz. "There has been quite a bit of northern wind lately and when the north blows you can build, but you can't go fishing."

CPYRGHT WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
25 January 1972

CPYRGHT

CUBA DIARY:

Havana stores are nearly empty

Mr. Berkow is the second accredited American journalist — and the first news service representative—to report from Cuba in nearly two years.

By IRA BERKOW

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HAVANA — In a large department store in downtown Havana, a "saleslady" leans vacantly on a glass case that is empty except for one pair of perforated black men's shoes. On the second shelf there is one box wrapped in colorful paper and a blue ribbon. There are rows and rows of such stark glass cases. The shelves are also almost empty. Few customers. You can hear their footsteps.

"We have money now in Cuba," she says. "But we have very little goods to buy."

With a few exceptions, only necessities are sold. Almost everything in Cuba, from cigars to shoe laces, is rationed. A copybook is needed for every purchase. I tried to buy a pair of socks and found that a foreign visitor can buy limited goods only at one of two stores (in hotels) in Havana. The buying population of Havana is split into groups, with one group able to make purchases on given days

SOME APPLIANCES

There are appliances in a corner of the store. East German-made radios, Soviet refrigerators and television sets. One television set sells for 750 pesos (\$750 — the U.S. exchange is "par").

Yet only a privileged few can buy these rare items: They are the people who have worked well and hard and long, have done much volunteer work in the sugar cane fields, for example, and, in a meeting of their fellow workers and citizens, are chosen as worthy enough to buy these luxury items.

For others there is a stiff black market. "To buy a 1949 Westinghouse freezer," says a woman who had lived in New York for two years in the early 1950s, "it will cost about 13,000 pesos. A 1958 Ford, 35,000 pesos."

On the narrow street there are a goodly number of cars, though there are no traffic jams. Autos are neither made nor sold in Cuba. Officials usually get cars from Russia, though Castro himself has a chauffeur-driven 1970 Alfa Romeo. Most cars in Cuba are Detroit-made from the 1950s. Chevys, Fords, Oldsmobiles, even an Edsel, are common; often the chrome is off, the paint jobs are ancient.

HEIRLOOM AUTOS

"But they run," says one owner of a 1919 faded-blue Plymouth. "I got mine from my father. I take care of it very, very carefully. It is like the baby in our family."

It is lunchtime. I stop in a store that was once a Woolworth's. The sign above the front door is still up, but looks shabby without the embossed lettering. It is called "El Ten Cent." The line is long. I wait 30 minutes before being seated. No menu. Everyone eats the same thing. Today: A simple roll, a soapy cream soup, a slab of a white fish topped with heavy cream, a hard red piece of chicken, rice pudding, a small cup of dark sweet coffee.

"No other choices?" I ask a workingman seated on the stool beside me.

"No," he says. I ask him if that doesn't bother him.

"No, no," he says, surprised at my question. Then proudly: "El Ten Cent has the best food around here."

NOT LIKE SEARS

The man once lived in Miami, he says. I ask him how he has adjusted to the scarcity of goods and choices in Cuba.

"It was hard at first," he replies. "I mean a department store here is not like Sears or

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Roebuck in the States. But you get used to it. And you are suffering now for your country. We know that.

"We do not have the consumer mentality here like you do in North America. We know that we cannot have the luxuries we like today because we must export clothes and food to import industrial and farm equipment. We look to tomorrow. Tomorrow will be better. We are in a revolution. A revolution takes time. Some of us have less luxuries than before the revolution, but at least now we know that there are no more starving children with big bellies filled with parasites, that there are no beggars in the streets, that everyone in the country is guaranteed work."

SOME THINGS FREE

He tells me that schools are free, phone calls are free, medicine is free, that buses

cost only five cents.

It has been 12 years since Castro took over. How long will people endure the lack of goods?

"As long as it takes," he says. "You first stop being, before you stop being a revolutionary."

Two blocks away, there is a neon sign above a tall building facing a broad, tree-lined street. The sign reads, "You first stop being, before you stop being a revolutionary." (Fidel says it often, I learn.)

I walk thru the neighborhood streets in the Veda-do section. On every block there is a shingle in front of one house. It reads: "Committee for the Defense of the Revolution." The "committee" is a kind of vigilante group composed of block neighbors. Blocks are part of zones. The committees, organized by the Communist Party, perform such tasks as providing two neighbors each night — men and women

— to patrol the streets, watching out for vandalism or fires or thieves.

CLEAN HOUSES

"Cubans are becoming some of the best actors in the world," says one man. "When it comes my turn to patrol, I sit around with another guy and shoot the baloney. It's like the volunteer workers in the sugar cane fields. People from the city are asked to go maybe once a month to the country to help. Maybe all day one person cuts eight sugar canes — and eats six."

I notice the houses. At first glance, they are shabby and peeling. But they are also neat and clean and orderly. Carelessness is costly, a luxury.

"We must be demanding," Castro has told crowds. "It is neither right nor correct to allow a pig to be raised in a bathtub in the City of Havana."

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Excerpts from article by Tran Quoc Hoan, North Vietnamese minister of public security, reviewing the carrying out of the party line against "counterrevolution" in North Vietnam:

HOC TAP No. 3
March 1972

During the past 40 years...our people have struggled and achieved great successes in the great Vietnamese revolutionary struggle, opening the finest era for our nation.

...During the period when the party struggled for power, the French and Japanese imperialists resorted to many wicked, cunning and ruthless tricks to destroy our party and quell the revolutionary movement. To protect the party and revolutionary bases, the party led the masses in struggling against secret agents, informers and other reactionary lackeys, incessantly checked and eliminated from the party ranks the "AB" elements (Footnote: "AB" is short for anti-Bolsheviks who disguised themselves as communists and were organized by the French imperialists as fifth columnists to undermine our party) and continually educated cadres, party members and revolutionary bases to firmly maintain revolutionary pride and preserve revolutionary secrets. As a result, the party and revolutionary movement were increasingly consolidated and developed and won one victory after another.

In the August 1945 general uprising, faced with the enormous offensive strength of the revolution, the reactionary forces were caught off guard. Driven into a passive position they declined quickly. Under party leadership the revolutionary masses ruthlessly repressed stubborn reactionaries and elements owing blood debts to the people, but were lenient toward those who went astray and sincerely repented...

After power was won our people were faced with the danger of having an enemy within and without, with the responsibility of coping with many enemies at the same time and with the extremely difficult situation of a newly established administration. But...our people's struggle against counter-revolution completely frustrated all of the enemy's sinister and wicked schemes and overcame a number of great obstacles as the people entered the protracted resistance struggle against the aggressive French colonialists.

In nearly 9 years of resistance against the aggressive French colonialists our people's struggle against counterrevolutionary elements occurred in all domains--military, political and economic--in all strategic urban, rural and mountain areas. Illuminated by the correct party line, the struggle against counterrevolution recorded great successes in protecting the party, the revolutionary administration, the people's armed forces, the resistance forces and the revolutionary struggle of the masses in the free areas as well as in the guerrilla base areas, thereby greatly contributing to the great victories of the resistance against the French colonialists.

After our people won in the resistance against the French...the struggle against counterrevolution became a broad, widespread mass movement, especially the campaign to motivate the masses to implement agrarian and socialist reform.

This struggle foiled all enemy schemes and sabotage...

The Northern people have unceasingly struggled against spies and other counterrevolutionary elements. They firmly maintained order and security throughout the time the U.S. imperialists expanded the war of destruction throughout the northern part of our country...

The line of struggle against counterrevolution is an important part of the political program of our party...

The imperialists have made use of reactionary members of our more elite nationalities to organize and instigate the underdeveloped masses in such a way that they, formerly giving no support to the revolution, turned against the revolutionary administration after the successful August revolution. The imperialists introduced many religions into our country to use this situation to sow disunity among our people and use the reactionary followers of these religions. They criticize communism, prevent compatriots of various religions from participating in the revolution and help the imperialists sabotage the revolution. The task of struggling against the reactionary clique which is using Christianity and against the reactionary clique of the more elite nationalities must be imbued with the party's policy toward religions and minorities and must be closely related to the satisfactory fulfilling of all tasks set by the party and state in these areas...

With regard to counterrevolutionary forces, especially foreign spies, we must use the absolute superiority of the revolutionary forces to resolutely attack them and promptly suppress all their dark schemes and sabotage. The absolute superiority of the revolutionary forces must be used to resolutely suppress all hostile sabotage of socialist construction....

The imperialists headed by U.S. imperialists have constantly sought and capitalized on all vulnerable points of the socialist camp and of the world revolutionary movement to launch counterattacks.

They have carried out combined measures and tricks--such as armed aggression, engineering of internal subversive riots and coups, economic blockade, psychological warfare, promotion of peaceful evolution...with the ultimate aim of eliminating the Marxist-Leninist parties, revolutionary power and the socialist system...

The imperialists' plots and activities are aimed at destroying our revolution through all acts and maneuvers, including armed aggression. To implement the imperialists' plots the counterrevolutionary clique in our country has carried out investigations and intelligence collection in the military, political and economic fields in order to study and evaluate our strength. It has carried out material and spiritual destruction with a view to causing difficulties and obstacles to the revolution, and has established secret bases in order to carry out destructive schemes, psywar, riots and murders of our cadres and to prepare its strength to overthrow the revolutionary administration and annihilate the socialist regime through violence or "peaceful evolution." The counterrevolutionary clique is camouflaging itself and infiltrating deep into our ranks in order to persuade, buy and corrupt our cadres

and to build secret bases. Its most common activities are psywar and counterpropaganda with a view to distorting all party and state policies and slandering our regime in order to reduce our party's prestige, to sow disunity and to kindle chaos among our people. It has actively carried out its activities in the military, political, economic, cultural and ideological fields anywhere and any time, especially when the revolution faced temporary difficulties.

Therefore the struggle against counterrevolution must be a struggle of the entire people led by the party and must be an overall struggle aimed at frustrating all the enemy's destructive schemes and plans in all fields. This is a continuous political struggle that accepts no "armistice" and no clear battleground...

In the period from its founding to the success of the August revolution our party led our people in struggling against the secret agents, informers and reactionary organizations--lackeys of the imperialists and the dominating colonialists--in order to protect our party, our revolutionary organizations and our revolutionary movement.

In the resistance against the French colonialist aggressors the tasks related to the struggle against counterrevolution consisted of effectively protecting the leading organs of the resistance, protecting the revolutionary armed forces, firmly maintaining public order and security in our free areas, contributing toward strengthening and developing the resistance forces and the revolutionary movement in the areas under temporary enemy occupation, creating conditions for liberating the temporarily occupied areas and firmly maintaining public order and security in the newly liberated areas in order to contribute toward victoriously carrying out the resistance.

At that time, the targets of our attacks in the liberated areas were all sorts of French aggressive imperialist lackeys such as enemy spies, informants, secret agents, bandits, commando spies, the reactionary clique that was making use of religion especially Christianity, the reactionary upper class in the highlands and reactionary parties and factions. In the areas temporarily controlled by the enemy, these were the Vietnamese traitors and reactionaries who collaborated with the French imperialist aggressors in destroying the revolution as well as the secret agents and informants who chased our cadres and destroyed our resistance bases.

During the days of mobilizing the masses to reduce land rent and carry out land reforms, the objective of the struggle against counterrevolution was to serve the peasants' struggle. The peasant struggle's targets--in areas where the movement to cut land rents and carry out land reforms was being conducted--were the cruel and stubborn landlords and despots as well as those who sabotaged and opposed this movement...

From Lenin's viewpoint, the suppression of counterrevolution...is a basic task to which great attention must be given. Lenin considered the organization and building tasks to be more important but he absolutely never considered the suppression of counterrevolution to be a secondary task...

Experience in building socialism in the Soviet Union, China and other brother socialist countries has completely testified to the great Lenin's teaching. The counterrevolutionary riots in Hungary late in 1956 and the "peaceful evolution" plot in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were also profound lessons...

There is an...inseparable relationship between suppressing the counterrevolutionary elements and the organization and building tasks. We do not consider violence to be an objective and an essential or sole method but when the use of violence is deemed necessary, it must be used resolutely and appropriately. Actually, in our dealings with counterrevolutionary elements in the recent past we have still entertained rightist thoughts and have not properly used violence. A great number of cadres and party members have been inclined to emphasize the organizational and building aspects of the proletarian dictatorship while neglecting the aspect of suppressive violence, believing it is no longer necessary...

In the socialist revolution in the north, our party held that "generally speaking, any person or organization that hates the revolution, sabotages socialist reform and socialist construction...or opposes the struggle for peace and national unification must be considered counterrevolutionary." In the process of socialist reform and socialist construction, a number of people, because they were deeply dissatisfied with their personal material situation, have performed counterrevolutionary acts against the revolutionary administration. The imperialist clique's spies are always the most dangerous for opposing the socialist revolution in the north. In the anti-French resistance we had to cope with French colonialist spies. Since 1954 we have had to cope with the spies of the Americans and their henchmen who are very perfidious and possess many modern means and techniques. However, to carry out sabotage against Vietnam, the enemy has to use his henchmen among Vietnamese reactionaries. The most notable of these are reactionaries who take advantage of Catholicism, who belong to the ethnic minority upper classes, who were members of the exploiting class in the old society or who are former local administrative personnel and spies. Because of the political and social conditions in our country, this reactionary force is not an independent political force. In various revolutionary phases they all have served the imperialists under one form or another. To have a force to carry out sabotage against the north, spies stationed outside the north must seek ways to collude with the counterrevolutionary clique remaining in the north in order to organize and have it sabotage the revolutionary administration. In the same way, to have a force to oppose the revolutionary administration, the counterrevolutionary clique inside the country must contact and receive aid from the imperialists' spies outside of the north.

This is a natural relationship between the imperialists' spies and the counterrevolutionary clique inside the country.

Therefore, in this struggle it is necessary to actively prevent and break all relations between the domestic counterrevolutionaries and foreign spies and deprive the foreign spies of their prop by eliminating all the domestic reactionaries and gradually abolishing the social organizations of which the reactionaries make use.

To what extent the enemy can carry out his scheme depends less on him than on us. If our people constantly heighten revolutionary vigilance and actively struggle against counterrevolutionaries they will be detected and properly punished and their schemes, no matter how poisonous and deceitful they may be, will be traumatically defeated.

WASHINGTON POST
14 April 1972

CPYRGHT

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
'Doves' Troubling Hanoi

AN ASTONISHINGLY tough warning by North Vietnam's internal security boss against a "counterrevolutionary" wave that may even now be affecting parts of North Vietnam has raised the specter of internal crisis resulting from Hanoi's massive offensive against the South.

Just how much the tough call for "repression" of all antiwar forces in North Vietnam is based on events actually occurring, and how much is designed to put party cadres on notice to beware, is admittedly somewhat speculative.

But the long and extremely specific lecture by Tran Quoc Hoan, North Vietnam's minister of public security and an alternate member of the controlling politburo, published in the March issue of Hoc Tap, the party's theoretical journal, hints strongly at the existence of grave home-front problems.

Consider, for example, these words:

"The counterrevolutionary clique in our country has carried out investigations and intelligence collection in the military, political and economic fields in order to study and evaluate our

strength. It has carried out material and spiritual destruction with a view to causing difficulties and obstacles to the revolution and has established secret bases in order to carry out destructive schemes, psywar (psychological warfare), riots and murders of our cadres (trained party workers) to . . . annihilate the Socialist regime through violence or 'peaceful evolution'."

In the past, the Communist government of North Vietnam has periodically been forced into draconian measures to put down revolt, particularly among the 700,000 Catholics, the montagnards (mountain tribes) and former small landowners dispossessed by the revolution.

Two such occasions came in the convulsive aftermath of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union and the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Both are referred to in the Hoc Tap article.

BUT TODAY, the sweeping directives to party cadres in Tran Quoc Hoan's draconian call to arms seem surely the result of war wea-

riiness coupled with fears that the main-force invasion of South Vietnam would trigger the strongest wave of antiwar fever yet experienced.

Thus, the interior minister's definition of "counterrevolutionary"—the first time such a definition has ever been published by Hanoi—includes "any person or organization . . . who opposes the struggle for peace and national unification" (as well as anyone against "Socialist construction" or the building of a Communist state).

What the publication of that definition of "counterrevolutionary" hints is that Hanoi is deeply concerned by the growth of North Vietnamese "doves." The message to party cadres: identify and punish anyone heard criticizing the war, because pursuit of the war for "national unification" of North and South Vietnam has equal urgency with building communism at home.

Moreover, the interior minister implicitly and

sharply rebukes party cadres for being too lenient with home-front dissenters.

"A great number of cadres and party members have been inclined to emphasize the organizational and building aspect of the proletarian dictatorship" (obviously by indoctrination and education) "while neglecting the aspect of suppressive violence, believing it is no longer necessary." In short, violent measures are needed.

Continuing, Tran Quoc Hoan writes that the object "in this struggle" is to sever all connections between "the domestic counterrevolutionaries and foreign spies, and deprive the foreign spies of their prop by eliminating all the domestic reactionaries and gradually abolishing the social organizations of which the reactionaries make use."

The clear implication: Hanoi is worried not only about counterrevolutionary agitation among individuals but among "organizations"—almost certainly including the Catholic church.

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May 1972

DATES WORTH NOTING

May 9	Geneva	25th Assembly of the World Health Organization.
May 15	Japan	Okinawa reverts from the United States to Japan, reestablishing Japanese sovereignty rights over islands captured during World War II. The Okinawa reversion points up the Soviet Union's refusal to return to Japan the Northern Territories it seized after declaring war on Japan in the last week of World War II when Japan was on the verge of surrender.
May 19	USSR	50th anniversary of the founding of the Young Pioneers (See article in this issue).
May 20 - June 1	U.S./USSR	President Nixon is to visit the USSR May 22-30, stopping first at Salzburg, Austria on May 20. He is to visit Iran on May 30-31, and Poland on May 31-June 1.
May 29- June 7	Geneva	International Labor Organization, 57th Conference and meeting of the ILO Governing Body.
June 5	Europe	25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany is to speak at Harvard University ceremonies commemorating Secretary of State Marshall's announcement there in 1947 of the U.S. offer of financial aid to European countries devastated by World War II. The aid totalled \$12 billion over the next three and one half years. Moscow forbade East European countries from accepting the aid and instead imposed upon them trade agreements with the USSR that cut them off from world markets, reoriented their trade towards the USSR, and limited them largely to a barter form of trade with members of the Soviet Bloc. As a result the East European countries were held back from participating in the rapid technological achievements realized in Western Europe in the 1960's. Now the Soviet Bloc finds itself economically and technologically far behind

the (West) European Common Market and is trying to demand the dissolution of EEC through front activities such as the Soviet-sponsored Peoples Assembly for European Security that is to meet June 2-5 in Brussels.

June 5-8	Munich	21st General Assembly of the International Press Institute.
June 5-16	Stockholm	UN World Conference on the Environment.
June 6	Bulgaria	25th anniversary of the arrest in the National Assembly of the Bulgarian agrarian opposition leader, Nicola Petkov, in the Communists' drive for total power. Petkov was hanged a few months later, on 23 September 1947.
June 11-12	USSR	35th anniversary of the arrest, secret trial and execution of Soviet Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other top Red Army generals in 1937. In the ensuing Stalinist purge of the army, about half of the officers, including all eleven army and navy vice-commissars disappeared -- an important factor in the Soviet Union's subsequent losses when Germany attacked in 1941.
June 12-15	Prague	Congress of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (national trade union organization).
June 12	Rabat	Summit meeting of the Organization for African Unity.

~~FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

May 1972

SHORT SUBJECTSSOME ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS:
A YUGOSLAV ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POLICY

The Yugoslavs have come up with an interesting and useful analysis of Brezhnev's 20 March speech to the Soviet trade union congress, pointing out the significance of Soviet acceptance, *faute de mieux*, of what Brezhnev describes as a Chinese offer to conduct relations between the two countries on the basis of "peaceful coexistence" rather than "proletarian internationalism." In addition to providing a succinct and accurate definition of the Soviet use of these terms, the Yugoslav commentary indicts Moscow for using the principle of proletarian internationalism to extend its hegemony over East Europe and, ironically, wonders why, since the USSR has recognized the independence and sovereignty of one socialist state, this should not open the door to other socialist states to build their relations on a similar basis. The Yugoslav analysis concludes that "simultaneously with the granting of coexistence status to China, the pressure for socialist integration... will increase in the socialist camp."

Janez Stanic's commentary in the Ljubljana Delo, 25 March 1972:

"At the Soviet trade union congress which opened at the beginning of this week, Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, unexpectedly made a major foreign policy speech. Following a whole series of important international events, including above all the visit of President Nixon to China, this speech represented the first Soviet reaction at the highest level. Although Brezhnev discussed all major problems in his speech, he actually introduced essentially new views on only two topics: West European integration, and relations between China and the USSR.

"The proposals which the chief of the Soviet party addressed to Peking throw a completely new light on those basic principles which Soviet policy has tried to follow in its relations with China. What is essentially involved here is this: Brezhnev is offering the Chinese relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, and not on the principles of proletarian internationalism. He said that the initiatives for building the relations between the USSR and China on the principles

of peaceful coexistence had come from official sources in Peking, and that the Soviet Union was ready to accept this if the Chinese leadership believed that it was impossible to build relations between two socialist states on the basis of higher principles, that is, on the basis of proletarian internationalism.

"To grasp the novelty and significance of this statement by Brezhnev, it is necessary to recall what peaceful coexistence and proletarian internationalism mean to the Soviet Union.

"According to the Soviet concept, peaceful coexistence is a model for relations between states with different social systems. According to these principles, the Soviet Union recognizes the independence and sovereignty of states with capitalist social systems, renounces all interference in their internal affairs and all attempts to influence their social systems, and develops trade, economic, and other cooperation with them exclusively in accordance with the principles of mutual benefit and interest. It is only in the sphere of ideology, that the USSR retains its right to a sharp and constant ideological confrontation and struggle.

"Proletarian internationalism on the other hand represents a model for relations between socialist states. It is based on the following viewpoint: the world is divided into two opposing camps, socialism and capitalism. Peaceful coexistence between these two camps is necessary because both are so powerful militarily that a battle between them would be catastrophic for both. However, this does not mean that an ideological and social rapprochement between them is possible because the capitalist camp is doomed to collapse. Of course, in its own struggle for existence, capitalism would like to destroy socialism, but is unable to do this because the Soviet Union is sufficiently strong militarily and economically to be able to defend the entire socialist world. Among other things, this also represents its first internationalist duty, whereas it is the duty of the smaller and weaker socialist states to support the Soviet Union, the sole bulwark of their defense against capitalist aggression. Since the Soviet Union bears the responsibility for the existence of socialism, it demands that other socialist states subordinate their own national interests to the

general interests of socialism, which essentially means the interests of the Soviet Union.

"Thus, the difference between the two models is that the Soviet Union recognized the complete independence and sovereignty of any state with which it develops its relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, whereas it demands subordination to the common interests -- which are primarily the interests of the biggest and the strongest, that is, the Soviet Union -- from any state with which it builds its relations on the principles of proletarian internationalism.

"Therefore, the offer to China to build its relations with the Soviet Union on the principles of peaceful coexistence rather than on principles of proletarian internationalism is equivalent to an official statement that in relations to China, the Soviet Union renounces its leading role and hegemonist policy. At the same time, this is also an admission that China represents too great and too powerful a reality to force it to adapt to Soviet wishes and needs as was done with Czechoslovakia in 1968. Thus, Brezhnev has offered the same relations to the Chinese that Nixon offered them recently, that is relations between two equal great powers unencumbered by any ideological ballast.

"This step is quite logical and had to be made sooner or later because all the ideology in the world is of little use if an opponent refuses to accept it voluntarily. It is impossible to force it upon him. Nevertheless, by its political consequences, this step is at least as far-reaching as Nixon's visit to China. Things have now been made clear within the great triangle: there are three superpowers which mutually recognize and respect one another and among which none is able to claim a leading role in relation to either of the other two.

"If we were naive, we could visualize more far-reaching conclusions; for instance, we could say that by recognizing the independence and sovereignty of one of the socialist states, the USSR has also opened the door to other socialist states to build their relations with the USSR on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Of course, this kind of judgment is completely groundless. China has not won its status as a "coexisting" state as a result of any Soviet good will, but rather because it is so great and powerful

that no other solution was possible for Moscow. We can call this realism. There was a great deal of realism in Brezhnev's speech, but nevertheless, considered from the Soviet viewpoint, this realism provides no grounds for any similar concessions where such concessions are not necessary. It is precisely for this reason that we can safely predict that simultaneously with the granting of a "coexisting" status to China, the pressure toward socialist integration and for relations on the principles of socialist internationalism will increase in the areas where this is possible to implement, that is, in the socialist camp."

* * * * *

FRENCH COMMUNIST DAILY ANALYZES WORK CONDITIONS IN THE U.S.

L'Humanite, daily organ of the French Communist Party, published between 18 and 28 January a series of seven articles on the American worker (available on request). The series was written by Jacques Arnault, a Humanite reporter who spent two and a half months in the United States interviewing laborers and union leaders. Monsieur Arnault was reported to have been surprised and pleased by his reception and by the frankness of his interlocutors. He has responded by presenting his communist readers with an unexpectedly balanced account of working conditions in the U.S. Although the author does not ignore the problems of contemporary American industrial life, he also finds many positive aspects, such as the high levels of personal consumption, the physical and social mobility, and the dynamism of the American economy. In applying a Marxist analysis to the American scene, the author notes that certain "contradictions" in American life have caused serious problems for the Communist Party of the U.S.A. Among these contradictions he includes the fact that most American workers accept the system and that genuine grievances tend to be taken up by the major political parties and incorporated in their programs. Reader response to the series has been overwhelmingly favorable, praising the objective reporting which has helped correct an erroneous image of life in the United States. In particular, French communist readers expressed surprise that there are white workers (and not just black) doing assembly line work, and noted with satisfaction that U.S. workers, although higher paid, still have the same problems and worries as their French equivalents. Readers also showed a greater appreciation of the complexity of the race problem and the absurdity of anticipating a Marxist revolution in the United States.

* * * * *

SOVIET-IRAQI TREATY

The persistent Soviet effort at spreading its influence in the Middle East took a dubious step in the signing of a treaty with Iraq, announced on 9 April during Kosygin's visit to Iraq. It is similar to the Soviet with Egypt without being so clear in its military clauses concerning military assistance or mutual aid in the event of hostilities, though in some respects it places the Soviets in a stronger position vis-a-vis its new treaty partner.

For the Soviets, it is the payoff for considerable financial aid to Iraq's oil industry, primarily for developing the North Rumaila oil field. Additionally the Soviets apparently intend to capitalize on this agreement to gain naval access to the Persian Gulf via the Iraqi port of Um Qasr.

The treaty is one more case of the Soviets' fishing in the troubled waters of the Middle East for their own ends, which, needless to say, are motivated not at all or, at best, incidentally by regard for the interests of the countries with which it deals. In the current case, for example, some observers see the treaty as a Soviet move to gain a second foothold in the area as insurance should its relations with Egypt deteriorate even faster, and also as a kind of pre-emption of Egypt's ambitions to be the prime mover in Arab affairs. The indications are that the USSR will seek some similar arrangement with Syria, again as a counter to Egyptian claims to exclusive relations with the Soviets and to hegemony in the Arab Middle East. The Soviets feel the need for a freer hand in dealing with Egypt.

It will be interesting to see to what lengths Soviet diplomacy will go in forthcoming months in its pursuit of improved relations with Iran, a non-Arab country which views neighbor Iraq's advances in the Persian Gulf with considerable suspicion.

(Evaluation and analysis of this new Soviet initiative are contained in the attached news articles and commentary on the treaty.)

NEW YORK TIMES
10 April 1972

SOVIET AND IRAQ IN 15-YEAR PACT

More Military Assistance
Expected Under Treaty
Signed by Kosygin

BEIRUT, Lebanon, April 9—The Soviet Union and Iraq signed a 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation today that provided, among other things, for the strengthening of Iraq's military defenses.

The 14-article agreement was signed in Baghdad by the Iraqi president, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and by Premier Aleksel N. Kosygin of the Soviet Union, who is on a five-day visit.

President Bakr said at the ceremony in the Presidential Palace overlooking the Tigris that the treaty would be "the solid foundation on which our relations will rest."

'A True Friend'

The 58-year-old Mr. Bakr, a leftist who has governed Iraq for the last four years, hailed the Soviet Union as a "true friend of the Arabs." He said the Arab countries were especially appreciative of Soviet military assistance and declared they were "capable of liberating their usurped land," meaning the territory lost to Israel in the six-day war of 1967.

Mr. Kosygin emphasized that the treaty was not aimed at any other country and that its purpose was to insure world peace.

Neither he nor the treaty referred directly to Israel, but Article 4 announced that the two countries "will continue their determined struggle against imperialism and Zionism and for the total elimination of colonialism."

Cooperation on Defense

Observers here believe that the use of the word "Zionism" might have been as far as the Soviet Union would go in publicly supporting Iraq's policy against Israel. Iraq, which is not now directly involved in the confrontation with Israel, has stood strongly against a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November, 1967.

Article 9 of the treaty said that it was "in the interest of the two countries that they pursue cooperation in the field of strengthening each other's defense ability."

The treaty did not spell out what this meant, but, to observers, it suggested further Soviet military assistance to Iraq. The Soviet Union has been supplying arms to Iraq's 150,000-man army and air force for the last 13 years.

Persian Gulf a Factor

Informed sources see the treaty as having most bearing on the Persian Gulf area. They believe that by emphasizing that it was not aimed at any other country Mr. Kosygin meant to reassure Iran, with which the Soviet Union has friendly relations.

Iraq and neighboring Iran are in a sharp conflict over influence in the Gulf and Baghdad, observers believe, will try to interpret the treaty as constituting Soviet support for its policy.

For the Soviet Union, the

treaty opens new horizons in the Arab world, these observers say. They expect that Soviet warships will soon be seen frequently in the Gulf as they are in the Mediterranean. The Iraqi port of Basra could provide Soviet warships with needed facilities in the region.

Firmly on Soviet Side

The treaty puts Iraq firmly on the Soviet side. Article 10 stipulates that neither country will join any alliance hostile to the other.

Until 1958 Iraq was part of the area's Western Alliance, then known as the Baghdad Pact. A military coup in Baghdad that year destroyed the pro-Western monarchy and began the Iraqi move toward Moscow.

The Soviet Union has already made inroads in the oil industry in Iraq, until recently a Western monopoly. Mr. Kosygin, who is to return home tomorrow attended ceremonies marking the start of production at the Soviet-financed North Rumaila oilfield, which the Iraqi Government had taken away from the Western consortium that exploits the country's main oilfields.

The treaty provides for greater economic and technical cooperation between the two countries, including the development of the oil industry. Observers predict a larger Soviet role in Iraqi oil if the Western consortium, the Iraq Petroleum Company, is eventually taken over by the Government.

THE ECONOMIST
15 April 1972

CPYRGHT

Iraq and Russia

The tip of the boot

Mr Kosygin cut the ribbon and the oil flowed. A little oil, anyway. On April 7th production started at North Rumailah, one of the oilfields expropriated from the Iraq Petroleum Company and developed with Russian financial and technical assistance. According to Baghdad, the first ship load is already in a Soviet tanker on its way to destinations in Russia or eastern Europe. On April 9th Mr Kosygin and President Bakr signed a 25-year friendship treaty, similar to the Russian-Egyptian treaty signed nearly a year ago. On April 11th a Soviet naval squadron began a five-day goodwill visit to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. Friendship is, indeed, a lovely thing.

The initial yield from North Rumailah will be about 5m tons a year. This is only peanuts compared with the oil that the IPC, despite the bitterness of the open-ended quarrel over expropriation, continues to export from Iraq. It is, all the same, a turning point—though the direction of the turn depends, partly, on the measures that the IPC's shareholders, an international group of major oil companies, may take in retaliation. Mr Saddam Hussein, Iraq's Baath party boss, claimed that with Russian help Iraq had at last managed to break the oil companies' monopoly of production and marketing. In response, Mr Kosygin rejoiced over the forced retreat of colonialists, capitalists and all such bad men. What it adds up to is that Russia has made a start in establishing a Middle East oil source. This, if it leads to larger operations, could be useful in helping Russia to keep up with eastern Europe's growing demands and thus releasing its own supplies for other markets; a project for transporting Siberian oil to Japan is, for instance, in the air.

But this is only one aspect of Russian-Iraqi friendliness. Iraq's great value from Russia's point of view is its superb geographical position: it leads

of rich, western-oriented states and kingdoms; it also outflanks the Nato and Cento positions in Turkey and Iran. True, Iraq is no alternative to Egypt; despite its repeated efforts to join some Arab club or other, it is too bottled up by its own power groups to have much influence on the Arab world to its west, let alone on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The importance of the Iraqi alliance is that it provides a foothold in precisely the position where it is useful, strategically and economically, for Russia to balance the tip of its boot.

Iraq's neighbours are playing the new development coolly, though the Kuwaitis have privately allowed their nerves to show. The Shah of Iran, who might have been the first to over-react, has been markedly restrained. Before Mr Kosygin descended on Iraq, the Iranians made discreet inquiries from the Russians, which produced an informal assurance that nothing was intended that might damage Russian-Iranian relations. The Shah, one presumes, is less than assured. But he may, uncharacteristically, be taking the advice of those advisers who believe that his recent boast that Iran would be the strongest military power in the Middle East within five years, and his preparations to this effect, are partly responsible for Iraq's turn to the Soviet Union.

The western powers have banked their money, and their arms, on Iran; Russia may now be deciding to put considerably more effort than before into building up Iraq. While the Iraqi regime is treated dismissively by many other Arab governments, it could well have a better chance of survival than most. The regimes now in danger of losing out are the ones that could be caught between a western-directed push from Iran and an eastern-directed push from Iraq. At the least, a new factor has been added to the edginess of politics in the Gulf—and beyond.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 April 1972

Oil—literal and figurative

Kosygin visit linked to cloudy Iraqi scene

Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin's visit to Iraq comes at a time of growing friction between the Soviet Union and Egypt, its major Arab-world ally.

The Moscow-Cairo clash over the quality and quantity of Soviet arms deliveries and over Moscow unwillingness to back any Egyptian military campaign against Israel has led Moscow to improve relations with other Arab states.

Premier Kosygin's visit demonstrates Moscow's growing interest also in Mideast oil supplies and in access to the Persian Gulf, observers here believe.

Mr. Kosygin and an entourage of high-ranking Soviet technocrats, including the Soviet petroleum minister, were met at Baghdad airport April 6 by Saddam Hussein, vice-chairman of Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command Council Baghdad Radio said.

The Soviet visit, apparently arranged on short notice, topped ceremonies in Baghdad marking the 25th anniversary of Iraq's ruling Baath Party.

Events coincide

It also coincides with the ceremonial start of production at southern Iraq's giant North Rumaila oil fields, which the Soviets are helping to develop.

Further, the Kosygin visit returns one made to Moscow by Saddam Hussein, Iraq's most powerful politician in February. It might lead to signing an Iraqi-Soviet cooperation and friendship treaty similar to that signed by the Soviets and Egypt last May, reports from Baghdad said.

After Saddam Hussein had visited Moscow, a Soviet-Iraqi communiqué predicted the nations would "embody in treaties" their interstate ties and "raise them to a new and higher level," the same phrase used by the Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda after signing the Soviet-Egyptian pact.

The Kosygin visit closely follows a new port call by Soviet naval units at Iraqi Persian Gulf ports. The gulf area's con-

servative rulers are increasingly worried about Soviet moves in the gulf and Indian Ocean zones.

A stride forward

The Baghdad government sees the April 7 North Rumaila oil field inauguration as a major stride forward for Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), the Iraqi-owned rival of the Western-owned Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC).

INOC took control of North Rumaila away from IPC following passage of a law in 1961. IPC's British, U.S., French, and Dutch shareholders have continued to contest the move and demand compensation from Baghdad.

Moscow granted to INOC loans totaling \$72 million to develop North Rumaila. Its oil production is expected to increase from an initial annual level of 5 million tons to 18 million tons.

Hungarian technicians are drilling wells. Czechoslovakia is building a new refinery in the Persian Gulf port of Basra, while Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany provide technical aid and equipment. Romania has loaned INOC \$35 million for industrial development, to be repaid by crude oil delivered over seven years.

Tankers chartered

INOC is chartering Soviet tankers until Spain delivers the remaining five of six 35,000-ton tankers it is building for INOC.

On the Persian Gulf, the Soviets are working in a joint venture to develop the Iraqi fishing industry in Basra. They have completed a drydock there and now are building a shipyard.

East Germany has promised to build a merchant-marine school in Basra and is constructing four large cranes to improve the port of Umm Qasr, used by Iraqi and Soviet naval units.

In Al Faw the other Iraqi Gulf port, the Soviets are building new oil installations as part of a pipeline system to export the North Rumaila oil.

CPYRGHT

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CPYRGHT

Russia Seeks New Friends In Mideast

By K. C. THALER

LONDON (UPI) —Russia is "diversifying" her alignments in the Middle East to safeguard her foothold in the area against any weakening of Egyptian dependability.

Iraq seems the latest alternative, amid signs that Moscow is aiming at a "friendship treaty" with that country's Baathist regime. Until recently Egypt was the sole Arab nation singled out for such close alignment.

(This article was written before Iraq signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union Sunday.—Editor)

The Kremlin leadership, steadily pushing its influence in the Middle East, in the past relied heavily on the late UAR President Abdel Gamal Nasser in whom they placed virtually unlimited trust.

Egypt then seemed the only worthwhile partner is the Soviet search for a permanent foothold in the area. The growing dependence of Egypt on Soviet military aid seemed to assure Moscow's objective: Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean and the eventual passage to the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet investment in Egypt is estimated at \$5,000 to

\$6,000 million over the past decade.

If the Arab-Israeli war constituted a heavy blow to Soviet prestige and undermined Egyptian trust in Russian dependability, the death of Nasser shook the foundations of the friendship between the Communist superpower and the defeated Arab nation.

Moscow accepted his successor Anwar Sadat, largely because it had no alternative. But Moscow's uneasiness has since grown into an apparent growing distrust of the Cairo leader. Sadat in his turn has shown little confidence in Russian credibility as a genuine, disinterested friend and partner, anxious to rally to the Arab cause.

Cracks in the Moscow-Cairo axis have widened lately, with Russia leaving Sadat in no doubt she has no intention to be dragged into a confrontation with the United States over the lingering Middle East crisis.

Moscow has shown signs of growing disappointment with Egypt's military prowess, despite the heavy Russian investment, and Cairo has displayed discontent with the Russians' coolness and criticism.

More recently the Soviets have been looking around for

other partners in the area, as a sort of reinsurance against any change in Egypt's posture toward the USSR.

There have been comings and goings between Moscow, Baghdad and Damascus, and latest reports suggest that Moscow has clinched a deal with Iraq which might become a major new foothold, if it came to a major crisis in Russo-Egyptian relations.

This is obviously planning ahead on the part of the Soviets, who are known not to take risks lightly and to reach for political safeguards wherever they see a chance.

This chance has now come to all intents and purposes in Iraq. A Soviet flotilla is on the way to Iraq's Persian Gulf ports, long a glittering strategic target and more recently made more important for Moscow in the light of its successful push to the Indian Ocean.

Important contacts are also in progress between Moscow and Syria whose strategic importance is considerable in the wider framework of Mideastern security planning.

Some diplomatic experts consider these latest moves a significant pointer to a major shift in Moscow's dealings with the Arab world.

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CPYRGHT

Moscow: still busy making friends

Alexei Kosygin's visit to Bagdad last week — the first ever by a Soviet Premier to Iraq — marks an astonishing improvement in relations between the two countries after a long period in the shadows.

The greater degree of cooperation between the two nations initiated during the February visit to Moscow of Iraqi "strongman" and deputy chairman of the Council of the Revolution Saddam Hussein, was consolidated last Sunday with the signing of a treaty of friendship and co-operation. There can be no doubt that this pact represents another success for the Soviet Union in its bid to strengthen its influence in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

The treaty is also an indication that the Kremlin, set on its guard by anti-Communist repression in Khartum and Cairo's momentary flirtation with Washington, wants to increase and diversify its alliances in the Arab World.

The text of the Bagdad agreement is virtually identical to that signed between the USSR and Egypt on May 27, 1971, except that this earlier pact spelled out greater involvement by the two signatories in the Middle East conflict, in the military sphere, and in constructing and defending Egyptian Socialism.

But if the Egyptian-Soviet pact falls squarely into the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the agreement with Iraq testifies to Moscow's concern with assuring its presence in the Persian Gulf, which harbours the world's largest oil reserves. In a transparent attempt to upstage China in this region and rival the United States, which is well established in Turkey

and Saudi Arabia, the USSR already maintains diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates.

It was unable to do as much with Qatar and Bahrein, but it does have a port of call in Aden for its warships from the Indian Ocean, while its fishing vessels sail at will through the Gulf, thanks to agreements with Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen. Some of these vessels on "special missions" have been sighted regularly at the entry to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

As part of its design to secure its position in the region, the USSR, while maintaining good relations with Tehran, seeks at state level to exercise a tripartite mediation mission — along with Damascus and Bagdad, whose own relations have improved — between Kurds and Arabs to maintain peace in Kurdistan. And finally to eliminate differences between the Baath and Communist parties so as to pave the way to a "national front" in Iraq.

Success of such a policy would be certain to strengthen the hand of the "progressive" Arab oil producers in their dealings with Western petroleum interests — particularly the Americans. The treaty just signed in Bagdad also represents an important card in the Soviet hand only weeks before the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow. Paradoxically, even though Saddam Hussein is soon to visit Paris, Europe, which is the main user of Iraqi crude oil as well as the petroleum products of the Persian Gulf, remains a virtual spectator in a part of the world that is vital to its interests.

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CPYRGHT

RUSSIA'S NEW ARAB OPTION

IRAQ HAS now signed what has become the standard form of defence treaty with Russia, which Egypt signed last June and India shortly before the start of the war with Pakistan. Russia is now strategically firmly based on the Persian Gulf, having lost no time in moving into the vacuum left by Britain's withdrawal. Last year the extremist and unstable Iraqi Left-wing Government, after pushing its traditional pretensions in the Gulf too far, was faced down by Persia, which is rightly taking no chances in the new situation. Iraq now has a Super-Power backer, and will seek to exploit this.

Mr Kosygin, in addition to signing the treaty, also celebrated Russia's entry into the Middle East oil business. He inaugurated the first shipments from the new North Rumaila field which Iraq expropriated from Western oil companies in 1960 and which Russia has since developed at a cost of £80 million. Thus Russia's long-standing campaign to get into a position to deny Middle East oil to the West now broadens out into getting hold of increasing amounts of it for herself and her satellites. A confrontation with the Western companies will now follow if she tries to market it outside the Iron Curtain.

There may be some flies on this double layer of gingerbread. Egypt will be peeved that its upstart rival Iraq is accorded an equal place in Moscow's comradeship. Syria will also be jealous, and even more suspicious of Iraq than at present. King Hussein, after Egypt's rupture of relations with him because of his Palestinian initiative, will feel that the ring of brotherly Arab malevolence around him is more dangerous. The result is to make a Jordan-Israeli settlement even more obviously a mutual matter of self-preservation and of political and economic advantage than is already the case. In fact the two keep in touch to explore the possibilities, which were made to look unduly bleak a month ago by Israel's calculatedly over-adverse public reaction to King Hussein's Palestine plan. The prospects should now be better.